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THE IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY
FOR THE LEGAL PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
N 1963 the University of Denver College of Law faced what was then
a novel question: "What is the relationship between law and the
behavioral sciences ?" As a first step toward finding the answer, we
called together a group of scholars and practitioners from the bench,
the bar, and the behavioral sciences to explore the question and to give
us some advice on what our institution could do to utilize the social
sciences in broadening legal education.
Our advisors told us that justice was really our topic and that
the subject dealt with the "[d3etermination of the controversies that
arise in society between man and man or between the individual and
the state in a way that takes due and proper account both of demands
of general legal principles and of the merits of particular concrete
cases."' We were told, of course, that
there is more to justice than this. Law is not a closed system; it lives
and progresses and gains its great momentum only when the passion
for justice is shared by all members of the society ....
[I]t is not
enough that justice be done. It must also be seen to be done. Persons
who come into touch with the functioning of legal institutions, [sic]
as jurymen, witnesses or parties, [sic] must be persuaded of law's right2
ness, must be brought to say: "Yes, that was right; that was fair."
Further, the College of Law was reminded of the
law explosion, the proliferation of controversies and legal problems of
range and number quite beyond anything with which an earlier legal
order has ever had to deal. To a limited extent, this law explosion is
a function of the population explosion: twice as many people, therefore twice as many law suits, twice as many offenses, twice as many
delinquencies.
• . . Contributing to the law explosion are the tasks created for
law administration by the vast and almost incomprehensible technological developments of this century.
1 Jones, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: The Case for Partnership,47 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y
2

109 (1963).
1d. at 109, 110.
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* * * Whether we like it or not ... the administration of justice is
no longer a handcraft like custom tailoring or cabinet making.3

We were also told that "this is a time of vast social change, a time
in which we encounter not only massive increases in population but
also new social conditions, new ideas of social justice, new and unsettling demands for equal opportunity and status."'4 Indeed, "law must
be stable, and yet it cannot stand still. If law stands still, it loses its
powers as a force for social stability.'' 5
Lastly, we were told that law must be responsive to social change.
Law, in a sense, has been a technology in search of a "pure science"
partner .... Social science insights and methods are there to be drawn
on for the improvement of legal institutions ... men of law must ask
the behavioral scientists to come over into Macedonia and help us.
Perhaps the greatest task the legal scholars, judges, and practicing
lawyers have in the years ahead is to devise patterns of colleagueship
...within which the subtle and disciplined knowledge and techniques
of the social sciences can be drawn on for the advancement of legal
understanding and the improvement of legal institutions. 6

The Chairman of the Committee of Advisors back in 1963 was
Dr. Donald R. Young -our Chairman for this conference. Under his
watchful and thoughtful eyes, some significant new directions were
given to legal education at the University of Denver College of Law.
Initially, the Administration of Justice Program, funded by the Russell
Sage Foundation, provided a base for curricular and research activities;
and very soon the idea of developing a partnership between law and
the behavioral sciences was accepted and began to spread through the
curriculum so that today social science concepts and materials are found
in most of our law school courses. An important medium for this grassroots development has been the appointment of social scientists, who
are not lawyers, to the full-time faculty as full colleagues of the legally
trained faculty. Presently there are four sociologists, an economist, a
social psychologist, a political scientist, and a theologian serving on
the law faculty along with their colleagues who hold law degrees.
The rationale for the conference of advisors in 1963 is recalled
today. As we pursue our tenacious commitment to the implementation
of a partnership between law and the behavioral sciences, we are
continually reminded of the equal importance of a pure science partnership - a slightly different twist on the 1963 summary observations
just described. Indeed, we find that the "law explosion" has a dimension
not specifically observed in 1963 - an explosion triggered by a sciencetechnology fuse; because for the legal system (which has repeatedly
been shown not to be a closed system) to be just, there must be due
3
4

Id. at 110.

1d. at 111.
5 Id. at 111.
61d. at 112.
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and careful account taken of the assessment of technology which science
has wrought. And technology has shown us certain ways for the older
legal system to convert technological handicrafts into that system.
Clearly, the effects of technological developments have underscored
the need for the law to be responsive to social change.
Now, 7 years after our initial explorations and subsequent deep
involvements with the partnership between law and behavioral sciences,
we, the College of Law faculty, feel compelled to explore carefully
and systematically the case for a partnership between law and pure
science, including its technological implications. Under the expert guidance of the same distinguished Chairman, Donald R. Young, and with
the able planning assistance of Professors John H. Reese, of our own
College of Law, and Ernest M. Jones of the University of Florida Law
School, we have gathered experts in science, technology, and the law
together to give us the benefit of their good advice. We need directions
for seeking another partner. While we think that our model for establishing a partnership with behavioral scientists has been a viable one, we
cannot be assured that the same paradigm is operative for incorporating
the knowledge of science and learning to assess its technology.
Our primary aim is to look at the directions which legal education
might take in view of the impact of science-technology and the need
for assessment. Hopefully, what legal education does, the law will do
also. Right or wrong, we feel that as an institution committed to
training future generations of law men (who will make, interpret, and
reform laws), we should be engaged critically and constructively in the
business of considering the implications of science-technology on legal
process.
It might be fallacious for us to draw on the experiences we have
had with the behavioral sciences. Yet, let me offer a few observations
about that program, all of which we may wish to challenge when we
think about interdisciplinary efforts which combine law, science, and
technology.
First, we have found the strategy of full and equal colleagueship
of non-lawyer behavioral scientists and legal scholars to be a most
desirable initial structure.
Second, we have found that introduction of experimental and
untested courses into the curricular offerings has been frustrating but,
over the long haul, productive. At least, students taking the experimental courses have begun to think in interdisciplinary terms and, more
importantly, to research and write in those new terms with the guidance
of social science teachers, both to the advancement of the partnership
and, we believe, to the advancement of knowledge.
Third, after several years of groping, we have learned that clinical
legal education plays an important part in the ultimate success of the
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partnership between law and the social sciences. While it was somewhat
unexpected, we have found that the real and lasting merger of interests
between law men and social scientists comes when real life legal problems are actually confronted, particularly in the area of the public
interest law suit.
Fourth, our students have observed - and we think it is partially
due to our systematic fusion of social science methods and knowledge
into the legal curriculum - that law is inadequate to handle all social
problems. In working with students from other disciplines, law students
have come to this realization. There is a great irony in this recognition
by law students that their intellectual horizons are broadened by working with students in other disciplines, an effect which might be described
as the "humanizing" influence of scientific inquiry on law and as the
study of the real world rather than merely the individualized case.
Science and its technology offers, we believe, great challenges to
law and therefore to the education of those who make, interpret, and
administer law. We called this conference to help us begin to chart a
course for a partnership between law, science, and technology at the
law school level, with the sincere and optimistic hope that we may build
another successful program to the end that justice shall be re-explored
and, through that re-exploration, improved.
Robert B. Yegge
Dean
University of Denver
College of Law

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY V. LAW, OR A
PLAGUE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES
BY

WILBERT

E.

MOORE

T

HE topic of our conference is sufficiently broad to permit us lots
of room to move around, perhaps to lose ourselves. My mission
in these introductory comments is, to change the metaphor, to recognize
that we do have a broad canvas and to seize a large brush and paint
with broad strokes. This means that some of my statements are bound
to be cryptic.
The title of this brief discourse may stand accused of being too
cute, as I intend to explore interdependence as well as conflict. Yet
the prideful and sometimes insular quest for autonomy on the part of
representatives of major fields of learning lends some credibility to an
adversary proceeding.
The participants in this conference represent a broad cross section
of natural scientists, technologists, legal scholars, and social scientists
not elsewhere classified. That means that our communications will have
to be interdisciplinary if we communicate at all. Now, the glamor of
interdisciplinary work, so highly touted a decade or so ago, has been
dimmed by its difficulty. Yet, the problems that face our civilization
are notably undisciplined. Some cooperation is therefore essential if
we have any chance at all for sensible solutions. But that requires that
some highly disciplined men also become interdisciplinary; one might
almost say that the desirable strategy is to develop an intellectual
specialty to a high level and then outgrow it.
In introducing the discussion of the interrelations of science and
technology on the one hand and law on the other, I want to attend
first to a couple of what I shall pretentiously call grand themes and
then to a few minor and major themes, concluding with an attempt to
put some of this discussion in the context of my own primary discipline
of sociology.
I.

THE GRAND THEMES

The first theme that I wish to explore concerning the intersection
of science and law may be summarized as the view of science as
innovator and law as conservator, or put even less tenably, scientists
as perpetrators of problems and lawyers as perpetrators of solutions.
(Clearly, I do not refer here to the scientific quest for the lawful
character of nature and universe rather to the relation of that enterprise
to the formalized custom, conventions, and procedures by which
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societies attempt to maintain a modicum of social order.) For the view
of science and technology as innovative and law as conservative there
is considerable evidence and conventional wisdom, but the case is not
untainted.
(1) Technologists often, and sometimes properly, stand accused
of "tunnel vision," of pursuing narrow goals and solutions according
to decisions made by others without regard for real social need or
merit. For some inventions the proper response may be "Who needs
them ?" or even "Shouldn't we prevent them ?"

(2) Even in "pure science" the innovations may be relatively
minor. If we accept Thomas Kuhn's view of The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions,1 much of scientific work consists of filling-in paradigms
until the paradigms will no longer serve insistent observations. Thus
science may be more or less locked in by current presuppositions.
(3) The conservative influence of law may also be exaggerated.
Against the undoubted importance of precedent in court decisions we
should have to set the influence of legislation, administrative decision,
and even judicial decision as agencies for the achievement of legal
change.
The second theme to be explored is the view of science-technology
and of law as autonomous forces. Part of this view is the myth of
technical primacy. That technology always leads and other human
concerns tardily follow is a belief widely held, and one widely admired
by technologists for that makes them leaders. The view will not withstand close examination. Though essentially accidental discoveries do
occur, we mainly get the technology that we deserve or are willing to
pay for: moon shots and dirty rivers, two-car families and congested
cities. A perhaps stronger case can be made for the leading position of
science as such; but here too, we must note that there is an interaction
between science and technology, not a unidirectional flow from theory
to practice, and that science prospers or barely survives chiefly in terms
of levels of support from all sources. For some time now scientists and
technologists have proved themselves less immune to or innocent of
the political process than their traditional protestations of neutrality
would lead us to expect. It would be far too cynical to allege that the
participation of scientists in the many discussions of science and public
policy reflects chiefly an interest in research budgets, but that concern
is one effective way of losing political neutrality.
The autonomy of legal systems is also subject to reservation.
Despite the sense by the legal fraternity that they represent an ancient
and honorable tradition, that tradition is subject to both disuse and to
reflections in the law of our current state, including our current
1

T. S.

KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

(1962).

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

1970

V. LAW

technical state. It is true that in the Roman law system (improperly
called the civil law system) there is a strong presumption that the
framers of the codes took care of all eventualities, but it is a presumption
conspicuously falsified by crucial issues in a changeful world. In the
common law system, judicial precedent (the doctrine of stare decisis)
is sometimes given similar credence as providing legal autonomy. But
decisions do change, albeit sometimes slowly, in large part because
the cases change as a consequence of changing social, scientific, and
technical circumstances. Indeed, if we take political and legislative
processes as part of the legal system, as I believe we must, the law
necessarily reflects the various pressures for amelioration and redress
of grievances as well as the changing balances of interests. But this
second theme was to doubt the autonomy of either science or the
law; we now rest the case.
II.

THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY AND THE

LAW: MINOR AND MAJOR THEMES.

In what immediately follows I am going to play the part of the
amateur lawyer, for as a law professor I am licensed to practice in no
known jurisdiction except possibly in the south basement of the University of Denver College of Law. In doing so I should like to note
briefly some substantive areas in law that conspicuously intersect with
technical and scientific concerns. Perhaps the most obvious of these is
the law of patents, a legal specialty long recognized by the legal
profession which has long pretended that it generally did not specialize.
The patent attorney, working with an inventor or with a technical team,
must determine whether the innovation in product or process is both
sufficiently novel and useful. As I understand patent law, some color
of utility must be claimed, and that could scarcely be determined on
legal grounds alone. A technical and even possibly a social input would
seem indicated.
Another clear-cut intersection of law and technology is that of
natural resources law. The legal interest is clear in real property law
and in such rights as arise in irrigation networks. But further, the
question of what constitutes natural resources also prominently involves
the current state of the useful arts, that is, technology.
Still another area of intersection is represented in traffic control.
The rules of the road are mainly represented in a host of administrative
regulations, and not a few of those are implemented technically, ranging
from safety inspections and radar traps for speeders to possible electronic controls for the spacing of vehicles on streets and highways. The
current scandal of automobile liability insurance and the overburdening
of the courts and the legal fraternity by automobile negligence (tort
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liability) cases are inviting institutional remedies such as no-fault
insurance, yet the proximate cause of this grave problem is the automobile accident, and accident prevention would seem to require a
combination of legal and technical innovations.
As a final substantive area of law for present illustrative purposes,
there is that somewhat abstruse - some would say nonexistent - legal
specialty identified as international law, including such clearly technical
fields as nuclear limitation, space law, and exploitation of the sea. To
keep science and technology national is virtually impossible, despite
security regulations and what I call the gauze of secrecy. This is partly
because scientists and technologists identify professionally and communicate with their fellow specialists. But, more importantly, similar
people working on similar problems will probably reach similar conclusions. Yet, if science and technology are predominantly international
- and they do indeed form part of a global system - law is not. Law
is predominantly territorial or jurisdictional, and that presents problems
for the legal control of scientific and technical innovation. Since we now
have a variety of ways of destroying the world for human habitation,
it would seem that some legal and technical ingenuity might be devoted
to saving it.
I next turn to a brief review of legal procedures for intersecting
with science and technology. The predominant one, of course, is that
of legislation and its creatures: the funding, research, and administrative
agencies. One need only note by example the National Science Foundation, the Office of Science and Technology, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, or the Federal Aviation Administration to call to mind
many others that rely on technical information and advice for carrying
out their missions. Some of these promote and some of them administer
and control, but the difference is not sharp, since the power to promote
is in effect the power to control.
Even the judicial process is of course not impervious to technical
information. One well-established procedure, though not exactly common, is the amicus curiae brief that presumes to inform the court on
matters relevant to a judicial decision. The appellate judges may take
"judicial notice" of such amicus briefs in rendering decisions.
A currently very lively but still controversial procedure is the "class
action" suit, perhaps most conspicuously associated in the public consciousness with "Nader's Raiders" (who have instituted few such
suits). Recent attempts to represent purchasers of allegedly inferior
or unsafe products, or citizens suffering from air pollution are examples
of such suits. Even esthetic suffering may provide a cause of action, as
it already does in zoning regulations. The problem of "bounding the
class" one supposes is mainly a legal and sociological problem; but,
testimony on the mischief complained of is mainly a technical one.

1970
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Before concluding the discussion of the intersection of law and
technology, I should like to refer briefly to law itself as a kind of social
technology practiced by professionals at varying degrees of proficiency
as well as by a variety of paraprofessionals, some of whom are
comparable to technical assistants. Whether law is also a social science
has excited animated debate in more than one conference, and I doubt
that it would be useful here to debate it again. However, I do have a
comment to make. One view contrary to the acceptance of law as a
social science points to the supposed contrast between the inquiring
mind of the scientist and the adversary or the litigious mind of the
lawyer. Yet when I observe the disputes among scientists, I am not
totally persuaded of the validity of the contrast.
III.

GRAND THEMES REVISTED

It would not do for a sociologist, who is supposed to be able to
relate anything to anything, to conclude without a small conceptual
exercise and a tiny view of sociological theory. Hence, I shall characterize briefly four sociological views of the social order.
Functionalism, which dominated sociological theory for a considerable time, might be succinctly summarized as the view that everything is related to everything. It was predominantly a static view of the
social universe and methodologically meant that the selection of independent and dependent variables could be nearly arbitrary.
Neofunctionalism might be summarized as the view "but some
things are more related than others," e.g., that economy, education, or
technology predict more similarities and variations in behavior than
religion or even law.
Dynamism, a clear outgrowth of neofunctionalism, attended to
intrinsic sources of change in systems, although it often operated on
mindlessly mechanical models, such as the social evolutional doctrine or
the doctrine of technological primacy (as though machines were selfinventing without the intervention of human skill and purpose). Yet,
more complex models of change do attend to unequal rates, to genuine
sequences, and to interplay among elements in the dynamic process.
Here again, I should reiterate that science and technology may be
lagging, not leading.
Neodynamism (a regrettable term used only for symmetry) argues
that we can alter the course of events by deliberate action, both in terms
of goals and, to a more limited extent, in terms of means and sequences.
Neither science-technology nor law is indeed autonomous and independent of human will and wisdom. Each is subject to human purpose.
In closing, I cannot refrain from quoting a quatrain from Fitz-
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gerald's first translated version of a portion of the Rubaiyat of Omar
Khayyam.2
Ah love. Could thou and I with Fate conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits - and then
Re-mould it nearer to the Heart's Desire?

2 RUBAIYAT OF OMAR KHAYYAM (ist ed. E. Fitzgerald transl. 1967).

COMMENT
By

I

HAROLD

P.

GREEN

AGREE with Dr. Moore that some of his statements are cryptic and
despite the fact that I have sometimes fancied myself as being pretty
good at cryptography, I do not understand some of the statements which
he made. I do not particularly say this is his fault, for, although I regard
myself as a social scientist with some knowledge of economics and
political science, I am abysmally ignorant of Dr. Moore's field of
sociology. In any event, I do want to confess very candidly that I lost
Dr. Moore about half way through his paper. I lost him when he began
talking about substantive and procedural intersections of the law with
technological and scientific concerns. But in that part of the paper
which I understood there is considerable substance on which I can
comment.
To begin at the beginning, the title of Dr. Moore's paper is "Science
and Technology v. the Law, or a Plague on Both Your Houses." I
think there may be areas of confrontation and opposition between
science and the law, but I think at the same time there are also areas of
cooperation, perhaps even symbiosis, between the two. I am not sure,
and certainly Dr. Moore did not make the case, that the area of confrontation exceeds the area of cooperation. Moreover, I am not sure why
we are visited with a plague on both our houses. It seems to me that
if there is something wrong with either science or technology on the one
hand or law on the other hand, instead of saying a plague on both your
houses, it might be more appropriate to say a therapy on both your
houses.
In Dr. Moore's exposition of the clash between science and
technology and law, he bases his concept of the clash on the notion that
science and technology are innovative and that law is conservative,
although he says that the case is not untainted. I think this point is
worth discussing and perhaps defining. To begin with, it is perfectly
clear that science and technology are intrinsically subordinate to law.
Law is the accumulation of all the enforceable rules governing the
conduct of individuals and individual entities in our society. Accordingly, the law must control and does control scientific and technological
activities. Science and technology can flourish only to the extent which
is permitted by the law, that is, by the legal system.
Now it sometimes happens, and indeed very frequently, that
science and technology do result in innovation. I do not think however,
that the law necessarily resists innovation, although in some cases it
may have this effect. For example, the present scientific and techno-
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logical developments in the area of amniocentesis may not be fully
exploited for the good of mankind because of the laws of the various
states pertaining to abortion. But, I think this kind of thing is relatively
rare. I think it is more accurate to say that scientific and technological
developments tend to disrupt the judical order. They have this disrupting effect because they pose new kinds of problems which do not
neatly fit within existing legal principles. When the law is confronted
with such disruptive influences, I think it is true in this sense that the
law may be conservative. It tends to look backward to find precedents
which it can use to deal with new problems.
On the other hand, I think it is very important to point out that
the fact that the law looks backward for precedents to deal with new
problems does not mean that the law resists the introduction of new
scientific and technological developments. Rather, I think it is more
usually the case that the fact that the law looks backward permits new
scientific and technological developments to flourish for a time before
effective social controls are imposed. Parenthetically, I might add that
Dr. Moore seems to talk about the possibility that in some instances
the law may not be conservative. I really do not think law which is made
by legislatures or law which is made by administrative bodies is any
less conservative than law which is made by courts. I think that legislatures as well as courts tend to look backward or at least tend to look
for experience to justify new legal developments.
Another of Dr. Moore's points which I do not fully understand is
his discussion of the autonomy of science and law. I do not understand
this point because it seems to me that law at least is not autonomous;
law exists for the purpose of being applied to other areas. The application of law to specific problems results in the growth and change of
the law as a result of the feedback which the legal system receives from
other areas of our society. Further, with respect to science and technology as autonomous processes, it is clear, as Dr. Moore points out,
that science and technology are largely dependent on the provision
of resources from external sources. These resources are in fact available from external sources only when those controlling these sources
believe that the scientific and technological developments which are
being supported will be in some degree useful.
I think a fundamental problem which we have to face up to and
which I do not think Dr. Moore touches upon is the relationship between
the benefits of science and technology and the risks these benefits
entail. It is very difficult to conceive of a beneficial technology which
does not involve some risk to the values which our society regards as
important. These values may lie in the area of health and safety, in
the area of privacy, in the area of human dignity, and perhaps in other
areas as well.
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Another fundamental problem is that it is possible to produce almost any desired level of technological accomplishments merely by
pushing the button on the money machine to provide the necessary resources to carry out what you want to carry out. When you push the
button on the money machine and produce a given level of scientific
and technological response, you are creating new problems for society
and new problems with which the law has to deal. But, I do not know
of any button which one can push on the money machine or any other
machine which will produce the requisite social wisdom or the
requisite change in law or the legal system.
Dean Yegge in his introductory remarks said, and I think this
is a direct quote, "[t]he law must be responsive to social change." You
cannot make the law responsive to social change merely by wishing it
to be responsive or merely by having the National Science Foundation,
the American Bar Foundation, or any other well-heeled organization
provide funds to produce this result. There are some very difficult
questions which are involved in this process of making the law responsive. Dean Yegge also said it is not his desire that this conference
deal with the ordinary techniques of lawyering. We are to be concerned
more with the role that the law schools and the legal profession can
play in finding new ways to formulate policies to deal with the revolutionary rate of technological progress which we are now experiencing.

COMMENT
By

MELVIN KRANSBERG

N a conference bearing on the implications of science and technology
for the legal process, I believe it is somewhat unfortunate that
the opening paper should pose a dichotomy between science and technology and law and, by interposing a versus between them, imply that
they are pitted against one another. I do not believe that science and
technology and the legal process are competing against one another.
Further, I am not very sympathetic with Dr. Moore's subtitle A Plague
on Both Your Houses.
In the first place, cursing both science-technology and law strikes
me as an exercise in futility similar to King Canute's attempt to command the tide. Second, although the title does justice to Dr. Moore's
unific knowledge of literature as well as his broad knowledge of social
forces, nothing in the text of his paper would seem to justify such a
castigation. On the contrary, Dr. Moore's paper proves, perhaps unwittingly, the opposite- that science-technology and law do interact
peaceably - and I infer from many of the things he said that they are
interdependent rather than competitive.
This result is not surprising, since science-technology and law represent cangeries of human activities, social institutions, value systems,
and methodologies. And Dr. Moore gives us several examples of intersection, but unfortunately not interaction, between these aspects of
both. He goes to a lot of trouble to prove that neither science and technology nor legal systems are completely autonomous, although each
views itself as being independent from external elements. I would like
to know not only how they impinge upon one another's autonomy,
but also how they both affect and are affected by the social currents
and values of such external factors as economic systems and democratic political institutions. Being a historian of science and technology,
I am perhaps hypersensitive to the ways in which science and technology help to change society and are themselves products of the
society vhich they change. My view of history tells me that science and
technology are powerful agents of social change affecting values, institutions, property rights, and, above all, individual lives.
One of the questions which emerges from this historical perspective is the degree of flexibility of our legal institutions and processes in taking cognizance of the changes which science and technology
help bring about. Dr. Moore has given us an example of clogged court
dockets arising from traffic accidents. I regard the situation described
by Dr. Moore as one created by the inability of the legal process, in
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the form either of legislation or of the practices of litigation, to
respond with imagination or with any degree of alacrity to the increase
in scale of the ownership and use of the automobile. The lawyers
proved remarkably adept at extending the laws and practices of the
horse and buggy to the automobile; and this simple extension from
the law of one technology now obsolete to a modern technology worked
when there were only a small number of automobiles and hence fewer
accidents. But, when that technology grew in scale and application the
legal process as constituted was unresponsive. The lawyers and legislators met the increase in the scale of technology by an increase in
scale of their own: the law schools added courses in tort liability and
turned out more lawyers specializing in personal injury suits; the
courts added more judges; and the legislators passed more laws. The
increase in scale of the legal effort did not work, so finally some people
had to come forward, as in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with
an entirely new concept of damage liability in the hope of getting the
jams of the legal process unstuck.
What I am suggesting here is that our present legal process is
neither imaginative nor adaptive enough to cope with the implications
of scientific and technological change; that a simple increase in scale
or adaptation of past laws might not be adequate to deal with technological changes; and that perhaps the legal process must begin to
take a look at the nature, mechanisms, and social consequences of technological change and respond in a more innovative manner in the
future - perhaps even foreseeing the social implications and taking
measures to cope with these beforehand, instead of merely reacting.
In a sense I am suggesting that what we call technology assessment
might include a component of legal assessment.
What particularly interested me regarding Dr. Moore's presentation is how science, technology, and law would fit into the four
sociological views of the social order which he described so succinctly.
Would, for example, the interpretation of the interaction of sciencetechnology and the legal process differ among the functionalist, neofunctionalist, dynamic and neodynamic views? If so, what are the implications for the legal process? In brief, I am asking what contemporary
sociological theories and methodologies have to contribute to our discussion of the implications of science and technology for the legal
process. Dr. Moore has tantalized us by implying that question, and
he arouses our interest still further by stating that we can alter the
course of events; but he ends at that very point - just where we would
like him to begin.
Finally, I must assume that the goals and processes of technology
assessment fit into the neodynamic view described by Dr. Moore. Since
technology assessment represents an area of activity and institutional
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growth for science and technology, it obviously has implications for
legal processes in the future. I should like to know what sociological
theory can tell us about the validity of the concept of technology assessment and what it can tell us about the merits and defects of the
various institutional arrangements and approaches to technology assessment which are now being advanced. Now I should imagine also
that lawyers should be interested in such matters as they affect the
legal process. I hope that Dr. Moore can help us find answers to some
of these questions which his stimulating paper has raised.
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SHIRLEY JOHNSON

MUST confess that elements of Dr. Moore's paper underscore the
theme of C.P. Snow's two cultures that physical scientists and social
scientists have a hell of a time communicating and that too often
when they do, they both end up with bloody noses.
In my first reading of some of my colleague's introductory broad
brush strokes depicting scientists in his first theme, as "perpetrators
of problems," "tunnel vision technologists," and "pursuers of narrow
goals without regard for social need" my blood pressure went up
more than just a little. On second reading, assisted by some tranquilizers, I progressed to his second theme that science and technology
are not necessarily autonomous forces. Whereupon I said, "Ah, how
beautiful!" Because, you see, I accept fully the second premise, and
therefore I do not have to go to the mat with my most distinguished
colleague. Incidentally, I am afraid I will come out a poor second on the
question of whether or not scientists or engineers are black hat or
white hat guys; and for the purpose of our discussion, it really does not
matter whether they are good or whether they are bad. What does matter
is whether society can control them; and I feel very strongly that it
can. As Dr. Green said a few minutes ago big science, because it consumes tax dollars, can be shrunken to tinker-toy size in a very big
hurry if legislators decide this would be in the best interest of the
general public.
Hence, technologists who translate science into goods and services
traded in the market place must be wholly responsive to the demands
of consumers and the laws of the land. What is tragic, but true, in
our social system is that the public gets what it wants; and it wants
high compression, 400 horse power automobiles with chrome and
without safety devices. It wants 27 electrical push button gadgets in
every home, and to hell with the fact that it consumes vast amounts
of power, eats up our natural resources, and pollutes the atmosphere.
How long is mankind going to labor under the myth that technology
has caused these problems and that technology must solve these problems?
On the other hand, any technological solution to the acute societal
problems of today is only temporary; for we are increasingly overtaxing
nature's ability to accommodate man, and a brilliant technical solution
today is antiquated tomorrow. We are, I believe, at a point in time
when man should no longer be lulled by the false hope that technology
alone can answer these pressing problems, for such idealism only puts
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off the day when man must come to grips with major moral and value
decisions and the body of laws to enforce them. Garrett Harten, a
biologist, said: "The population problem has no technical solution, it
requires a fundamental extension of morality." Weisner and York
commenting on the ABM arms race said, "This dilemma has no technical solution."
Continuing with Professor Moore's next theme, I certainly concur
that there are many points of interaction of science-technology and the
law. In fact, as you ponder this theme, you become quite fascinated
by the existing interdependence and by the possibility of greatly heightening this interaction. At this point the significance that might evolve
from this conference comes into rather interesting focus. It is a fact
that law can force technocrats, i.e., executives of technologically based
industries where decisions are based on consumer demands and economic constraints, to develop alternative solutions. We all know about
the California laws on automobile exhaust emissions which are forcing
the trade into many changes. Similarly, other states are forcing on
technocrats laws regarding energy absorbing automobile bumpers,
air-cushioned collision bags, and collapsible steering wheel columns.
Laws in all the states are forcing industries to do, in a few years, what
they have not previously been forced to do in a lifetime.
At this point I would like to refer Dr. Moore to a statement made
in 1928 by Albert Einstein: "Anyone who thinks that science is going
to make their lives a little better is an idiot."

THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
By

MICHAEL

S. BARAM

S CIENCE
and technology increasingly work changes in the complex
matrix of society. These changes pervade our

ecological systems and
our physical and psychic health. Less perceptibly, they pervade our
culture, our values, and our value based institutions such as the law.
In turn, our values and institutions shape the progress and utilization
of science and technology.
As we know, science and technology have provided society with
enormous material benefits and a higher standard of living and health.
But we now realize that this process has been accompanied by alarming
rates of resource consumption and many new hazards to ecological
systems and health.
Social response to these unexpected problems has been of a remedial
nature - e.g., how to diminish pollution through regulation and technology. But it must be repeated that our values and institutions shape
the progress and use of science and technology, and therefore the fundamental social response must be of a preventative or a priori nature to
the extent that this is possible.
This important task can be described as the need to formulate
coherent and humane social controls on science and technology.
Of course when we talk about science and technology, we are not
discussing discrete activities. We are depicting an interrelated number
of events which occur across a spectrum which ranges from basic
research through applied research and developmental technology to
application and use technologies.
Since World War II, events along this spectrum have been highly
dependent on federal funds. In 1969, approximately 65 percent of the
funds expended in the United States for basic research, applied research,
and development technology were provided by federal agencies. This
reliance on federal support provides some justification for public interest
in the social control of science and technology.
Most such social change occurs during the latter stages, where technology is manifested either in specific acts - such as organ transplantation techniques - or as part of a major public or private system - such
as nuclear energy or computer applications.
The most substantial expenditures and investments occur during
the developmental technology stage, after a number of important decisions have been made to pursue development of prototypes, production,
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application, and use. Of the approximately $17 billion of federal support
for research and development in 1969, it is estimated that $5 billion
went for research, and $11 billion for development. Production and
application activities undoubtedly involved billions more. Similar ratios
prevail in the private sector.
These investments must be recognized in human as well as economic terms, for it is during the development and subsequent technology
stages that large numbers of engineers, administrators, managers,
production and shop personnel, salesmen, and subcontractors commit
their careers, personal values, and families - ultimately their communities- to the specific technological activity or system. Therefore,
all subsequent social controls must consider this set of political, economic, and human factors which has been developed.
Numerous social controls on science and technology have been
developing and functioning over the years.
The table on page 569 suggests in generalterms what these controls
are and where they function in relation to the spectrum of activities.
The cluster of legal doctrines in the table all function during the
advanced technology stages, after decisions committing economic and
human resources have been made, and normally after injury has
occurred. By this time, fully developed systems and practices are in use
without coherent controls.
This has led to condemnation of law as a modern system of control.
As Jacques Ellul has said:
The judicial regime is simply not adapted to technical civilization, and
this is one of the causes of its inefficiency and of the ever greater

contempt felt toward it.
Law is conceived as a function of a traditional society. It has not
registered the essential transformation of the times. Its content is exactly
what it was three centuries ago. It has experienced only a few frag-

mentary transformations (such as the corporation) - no other attempts at modernization have been made. Nor have form and methods

varied any more than content. Judicial technique has been little affected
by the techniques that surround us today; had it been, it might have
gained much in speed and flexibility.
Faced with this importance of the law, society passes to the opposite extreme and burdens administration with everything that is the
product of the times in the judicial sphere. Administration, because it
is better adapted from the technical point of view, continually enlarges
its sphere at the expense of the judicial, which remains centered on
vanishing problems such as codicils, community reversions, and the
like. These last, and all similar problems that are the exclusive concern
of our law, are problems that relate to an individualistic society of pri-

vate property, political stability, and judicial subtlety."
In specific terms, the legal system has not interposed itself as an
effective control on science and technology; it does not perform a
control function early enough on the spectrum of events.
1J. ELLUL, Ti-E

TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 251

(1964).

THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF SCIENCE

1970

569

SOCIAL CONTROLS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Production,
Basic
Science

Development
Technology

Applied
Science

Application,
Use, Technology

Patents, Copyrights,
Trade Secrets
Torts

IMEM

Consitutional Rights

IMIM

Land Use
Consumer Protection
Experimentation
Private Sector
Industry-Consumer Markets
Industrial Associations
and Labor Unions
Insurance

...
: :::!:..*
. :::;
:::!:
:..M$..
. ..

.

;...

.Nom:?..

Crusaders and Citizen Groups
Federal Government
Executive Agencies
Programs
Congressional Action
Funds
Agency Classification

4 ~

4.

4

~.

..~,,.,,

t5..~

4

Regulation-EfficacySafety

'.:>

Scientific Peer Groups
Professional Associations

1L~1~ .~g

Education-Ethics
4

....

i6(iA..

Harold Green, in discussing this issue, has said:
The basic question is whether our legal system is capable of imposing
effective social control over new technologies before they inflict very
substantial, or even irreparable injury upon society. It seems clear that
we cannot rely on the courts alone to protect society against fast-moving
technological developments. Judge-made rules of law always come
after, and usually long after, the potential for injury has been demon2
strated ....

This characteristic of retroactivity limits the ability of the legal
system to respond to a number of modern social problems, in particular
2

H. GREEN, The New Technological Era: A View From The Law in
(Program of Policies Studies, George Washington University 1967).
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the harmful effects of science, technology, and environmental deterioration. Retroactivity is inherent in a legal system based on the values and
conflicts of the private sector of society. The courts have not been
designed to serve as oracles, but to grapple with actual conflict manifested in specific acts or injuries. They lack the technical, astrological,
or other expertise needed for the difficult task of evaluating present
diffuse effects and future effects. Consequently, the courts are reluctant
to impose controls and, for example, have rarely intruded on the
substantive decisions of public agencies, which presumably are technically expert.
Judicial procedures which reinforce concepts of justice and due
process, and include statutes of limitations, and rules of evidence and
standing, have also brought an immobility to the law so that it cannot
respond easily to issues of deleterious damage or public health.
Recent developments in environmental litigations have ameliorated
some of these procedural obstacles, particularly the issue of standing
for citizen's groups alleging other than economic injuries. However, in
Sierra Club v. Hickel,3 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
denied that the Sierra Club had standing because the Club had not
alleged that its members would be affected, beyond displeasure, by the
scheduled action of the Department of the Interior. This may indicate
that the bounds of procedural flexibility have been reached.
This list of legal problems is incomplete, but is sufficient to justify
the conclusion in a recent law review note that "[tlhe passive nature
of the courts and the difficulties encountered in their use make it clear
that they cannot serve as society's primary instrument for technology
assessment."

4

The controls of the private sector are similarly clustered in the
advanced technology and use stages. Industrial decisions and insurance
controls are implemented without full consideration of the public
interest. Decisions are made on market or profit considerations, based
on what the consumer wants or can be manipulated to want, and do
not consider larger public interests in the preservation of natural resources or public health. Advertisements boost sales of items attractive
to individual consumers, but which collectively erode environmental
quality, other public interests, and, ultimately, private interests.
Sales of snowmobiles to the new breed of armchair sportsmen now
climb to 1/2 million annually and provide a current case in point, but the
automobile represents the ultimate absurdity. Auto birth rates are now
treble human birth rates in the United States, 10 million to three million.
Auto death rates occur in similar ratio. Our automobiles produce most
3 39 U.S.L.W. 2180-81 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1970).

4 Portnoy, The Role of Courts in Technology Assessment,. 55 CORNELL L. REv. 861
(1970).
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of our air pollution, are dangerously designed, and are not economically
recycled. How much longer can these absurd ratios and harmful effects
be tolerated, despite the importance of the industry to the economy?
Obviously, many of our problems labeled technology induced or
environmental, are in reality, the behavioral problems of a materialistic
society. As such, we cannot expect effective private sector controls to
emerge, nor can we expect courts to alter such "normal" behavior.
Crusaders and citizen's groups have recently proven somewhat
effective as technology-curbers, but have not provided coherent, a priori
controls. Crusaders are in short supply, and citizen's groups lack funds,
technical expertise, and national political strength. They can only attack
discrete problems, often on a local scale, and must ultimately resort to
the legal system with its shortcomings.
The Internal Revenue Service is now reconsidering the tax exempt
status of public interest groups which litigate or support litigation for
environmental protection and other "public good" purposes. Its decision
may preclude, in an economic sense, most of the litigation which could
5
force onto the legal system an assessment and control function.
The task of the public interest group is made extremely difficult
by the fact that, once again, substantial economic and human commitments have already been made in support of harmful developments,
on a scale far larger than the immediate interests represented by such
groups. Without substantial evidence of harm to public health, such
groups appear to represent merely their own aesthetic or otherwise
elitist values, or a Luddite revival. This is not said to disparage such
activities. They have served to educate and involve citizens and represent an exciting and valuable development.
The public agencies have actual and potential social control functions across the complete spectrum of scientific and technological
activities. But this role is inextricably wound up with their several other
functions which include the promotion of certain activities for national
purposes like defense or the balance of payments, and the regulation
of activities according to numerous criteria having little relationship
to the social interest.
Agencies possess the financial and technical resources, and sometimes the authority, to function as effective social controls, but have in
general failed to do so. Reasons for this failure have often been cited
and are true to varying degrees: bureaucracy and inertia, ignorance and
lack of sensitivity to noneconomic interests, fragmentation of authority
by design or by new developments which supercede them.
Legislation has proven no guarantee of implementation. The refuse
section of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act6 is a potentially powerful
5 1 BNA ENVIRONMENTAL REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 629 (1970).
6 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
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source of authority for combatting most forms of water pollution as
they occur. Yet for 70 years, it has been ignored by the Corps of
Engineers and the Department of Justice.
The rational measure of reorganizing the federal agencies or
creating new administrative bodies to better control science and technology has been under discussion for some time. This would enable one
or several new and prescient groups to function as long-range planners
with coherent control authority. For example, a single agency could
perhaps determine national and regional energy needs, then plan, license
for construction, and regulate in the public interest more effectively
than the present multiple-agency situation. Reliance on teams of technical experts and experts from other fields such as law, health, and
economics could be built into such reorganization plans.
These are certainly steps in the right direction. Of our present array
of social controls, perhaps the public agencies (which support most
research and development) could effectively perform assessment and
control functions where they are most important - before there is large
scale development and commitment of economic and human resources.
Hugh Folk, in considering present and future social control by
7
public agencies, has already discerned some pragmatic problems.
Experts will once again be drawn from the same pool. Many will
actually have contributed, in industry or government, to the problems
they will be called upon to solve. Few experts will be able to apply their
disciplinary background to a wider range of social issues, and experts
will need extraordinary courage to function in a truly critical sense, since
their careers will still be rooted in the same industrial-governmental
milieu. What will happen to the expert who tries to serve the public
interest by calling for a halt to a particular line of research? A test
case is before us now, involving radiation safety standards. Drs. Goffman and Tamplin have challenged the AEC and its affiliates in industry
and the universities.
Folk's central thesis must be repeated here: assessment and control
are essentially policymaking processes, and as such, will be embroiled
in political controversy. He fears the repetition of nonrational policymaking processes which result in agency establishment of "standards
at levels slightly below that at which people complain vigorously ...
thus keep[ing] the public sullen but not mutinous."' Designs for
central or supreme assessment and control authorities must meet these
issues squarely if real change is to occur.
Let us briefly consider peer groups who are well-positioned to
assess and control early in the basic and applied science stages.
Folk, The Role of Technology Assessment in Public Policy, Dec. 29, 1969 (AAAS
Meeting Paper).
8id.
7
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Based on personal observation in part, I do not think scientific
peer groups presently have the objectivity or capability to function as
coherent and humane social controls. The members of a peer group
share the narrow confines of their discipline and individual success is
measured by the degree to which one plunges more deeply into, and
more narrowly draws the bounds of, his research. There are no peer
group rewards for activities or perceptions which extend beyond the
discipline or relate it to social problems. Members are therefore not
motivated nor trained to relate their peer group activity to broader
social concerns, and because of their closeness and commitment to their
work, they are unable to objectively assess implications and recommend
controls.
Genetic research today provides us with a fully developed case in
point. It is proceeding rapidly in the United States and Britain, and
periodically, significant breakthroughs are announced. Members of the
peer group and others have frequently discussed the potential applications of their work, and it has become a fashionable topic. Despite the
potential for genetic engineering and its misuse for political and social
goals repugnant to our professed values, this work continues at an
urgent pace. It would seem that the historical evidence of the political
misuse of science and technology in this century would at least bring
about a slight pause or slowdown in activities until our legal and other
control systems have time to prepare principles to control experimentation and to provide other public and private safeguards.
It is a disturbing experience to discuss these issues with biologists.
Their responses avoid the central issue of slowing or suspending work
to formulate controls and include the following:
If we don't do it, somebody else will;
Don't worry about secret and horrible developments, all work is done
in large expensive labs funded by the government;
Further work will improve the health of society and upgrade the gene
pool;
Cloning of humans is at least 5 (or 10) years away;
Science is intrinsically valuable in its contribtuion to man's collective
knowledge, and it must not be controlled for social purposes of any

sort.
Self-enclosed peer groups cannot be entrusted with self-control,
perhaps because of their narrow disciplinary backgrounds or self-interest,
or because our educational system does not foster ethical and interdisciplinary values in professional training.9
Finally, we must consider the problems of education. Our graduate
schools and departments represent artificial divisions of knowledge
and experience, and deprive students of important opportunities and
professional qualities. Substantive specialization and procedural barriers
9

See Morgenthau, Modern Science and Political Power, 64 COIUM. L. REV. 1386 (1964).
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prevent students from working with colleagues in other disciplines, and
often from clinical work of a socially relevant nature. As a result,
students are deprived of the chance to acquire some infornation on
values, attitudes, and methods of other disciplines, and of the opportunity to synthesize and apply the results to social issues. These limitations in training are then reflected in careers and social problems.
The social control of science and technology will be a troublesome
and never wholly successful undertaking. It bears a potential for the
politicization and regimentation of intellectual activity, which has been
realized in Russian genetics. Nor will the task lend itself to a specific
solution - there are no administrative, legislative, or judicial panaceas.
It must be recognized that future impact assessment and derivative
control will always be limited as man's intellectual and imaginative
resources are limited. Our measuring devices are still too crude to discern
pernicious impacts in many cases. The practice is made more difficult
and speculative as it is undertaken further back along the spectrum
before developmental technology.
But the practice must begin and develop, and pervade all the social
control mechanisms we now have and may devise. There are a number
of reforms that can be introduced in our present array of social controls.
Independent adversaries must be fostered. A tax-exempt status
ruling by the IRS would be a helpful first step for citizen's groups
pursuing activities in the public interest - e.g., as demonstrated by
their concern for public health. Multiple-year grants to interdisciplinary
groups, perhaps based at universities, could foster independent adversaries by establishing new career patterns. Congress, through its committee structure and Reference Service, should assist in this process.
Litigants should continue to press for responses from the legal
system. Environmental litigation has been marked by ingenuity, but it
lacks a coherent rationale. If Sierra Club v. Hickel1" is an omen of
anything, it may be that mere displeasure or aggravation of elitist values
held by a citizen's group will not be sufficient to challenge agency and
industrial action which serves economic or public recreational interests,
even though on a crass and commercial basis. Perhaps this is as it should
be. Litigation to control environmental quality and science and technology should seek a coherent and important raison d'etre - e.g.,
public health.
Public health, in both physical and psychic terms, includes aesthetic
and recreational values and the importance of eco-systems. Public health
must therefore provide the nexus between citizen group social action or
litigation and the public interest. The federal agencies, under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)," must now consider
10 39 U.S.L.W. 2180-81 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1970).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
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health effects. Establishing public health as the nexus does not simplify
decisionmaking but it does reduce subjective value clashes and uses
science and technology in a beneficial manner.
Administrative agencies must be reorganized sensibly in light of
national needs and available scientific and technological resources.
Legislation must be generated to provide guidelines for the administrative agencies, similar to those provided by NEPA, which impose
substantive and procedural duties on all federal agencies to implement
a broad policy of preventing and eliminating environmental damage.
Section 102(2) of NEPA requires that the federal agencies, in their
policies, recommendations, and other major federal actions affecting
environmental quality, shall
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach ... in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) ... insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities
and values... be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation... and other major Federal
actions ... detailed statement .. on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between... short-term uses. . . and
long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved ....
(D) study, develop and describe appropriate alternatives .... 12
We can only speculate on what the real impact of NEPA will be
on environmental quality. Perhaps its primary significance will be to
instill certain habits and values in federal officials and their expert
resources. The habits would hopefully include interdisciplinaryassessment and consideration of alternatives, and a value system which will
include health and aesthetic considerations.
Realistically, we can expect NEPA to slow down the agency
decisionmaking process and this will help matters. Finally, NEPA will
bring about the generation of information by the federal agencies which
should become available in useful form to adversaries who invoke the
Freedom of Information Act.1 The broad-based studies of harmful
effects and alternatives by the agencies will be helpful, either because
of contents or omissions, to environmental action groups. Hopefully,
executive privilege and other exceptions to the Freedom of Information
U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1970). A full review of NEPA is presented in an unpublished article by Ronald C. Peterson, Yale Law School, entitled Title I of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. It is available from the Environmental Law Institute,
1346 Conn. Ave., Washington, D.C.

12 42

13 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1970).
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Act will not be invoked to the detriment of Congressional purpose as
expressed in NEPA. Unfortunately, this has occurred in Soucie v.
DuBridge,14 where the Office of Science and Technology report to the
President on the SST was successfully withheld from conservationists.
Obviously, NEPA will also bring about some assessment and agency
control of science and technology, when environmental effects are
predicted. However, there is a need for legislation, similarly grounded
in a multiple-value system and the habit of assessment, which will more
directly confront the need for a priori control of science and technology.
This legislation should be directed at the substantial agency sponsorship
of research and development, and thereby regulate federal procurement
and government contractor activities.
Finally, the most important social control must be discussededucation. The training and values of our professionals in law, engineering, and other fields must be responsive to the problems that beset
society. The intense specialization that marks graduate education fosters
narrow professionalism in subsequent careers. Peer group rewards have
not been provided to members who apply their training to problems
which extend beyond disciplinary confines.
No new degree programs will provide us with the answers. Rather,
every degree program we now have must be enriched with interdisciplinary, clinical, or preferably problem-focused components. Interdisciplinary does not mean antidisciplinary.
It is my good fortune to be a part of several innovative developments in higher education. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
the School of Engineering is moving in new, exciting directions to confront problems of bio-medical engineering, and environmental quality.
The Civil Engineering Department has brought into its faculty and
academic structure an interdisciplinary team made up of a political
scientist, a lawyer, and an economist to work with the engineering
faculty on water resources, transportation systems, systems engineering,
and environmental quality. Engineering students can now enrich their
academic programs with courses and research which relate their engineering disciplines to the full complexity of the social context in which
they will eventually work. A number of engineering students will soon
join with members of the Harvard and Boston University Law Schools'
Environmental Law Societies on a number of projects confronting local
and national environmental issues.
An experimental 2-year masters program on the Social Application
has also been launched. This program will provide
Technology
of
members the opportunity to confront a complex social problem, fully
explore all aspects of the problem, and apply their learning to its
resolution in a pragmatic context. Off-campus research and learning-by1439 U.S.L.W. 2123 (D.C. Colo. Aug. 25, 1970).
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doing will hopefully produce a new type of professional ideally suited
for public service. A core group of courses is now being devised and
will include law, government and bureaucracy, applied economics, and
project-related technology.
Professor Jerrold Zacharias is now working on adapting MIT's
advanced degree programs to specifically train students for college
teaching careers in science and engineering. A mastery of a discipline,
educational methods and technology, ethical and legal materials, and
interdisciplinary research as vehicles for educating are now considered
to be important features of this development. Graduates will be expected
to bring breadth and innovative qualities to their teaching careers and
will be able to relate their discipline to the social context.
Finally, at Boston University Law School, the new Center for Law
and the Health Sciences has established a program which enables law
students to engage in work with graduate students from other disciplines
on social problems of a health-related nature. Student and faculty participants are drawn from different disciplines and institutions, and
students will receive academic credit through ad hoc institutional
arrangements.
Washington, D.C., chief circuit judge, David Bazelon, has played
a major role in this undertaking and he presided over the recently
completed summer pilot program. During this program, 15 graduate
students from Boston University, Brandeis, Harvard, and MIT divided
into four interdisciplinary teams and each team confronted a complex
health problem: genetic counseling, health insurance reform, multipleservice health centers, or the training of mental health professionals.
Each team contained a law student, medical student, economist or urban
planner, and student from a discipline particularly relevant to the
problem - e.g., bioengineering, ethics, etc. Fifteen faculty members,
representing a number of disciplines, served as a general resource to
the students at scheduled meetings and informal sessions.
Interdisciplinary education presents a number of organizational
problems and a number of unique educational benefits. Much was
learned from the summer pilot program, and the ongoing program is
now about to commence.
Problem orientation has proven to be an important aspect of the
interdisciplinary program, in that it forces learning, synthesis, and
application onto students, while enabling them to undertake considerable initiative in defining and working on the problem in a context of
competing values. With this approach the Center hopes to enrich the
graduate education of a number of students and enable them to function
effectively in health related careers.
The social control of science and technology, through the training
of new kinds of professionals, is one of the most important tasks at
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hand for law schools, schools of science and engineering, and other
programs of higher education. This task must become an ongoing
process, and needs interdisciplinary cooperation and public agency
support. Law faculty, in particular, are needed to help build and
implement these new programs of public service which are related to
the social system and values. For it is only out of individual and collective wisdom and temperance induced by an appreciation of another's
values that we will control science and technology in a coherent and
humane fashion.

COMMENT
By JOHN G. WELLES

P

ROFESSOR Baram's paper has made a real contribution to my
thinking by providing a very helpful framework to work within. The
matrix he has developed also suggests an excellent classroom project
which we, as teachers, could use to foster enlightened student thinking
about the social control of science and technology. An assignment could
be given which would require the students to develop a similar matrix
on their own with further analysis leading to the development of other
useful analytical tools.
My general objection to the paper is that it seemed to place a little
too much emphasis on the negative social response - the remedial response - to science and technology without considering that there are
also many ways in which society can act affirmatively. The pollution
problem provides an example. We might attempt to solve this problem
by looking at the composition of the Gross National Product and
reducing those specific components of the G.N.P. which pollute the
environment. This would be a negative social response. However, I think
that it is important to have a growing economy to provide the additional
money - tax income and private income - to clean up the environment.
Thus we can look to those components of the G.N.P. which produce
little pollution. By stimulating these selective components of the G.N.P.,
the social control of science and technology can be positively oriented,
and the growth of the economy would not be endangered.
The advocacy of such a position does not exclude the social control
of the source of pollution, of course, and this is adequately pointed out
in an interesting assessment of the environment developed by Herman
Daly, an economist at Louisiana State University.
Mr. Daly acknowledges the efficacy in Adam Smith's theory of the
invisible hand, where the self-interest of many producers works to the
general public good in the free market -or,
as we have it now, a
regulated market. But coupled with the action of the invisible hand, he
sees at work an invisible foot, kicking the environment, because in the
course of the invisible hand working, the producer simply makes use of
the air, water, and land to discharge his effluents. This foot needs to be
controlled because it will not control itself - conquering the foot may,
therefore, be seen as the crux of the whole control problem.
Now, looking specifically at Baram's paper I have several observations to make. In reviewing the controls presently being exercised by
society over science and technology, Professor Baram mentioned that
retroactivity is inherent in a legal system based on conflicts within the
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private sector of society. It is important to recognize that there are also
conflicts within the public sector (a good example is the conflict between
the Interior Department and the Federal Aviation Administration over
the location of a jet airport near the Florida Everglades) in which retroactivity plays as important a role as it does in the private sector.
Because retroactivity makes many of our control systems ineffective, it is doubly important that public interest groups survive. Their
function in bringing public pressure to bear on undesirable situations is
a concurrent function, though these groups, too, when forced to use the
legal system, are hampered by retroactivity. It would be a tragedy if the
Internal Revenue Service removed the tax exempt status of these groups
just because they are making trouble. In view of our discussion it is
imperative that they do make trouble.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Professor Baram's paper is his
faith in long-range planners. He spoke of creating new administrative
bodies at the federal level to better control science and technology but
then seemed almost to contradict himself by quoting Hugh Folk as
saying that such experts would need extraordinary courage to perform
a proper assessment function, since their careers would still be rooted
in the same industrial-governmental milieu.
By concentrating control in a few agencies one asks for real trouble.
I would rather pay the price of inefficiency, duplication, and a certain
amount of bungling under our present pluralistic and confusing system
than to concentrate this control in the hands of a few who have a great
deal of self-interest in the decision process as well as a vested position
to preserve when they do make mistakes.
Professor Baram stated at an earlier point in his paper that, although agencies possess the financial and technical resources, and
sometimes the authority, to function as effective social controls, they
have, in general, failed to do so. There is an excellent example of such
a failure here in Colorado.
This incident concerns the Rocky Mountain Arsenal which, from
1942-1957, disposed of their waste in an open pit. In 1954, a farmer

nearby who was irrigating his sugar beets from his well had his crop
turn brown. The agricultural experts that he called in diagnosed the
trouble as being caused by the chemical 2-4-D. Eventually two secret
investigations traced the trouble to the open pit that was draining into
the ground water the farmer was using to irrigate his crops. In 1961,
the Army admitted the damage and paid the farmer for 3 years loss.
At this point the Army decided to get rid of this waste by drilling
a deep well. They went 12,000 feet underground, and in March 1962,
they started to force the liquid waste, under pressure, into the deep
well. Between April 1962, and December 1965, Denver experienced
710 minor earthquakes.
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In 1965, David Evans, at the Colorado School of Mines, investigated this phenomena and theorized that the liquid waste was lubricating a fault into which the deep well had been drilled and was allowing the crust of the earth to slip back and forth. In 1966, the Army
stopped using the well when a U.S. Geological Survey study indicated
agreement with Evans, while disavowing any connection between its
well and the earthquakes. This, I think, was an example of bureaucratic
bungling.
To avoid such mistakes in the future, Professor Baram suggests
that "[a]dministrative agencies must be reorganized sensibly in light of
national needs and available scientific and technological resources."
Agency reorganization may be far more desirable than politically
feasible. For instance, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is so
jealous of its power that I doubt whether it would allow the Atomic
Energy Commission to be reorganized, as has been proposed, so as to
effectuate a diminuation of its power; and Congress is both the judge
and jury on that decision.
As a further measure to improve agency performance Professor
Baram indicated that assessment of environmental damage under the
National Environmental Policy Act should be made public. There are
two sides to the issue of full disclosure, and I think it warrants further
discussion. There are about eight or nine of us here who attended a
meeting on technology assessment at Andover, New Hampshire, in
August 1969. Considerable discussion centered on whether technology
assessment reports should be made fully public because of some of the
very things that are mentioned in Professor Baram's paper: the fear of
reprisal by the agencies on some of their employees because the employees are going against the self-interest of the director of the agency
and the fear that published speculation will lead the public to believe
that the agency is not sure of itself.
However, the provision of the Environmental Policy Act, requiring
agencies to make assessments of environmental impact, may prove very
beneficial, apart from the full disclosure issue.
According to the Wall Street Journal of October 27, 1970, under
a headline reading, "New Federal Program May Strengthen Effort to
Guard Environment: Presidential Council, Recent Law Pressure Agencies to Protect Valued Areas," the Environmental Policy Act had been
cited, as of August 1, 1970, in 18 federal court cases, 16 of which were
against the government. This act is a very encouraging development and
may have a lot more impact than the drafters, or at least the people who
voted for the legislation, may have realized.
I do agree with Professor Baram's approach to the method of
professional education, in that problem-orientation forces learning,
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synthesis, and application onto the student. It is like the Harvard
Business School case method that has been in use for many years.
As a final thought, I would suggest that one additional social
control be added to Professor Baram's matrix- long-term corporate
self-interest.
Robert 0. Anderson, Chairman of the Board of Atlantic Richfield,
made a speech (reported by The Denver Post, Environmental Section,
November 1, 1970) to the Institute for International Education in New
York recently in which he said that in the automobile and petroleum
industries we have placed a great value on the kind of efficiency that
results in high speed and fast pick-up. He says we should have been, and
must now begin, placing a greater value on the efficient use of energy
forms in an attempt to reduce pollution- even if the result is to
decrease consumption.
I may be harboring a naive hope, and I do not believe that the
general industrialist is ready to make such a far-reaching statement, but
industrial statesmen do serve in times of crisis, and I am hopeful that
Robert 0. Anderson is just the beginning of a long list of industrialists
who realize that it will be to their ultimate advantage to protect the
environment.

COMMENT
By Louis H.

I

MAYO

THINK the approach used in Professor Baram's paper was a highly
useful one. It seems that there was a controlled perspective in the
way that Professor Baram looked at a very complex process.
I also thought that the matrix was extremely useful. It looks rather
simplistic but, in fact, it is not. It takes much thought to produce a
research and instructional schedule that can be followed with great
profit. And further, to get anywhere in the field of problem-oriented
analysis, especially within the present university structure, takes a very
vigorous individual. Professor Baram should be congratulated.
Professor Welles covered nearly every point in Professor Baram's
paper, and his comments were so perceptive that I do not care to pursue
that line. We are here to discuss the ways in which science and technology relate to legal education, but if I may, I would speak more broadly
and include all professional education in my comments. I have set out a
number of questions which seem to set boundaries on the vast dimensions of this problem.
One approach to the problem is to look at the traditional decisional
context in which lawyers have operated and at the intellectual tools
and skills that have been used to see how these are matched. We could
ask in what decisional arenas have lawyers performed well? The
next step in this approach is to look at the types of emerging social
problems that exist today and investigate the analytical approaches and
professional skills that are needed to analyze and resolve these problems. Then one could ask whether lawyers are being equipped with the
appropriate concepts and skills to make some progress toward the
resolutions of these problems.
Because we are talking about social problems, this inquiry must
not be limited to lawyers. All professional groups have an input here.
So the question becomes are any professionals presently being equipped
with the appropriate concepts and analytical techniques needed to enable
them to understand, manage, and analyze the kinds of problems with
which we are faced?
Having asked these questions, we should turn to an analysis of
the approach we want to take in technology assessment so as to provide
a framework in which to answer these previous questions. Professor
Baram advocates a preventive approach to social matters; in other words,
one must attempt to avoid the adverse consequences of new technological applications or, for that matter, any other kind of new program
or project introduced into society. This approach puts greater stress
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upon a prospective analysis than upon resolving existing disputes, and
one gets the feeling that technology assessment is offered as a concept
and a method of focusing on an anticipatory approach.
Conceptually, technology assessment might be thought of as a
means of imposing a tolerable degree of control over the direction and
rate of social change. Operationally, however, technology assessment
may be defined as the identification of the effects or changes which
flow from the introduction of a new technological innovation into
society and the evaluation of the social desirability or undesirability of
such effects.
The discussion thus far runs between these two extremes; at one
extreme has been the conceptual - that is, what kinds of notions might
we have of professional education and social problems - and, at the
other extreme, a number of specific examples have been considered.
We should be concerned with how we link a concept of social control
with a new and effective policy which will achieve a net social gain in
the areas with which we are concerned.
In response to this query I would direct your attention to a much
closer look at the operational aspects of technology assessment. I think
that once we have engaged in an analysis of a major, complex technological application being imposed upon the social environment, the
level of discourse, or at least the degree of insight into our discourse,
will change drastically. By looking at the actual operation we will get
a better idea of the kinds of concepts we should form about legal and
professional education.
Now, let us return to Professor Baram's notion of problemorientation and observe that the legal profession has not yet recognized
the full implications of the problem-oriented approach or of stretching
traditional concepts and techniques of decisionmaking far beyond that
which is absorbed through exposure to judicial thinking in case after
case. The legal approach, as we know, emphasizes deductive reasoning
from given principles or premises rather than alternative thinking about
desired social goals and the satisfactory means of achieving such goals.
This judgment may be a bit unfair to some law schools, since numerous
legal scholars have been emphasizing the need for problem, policy, and
alternative thinking for years, but on the other hand, the continuing
push toward specialization must inevitably have the effect of constructing total social problem conceptualization. One has but to scan the list of
areas of interest which appeared on a recent questionnaire sent to the
members of the American Bar Association to see this narrowness; nor
does the situation appear any more encouraging when one reviews the
list of law books recommended for libraries which was recently published by the Association of American Law Schools.
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What this means is that the legal profession, including legal education, is not placing sufficient emphasis on structured approaches to
decisionmaking nor to institutional innovation. There is too much
emphasis on subject areas rather than on the process of legal policy
decisionmaking. Further, to the extent that process or function is treated,
such treatment is usually limited to the conventional, nonoperational
categories of the adjudicatory, legislative, executive, or regulatory
functions, rather than focusing on the actual phases of the combined
policy formulation and program implementation process.
We need an approach that will provide for: (1) perception of
the problem; (2) formulation and definition of the problem and its
context; (3) the assembling of relevant information; (4) consideration
of alternative means such as statutory schemes, organizational arrangements, and social action programs; (5) evaluation and recommendation
or promotion of selected outcomes; (6) formal prescriptions for new
law or for the operation of new programs; (7) application of new
statutory schemes in appropriate decisional contexts or the implementation of the prescribed social action program in a similar context; and
(8) appraisal of the effects of the application of the statutory scheme
or social action program based on continued monitoring and appraisal.
Now I would like to turn to the various operations that seem to
be involved in technology assessment. Assessment tasks differ considerably depending upon many factors which effect the study parameter
such as the sponsoring agency or the initiating entity, the nature of a
particular application, or the resources of the assessing entity. Hence,
we can anticipate a variety of assessment methodologies.
If we assume for the present that there is a major, new technological
application that is being proposed for introduction into the future social
environment, then it appears that the following types of organizational
and analytical operations are essential. In the preparatory phase, a time
sequence should be specified in order to achieve the objective of the
assessment. The next step would be provisional organization of assessment staff and the social impact test units related to social subsystems.
Examples of such subsystems include effective public decision processes,
economic institutions and processes, knowledge and skill institutions
and processes, urban and regional development processes, social behavioral patterns, standards of conduct, interpersonal relations, processes
for exercising rational options in the social environment, access to goods
and services, and processes affecting the quality of the natural environment. The assembled staff must then be instructed in the overall
methodology of the study and the techniques for the evaluation of
social impacts.
During the execution phase, when actually performing the assessment, the following operations must be performed: base line data on
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the existing social environment must be established; base line data on
the development and research stages of the relevant technology must
be established; projections of alternative future social environments
within the prescribed time frame; deliberate interventions and contingencies must be taken into account; the proposed technological
application must be imposed on the projected future social environment;
the significant effects or changes which will necessarily or possibly
occur during the initiation, implementation, and operational stages
of the technology application must be identified; those effects which
will be fully analyzed and evaluated to determine the social impacts
of the application must be selected; the participants, institutions,
processes, and social interests affected by the changes brought about
by the introduction of the application in the future social environment
must be identified; there must be social impact analysis of such effects
in terms of their probability, magnitude, duration, or social desirability
or undesirability; the social impacts must be measured in such a manner
as to provide useful inputs into a rational decisional process; and the
assessment outcome must be presented in terms of an overall social costbenefit ratio, or by an analysis of critical policy issues.
The one thing that is apparent from such a problem-oriented
approach or operational analysis of technology assessment is that social
problems are damned complex creatures; they are not solved by looking
at any fixed set - legal, economic, or sociological - and certainly not
just by technology. This we clearly should be able to derive from our
consideration of the technology assessment, problem-context analysis. By
deliberately pursuing some representative policy analyses or technology
assessments in terms of the particular operations noted above, we can
identify the types of concepts and analytical skills which are required
for effective performance. This in turn provides the professional schools
with guidelines for curricular development if we are to equip our future
graduates adequately for dealing with the problems of an increasingly
complex society.
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"And the wind shall say: 'Here were decent Godless people,
Their only monument the asphalt road
And a thousand lost golf balls.'"
-

T. S. Eliot, "The Rock"

INTRODUCTION

ALTHOUGH this conference is devoted to the interrelations of science
and technology and the legal process, and the gist of my remarks
will be so directed, I should like to state at the outset that such a focus
has the merit of convenience and necessity only. Let no one think that
what is being discussed here can be confined even within the broad and
amorphous limits of the title of the conference. Difficult as that subject
matter is to corner and corral, it nonetheless is part of a larger whole.
We need, in short, an "ecological" approach to the subject matter, something holistic rather than atornistic in nature. Law and the legal process,
in other words, are part of the total community process (a community,
as Fraser Darling so cogently pointed out in the 1969 Reith Lectures,
that encompasses much more than man alone but all of "nature"), and
should be seen and studied as such. To spin off any part of it for
concentrated scrutiny has merit only to the extent that it permits viewing
it in some depth; but it must be constantly kept in mind that someone,
at some time, must put the pieces together. That "someone" may well
be the lawyers, that dull, even dreary lot who at present are about as
close to being the American class of "generalists" as there is - although
the economists, those pseudoscientists, might dispute that claim. But if
lawyers are to do that job, they will need much more by way of tools
and intellectual equipment than they presently have. As of now, they
are ill equipped to deal with most problems of current social importance,
let alone the arcane area of science and technology. The lawyer who
knows no economics is, as Brandeis said, a menace to his client. And
the lawyer not privy to the meaning of science or of science policymaking simply is a legal mechanic, practicing, as Dean Eugene Rostow
once said, a rather esoteric craft of small social value. We do not like to
think that lawyers have small social value, or indeed that we as legal
educators are engaged in trivia amidst the buzzing, booming confusion
of life. But unless we change our ways, and change them drastically, that
* Copyright 1970 by the author.
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is just where we are going to be, something like the medieval scholastics
who wasted their time chopping logic over what Aristotle had to say.
In this paper I should like to essay a few tentative propositions
about the interrelations of science and technology and law; and also of
their importance for American universities, including the law schools.
The propositions are advanced only as possible hypotheses that require
further study and explication. If I speak dogmatically, it is because of
the need to conserve time, not because of the inherent nature of a vastly
complex subject matter. Here, as elsewhere, dogma is intellectual death.
In what follows, these propositions have been split into two categories:
first, the impact of science-technology on the legal system; and second,
its meaning for legal education.
Before doing so, however, I should like to state one basic assumption and also the value premise upon which the exposition proceeds.
The assumption is this: That man now lives on the knife edge of
ecological disaster and that unless he mends his ways, and soon, we
will soon be in a new Dark Age - one from which homo sapiens
will never emerge. The "Ice Age Cometh" is my assumption. The
likelihood that he will mend his ways is not very high, but try he
must. There can be no more important task for anyone.
As for the value premise (which I believe, with Gunnar Myrdal,
anyone who works in the area of social affairs should disclose), let
me state, far too tersely, that the humanistic values underlying the ideals
of the American constitutional order should be sought after as ends in
themselves. As matters now stand, science and technology, for what
doubtless are multiple reasons, are ends in themselves, with those ends
being aided and abetted by the American legal profession and the
political order. That situation should not last, indeed, it cannot last,
if the ecologists are correct, as I think they are. To stave off the dark
and murky depths of the new social Ice Age, which is hard upon us,
may be the most critical challenge that mankind has ever faced. Our
task in this conference is to probe into the question of what lawyers
can contribute to the alleviation of that dread prospect.
I.

SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM

I begin with a truism: That science-technology means change,
rapid and awesome almost beyond measure, with a consequent primary
need for effective management of that change. Daniel Bell has put the
matter well: "Perhaps the most important social change of our time
is the emergence of a process of direct and deliberate contrivance of
change itself. Men now seek to anticipate change, measure the course
of its direction and its impact, control it, and even shape it for predetermined ends." Behind that process of social change are the ac-
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celerating impacts of a multitude of scientific-technological developments, undertaken as a deliberate course of public policy.
What is required as a result is the development of what Donald
A. Schon has called "an ethic of change." If law, as Chief Justice Earl
Warren once said, floats on a sea of ethics, then the direct consequence
for the legal system and for lawyers is starkly apparent. Schon says this:
The concept of an ethic of change very nearly appears as a contradiction in terms. Our norms are precisely norms for stability. We
hold on to our norms and objectives, stand fast by them, keep them,
and because we do, maintain a steady course which enables us to dispense with an ethic of change. Our moral heroes ... are generally those
who stand firm in the face of challenge .... We are apt to see change
of objectives and norms, when it occurs, as inconstancy.
And yet the problem of the development of an ethic of change
now confronts individuals, organizations (companies and others) and
our society as a whole. The individual asks, How shall I act when the
foundations of myself (and the roots of my action) are disappearing?
The company asks, How can we find our way into the future and
maintain our integrity when it is no longer clear what business we
are in ... ? Our society asks, How are we to guide our course now
that the instrument of technology has eroded our objectives and we
are deprived of the illusion of a stable state toward which we are
heading?

Schon is not quite correct in that last sentence. We may indeed be heading toward some sort of "steady state" - but it is one which none of
us will welcome and out of which man himself might not emerge.
Law is the instrument of stability about which Schon talks. It has
developed in the past by denying that change took place, that being
the central core of the declaratory theory of law. The essential problem
derives from the fact that the juristic order has been undermined by
a rampant science and technology. Historical law, if it meant anything,
was a set of interdictory rules of "thou-shalt-nots" which purportedly
circumscribed citizen and government alike. We are now beginning
to perceive the deep, pervasive manner in which that notion has been
undercut. In the United States, the movement away from Blackstone's
declaratory view of the law began at least as far back as Holmes's
famous lectures, The Common Law (1881). By 1908 Pound was able
to say that "jurisprudence is last in the march of the sciences away from
the method of deduction from predetermined conceptions." Then came
the legal realist movement, which forever shattered classical jurisprudence (although something of a reversion to neoclassicism is now
apparent in some quarters, the capacity of the human mind for selfdelusion being well nigh infinite). We now know the inadequacies of
the Blackstone conception of law as a set of known ru!es applied by
a judge, as well as the inadequacies of the Holmes-Cardozo notion that
law is a prediction of what a court will do with a given set of facts.
What the scientific-technological revolution has produced is a public
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law explosion, one that has made public law dominant in the American
legal system. That means that law has changed from static system to
process; or as Rosinski has said, we are witnessing the transformation
of man's way of life "from an 'existence' into an unending 'process'."
But here, as elsewhere, facts have a way of outgalloping theory.
Hence, we are still bound by a set of intellectual conceptions that have
been smashed beyond repair and in our law schools we continue to
adhere to a system of education that by and large consists of parsing
the opinions of middle-aged or elderly men who happen to sit on appellate courts and who have to decide, from time to time, a few of
what Karl Llewellyn aptly called "hospital" cases. It is odd indeed that
in law schools we study the pathological and thereby think that we
know the norm. As the immortal "Sporting Life" would have put it,
"it ain't necessarily so"; or perhaps better, it just ain't so. We have only
the foggiest notion about the role of law in society, of how it actually
operates. We do not even know, for that matter, what our graduates
are doing in a professional sense. For the most part, legal curricula
tend to be guided by what might appear on bar examinations. All that
can mean is that the bar examiners - the bar as a whole - are hopelessly behind time. We have a professional organization, it might be
noted, in the Association of American Law Schools, that to my knowledge has made no attempt whatever to change the completely inadequate system of examinations for admission to the bar.
Even more, our jurisprudants -those who are called to the important task of thinking about law in the grand manner - simply have
not come up with any marginally adequate substitute for the mechanical
jurisprudence of Blackstone. At a time when the human race is about
to fall on its face, what we seem to get is a plethora of logic-chopping
with judges larded with some unreadable, at least largely unread,
behavioralism (which tends to be half-Freud and half-fraud). I should
also mention the work of that sterling collection of legal intellects,
the American Law Institute, they who sit around and conjure up black
letter rules of law at precisely the time in history when the Holmesian
prediction about the lawyer of the future not being the black letter
man, but the master of economics and statistics, has come into reality.
America's crime rate soars to incredible heights, and the ALI produces
a model penal code. Foreign affairs are at their most abrasive point
in our history, and the ALI comes up with the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law. I put it to you that this is not enough, that the American people are not getting value received for the money invested in
the law schools and for the salaries of highly paid professors who
have not, as Dean Robert McKay has recently said, had a really new
idea in legal education in several decades.
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Some way must be found to preserve and enhance humanistic
values through the legal system. There can be no higher task to which
our legal thinkers can be called. The time is long past for the encyclopedists- Williston and Wigmore and Corbin and the rest- and
the time is also past for the hornbook authors, as the ne plus ultra of
legal scholarship. (I do not speak of the unspeakable - those books
called casebooks, derived after the pattern set by that brilliant neurotic,
Christopher Columbus Langdell; most of them are not worthy of
mention.)
There are a multitude of futures possible, Olaf Helmer tells us in
his volume Social Technology. He goes on to say that "appropriate
intervention can make a difference in their probabilities. This raises the
exploration of the future, and the search for ways to influence their
direction, to activities of great social responsibility." To discharge this
responsibility more than perfunctorily, "we must cease to be mere
spectators in our ongoing history, and participate with determination in
molding the future. It will take wisdom, courage, and sensitivity to
human values to shape a better world." The problems are not merely
technical; for as Hasan Ozbekhan has said, "We do not quite understand the complex legal, jurisdictional and, ultimately, constitutional
mechanisms that are involved." But are we meeting that challenge in
our law schools, in the profession, or, indeed, in our governmental
institutions? The answer is easy: We are not. But the prescription is
harder.
Let me digress a moment on Ozbekhan's point of "constitutional
mechanisms." I think it is now all too apparent that the American
Constitution, written in 1787 and interpreted by the Supreme Court,
with a patina of extra constitutional custom and usage, is an anachronism. As a structure of government, a way of ordering and allocating power, it simply is not adequate to the needs of the present and
the emergent future. But where in the entire legal profession do we
glimpse even a glimmer of a suggestion that we ought to have a new
fundamental law? I know of nothing along those lines. On the contrary, our constitutional scholars think it the highest form of scholarship to argue about activism versus self-restraint by the Supreme Court
and to write learned, but largely unread, expositions dissecting in
tedious detail what that Court said in one or more cases. If we are to
meet the challenges of science and technology, we must think largely
and grandly, we must make our minds bold, we must strike out and
take a leap into what Morris R. Cohen once called the "dark future."
Our Constitution, both in its formal sense and in what Lord Bryce
called the "practical" Constitution, needs extensive revision and updating to make it - and thus the governmental structure - more viable
and able to meet present and emergent needs.
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That provides a rough transition to my second point - that science
and technology have effectively undermined the political order. This
may be seen in constitutional terms in the changing relationships within
the misnamed "separation of powers" of the national government, the
most significant of which is the steady aggrandizement of power in the
Executive; in the evolution of the federal system from one that could
accurately be termed "dual federalism" to a situation where the national government is dominant and the states ever more mere administrative districts for centrally established policies; and in the steady
erosion of the twin lines between "public" and "private" and "foreign"
and "domestic." Of possible even greater importance, however, is the
desuetude of representative democracy, which has degenerated into a
system of what Theodore Lowi calls "interest-group liberalism." I
assume here, as does Lowi, that something different existed in the
past; that assumption may not be accurate, for we may be merely
awakening, at long last, to a situation that has always existed in this
country. But what can be said, at the very least, is that even the ideal of
representative democracy is being slowly washed away by the tides of
numberless developments in science and technology (and their creatures, not the least of which is the giant business corporation). Replacing that simplistic notion of how American constitutional government
works is "government by expert" - a notion greeted with hosannas
three decades ago by James M. Landis (and others) -which

means

in final analysis government by technocrats, they who man what Galbraith calls the "techno-structures" of the "new industrial state." Technology is anti-democratic; it works, as Henry Kariel has said, toward
the consolidation of power. Ralph Glasser, and also Galbraith, have
recently argued that the consumer has lost his economic sovereignty;
what I say here is that the citizen has lost political sovereignty.
Daniel Bell maintains, with some accuracy, that the United States
is becoming a "post-industrial society," with the "new men" of power
being the "scientists, the mathematicians, the economists, and the
engineers of the new computer technology." (Let me add parenthetically that I think Galbraith and Bell seriously oversimplify the
question; I am inclined to agree with Loren Baritz and Jean Meynaud
that the technocrats are "servants of power" rather than real powerholders.) It is sobering, or at least should be, that Bell does not mention
the lawyers. That omission tends to bear out the earlier observation of
political scientist Robert Wood, who, in an important paper, discussed
the change in nature of governmental decisionmaking. Perhaps Emmanuel G. Mesthene's use of Wood's paper will usefully point up the
situation:
The decision-maker's options ... [formerly] were legal options. They
were confined to interpretation of the rules. Political scientist Robert

1970

POLICY ANALYSIS CENTERS

Wood has made this point very clearly. The Politician... always
winds up asking the same fundamental questions, namely, "Can we
do this ?" In times when changes in the physical world were very slow,
governments operated as if such changes were nonexistent. The ground
rules were fixed, so that "Can we do this?" -Wood calls it the persistent political question- meant that is a question that lawyers
answer. The politician's toolkit, consequently, looked like a lawyer's. It
contained "bargaining skills, propaganda skills, and violence skills ....
The political order obviously required leaders and advisors with the
lawyer's special skill in value clarification, his verbal capacity, and
his experience as an intellectual jobber and contractor who could make
a strong case wherever one was required." The effect of this century's
very rapid advance in science and technology is, in Wood's view that:
"It subtly shifts the emphasis of the persistent political question 'Can
we do this?' from the consideration of legal restraints to consideration
of physical restraints. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that
the ranks of senior career personnel of the federal government, executives, advisors, and specialists, have been increasingly filled by the
scientific skill group."
The question "Can we do this ?", in other words, today more and
more means, not "Can we do it within the rules?", but "Can we
change the rules ?" The physical conditions of political action are no
longer fixed, because science and technology can make physical
changes occur much faster than they ever did in the past . ...

As with politics, so with law, economics, culture, and society; man's
ability, derived from his technical prowess, to change his physical
world at will and massively removes the only heretofore inviolable
constraint on the shape and development of his social systems and
institutions. This poses an unprecedented challenge to the public intelligence as society strives to achieve the wisdom necessary to contain
and channel the very great physical power that science and technology

have given to man ....
Let me put the point another way, and more succinctly: A few years
ago, Dean Don K. Price in his well-known book, The Scientific Estate,
asserted that the main lines of our public policy in the future will

likely be determined more by scientific and technological developments
not presently foreseeable rather than by political doctrines that we can
now state. Let us ponder that for a moment. What it means is that
the shape of things to come, if Price is correct, is going to be mainly

influenced by what the lads in white gowns in the laboratories will do.
Present law and present political doctrines will have little to say.
I think that Price likely is right, and that is another sobering
thought for lawyerdom. At the very least, it means that lawyers will
have to deal with both microproblems and macroproblems of science
and technology. Already lawyers are at least knee-deep in the former,
although it is surely fair to say that they are floundering around rather
than dealing with the situation adequately. The spate of environmental
suits filed around the country, medico-legal questions, much of substantive administrative law - all these and more, deal with the details,
the microcosmic aspects, of science and technology. There is a rather
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large literature on segments of this. But little or no attention has been
paid to the macrocosmic aspects, those that call for institutional change
and for social invention to preserve humanistic values. This leads me
to the main point in this paper. But before getting there, I should
like to digress again for a moment to note that it is not only the preservation of humanistic values that is important, but also their enhancement
and their spread. For many Americans, those values have been sadly
lacking throughout American history. We should forego the "Fallacy of
the Golden Age," that notion that at some unnamed time in the past,
all was sweetness and light. The past, for most people, was drab and
dreary, whether they were peasants or those who worked in the "dark,
satanic mills" of the early industrial revolution. In other words, although
we can note that we have careened to the precipice of ecological
disaster, in this country, at least, more people enjoy more economic
well-being than at any time in our past (or in human history). "Hunger
U.S.A." does exist, but probably on a rather lesser scale than in the past.
What I think should be seen, however, is the new social context
in which we live. A rampaging science and technology, plus high af fluence, plus overpopulation in this country, have run us close to the peril
point in natural resources, while simultaneously stoking the fires of
envy and frustration among the peoples of the rest of the world. This
situation poses a host of public policy problems beyond the scope of
this conference. Suffice it to say that we can now be vaporized by
nuclear bombs, asphyxiated by pollution, or bred to death by too many
people. All have scientific roots. John Platt, biophysicist at the Mental
Health Research Center at the University of Michigan, put some of my
point in focus in a trenchant article in the November 28, 1969 issue of
Science: After discussing overpopulation and pollution and nuclear war,
he goes on to say that:
[T]he next decade is likely to see continued crises of legitimacy of all

our overloaded administrations, from universities and unions to cities
and national governments. Everywhere there is protest and refusal to
accept the solutions handed down by some central elite. The student
revolutions circle the globe. Suburbs protest as well as ghettoes, Right
as well as Left. There are many new sources of collision and protest,
but it is clear that the general problem is in large part structural rather
than political. Our traditional methods of election and management
no longer give administrations the skill and capacity they need to
handle their complex new burdens and decisions. They become
swollen, unresponsive - and repudiated.
We may, Platt goes on to say, have less than an even chance to survive
until 1980.
This statement may seem uncertain and excessively dramatic. But is
there any scientist who would make a much more optimistic estimate
after considering all the different sources of danger and how they are
increasing? The shortness of the time is due to the exponential and
multiplying character of our problems and not to what particular num-
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bers or guesses we put in. Anyone who feels more hopeful about
getting past the nightmares of the 1970's has only to look beyond them
to the monsters of pollution and population rising up in the 1980's and
1990's. Whether we have 10 years or more like 20 or 30, unless we
systematically find large-scale solutions, we are in the gravest danger of
destroying our society, our world, and ourselves in any of a number
of different ways well before the end of this century.
Who among the futurologists have told us that, when they project their
scenarios into the year 2000 or 50 years hence? Very few. And where
in the domain of legal education is there recognition that Platt's gloomy
views merit attention and study? I put it to you that, save for a few
isolated individuals who are toiling in the murky depths of the bureaucracies we call universities and law schools, that recognition is minimal
at best. And I further say that that response- rather, that failure to
respond- simply must be altered. No one expects lawyers to do it all
but surely we as humans are entitled to ask of the academic lawyers
that they devote substantial, perhaps principal, time to the problems
that Dr. Platt so forcefully discusses.
It will not do, I might add, to minimize the threat or the manifold
problems. That would be all too easy - in fact, I surmise that this will
be the reaction of many who may read this paper. However, the Panglossian attitude was, as you know, a satire; when Voltaire had him
say that all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds, he was
telling us just the opposite. So, too, with Pollyanna and with Mr.
Micawber, he who was always saying that something would turn up to
solve any problem that might be vexing him at the moment. That sort
of attitude simply is not adequate; anyone who is not a pessimist today
does not know what the problems are. No literate person in the last
third of the 20th century can be optimistic about man's future. One
can have a blind faith but that's about all. This does not mean, I
emphasize, that attempts should not be made to resolve the problems
of the human condition. Indeed they should; and, as Platt says, on a
crash basis. But we are never going even to approximate suitable solutions unless the right questions are asked and the proper problems
posed. And we had better begin with the realization that science and
technology are not going to save us from our follies. Platt recognizes
this:
We need full-time interdisciplinary teams combining men of different
specialties, natural scientists, social scientists, doctors, engineers,
teachers, lawyers, and many other trained and inventive minds, who
can put together our stores of knowledge and powerful new ideas into
improved technical methods, organizational designs, or "social inventions" that have a chance of being adopted soon enough and widely
enough to be effective.
I have dwelled at some length on the nature of the problem, simply
because I feel that unless we begin with a realization of what faces us
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as humans we will have no chance at all to do anything effective. For
that matter, there would be no need for such a conference as this
unless one of its unstated, underlying assumptions was the belief that
Dr. Platt is by and large correct. In sum, our juristic order, our political
order, and our social order have been shattered by what Platt calls "the
crisis of crises," by which he means that all of the crises we are now
faced with are made even more dangerous because they come on top
of each other. Historical movements are coalescing into a crescendo.
We are facing an institutional crisis of truly monumental proportions,
one in which our instruments of governments are being challenged and
being seen as faulty and in need of repair, even replacement.
II. WHAT CAN BE DONE?

If I have not succeeded in "turning you off" by what has already
been said, let us turn our attention to what we in the law schools might
do about the crisis of crises. I would like to offer several suggestions,
most of them with little discussion and single out one for principal
attention. They are:
(1) Law school curricula need thorough revamping. Law schools,
at least those that pretend to national status, should offer dual curricula
one designed for those who want to work with the microcosmic
problems - the meum and tuum - of routine existence. These are the
lawyers who would draw wills, draft conveyances, and do the other
tasks of small social consequence when each task is viewed individually
but which, when viewed collectively, provide the very mortar which
helps to bind the social structure together. These people, in William
Pincus' terminology, would be paraprofessionals.
The other curriculum would be for those who would want to work
in the macrocosmic problems - the large areas of public policy, or
institutional design and social invention, of participating in multidisciplinary teams whose mission it would be to help in the resolution
of the manifold problems of the human condition.
Of course, having two curricula will require two things: first, law
schools will have to know what they want to do, with some high degree
of particularity; and second, students will have to elect one of the two
curricula. Both of these call for thought and the power of decision,
attributes in rather short supply.
(2) Prelegal education can no longer be ignored. Just as the
medical schools prescribe what their students should take when in
undergraduate school, the law schools should no longer admit any
student who applies, provided his grades are adequate. The 3-year
curriculum is far too tight; it cannot continue to permit what we are
now doing - teaching writing and history and a few other matters
sandwiched among courses in substantive law. These the students,
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particularly those who elect the second curriculum mentioned above,
should bring to law school. They should bring other intellectual baggage
as well - some notion of how government works, some economics,
at least the history of science (if not science itself), and command of
another language.
(3) The content of what is given in law school courses should be
rigorously examined to determine if it is "relevant" and meaningful
to the needs of the era. Can there be any excuse, in the present day,
for Contracts to be given in the hours it now commands using the
materials in the usual casebook? The short answer is no. The same
may be said for other courses- Administrative Law, for example.
(4) The law school should become truly a part of the university.
No longer should it exist as an appendage dangling on the outside.
It should get in or get out. I recommend getting in. This may be done
in a number of ways. One would be to make it mandatory for all
students to take a minimum number of courses at the graduate level,
in such subjects as economics, public administration, science policymaking, international relations, and business administration. Another
would be the institution of a system that already has a beginning in
some law schools, but which could well become more widespread:
The combined degree program, whereby a student would get at the
end of 4 years both a J.D. and an M.A. in some other discipline. This
could be done without added cost to the institution, but with another
year's cost to the student. The payoff would be considerable, particularly for those aiming at the "second curriculum" mentioned above.
(5) Law should be taught as a "liberal art," and no one should
get an undergraduate degree (B.A. or B.S.) without having taken such
a course. That means that those students would be taught rules about
law but not rules of law (save in passing). At one time, jurisprudence
was considered to be part of a liberal education. It should be made the
same again. Law is too important to everyone to be left to the lawyers;
and a knowledge about law and the legal system would likely produce
spin-off benefits in greater interchanges between lawyers and others.
The United States is devoting an immense part of its energy and natural
resources to higher education, but this is one part that is sadly neglected.
Those courses, when given, should be by lawyers, preferably professors
from the law schools. The return benefit to the law school should be
quite evident, for the undoubted result will be a deeper and richer
knowledge of the law and its role in the social structure.
(6) A new category or categories of professors should be created.
One group would be "research professors," they who would spend their
time in doing the vastly important tasks of research now being neglected.
Their teaching would be limited to small seminars, if anything. The
other group would be "university professors," they who would teach
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anywhere they wished in the university and offer any course they
desired. Admittedly, this group would be small, made up of the very
highest caliber persons who could be found.
(7) I come now to my final point, the one that I want to hammer
home with some force: The law school should undertake, as one of its
principal missions, the task of becoming "a center for policy analysis."
If in what I say about this, I appear to speak with the invincible parochialism of one wedded to one discipline or one profession, let me
say that this is not my intention at all. A center for policy analysis
(CPA), it seems to me, logically belongs in the law school if it belongs
in the university at all. The reason for that is simple: Lawyers are the
only "generalists" we have; their training, poor as it is, is in problem
solving, with a problem by definition being social.
I should add that CPAs may well not belong in the university at
all. That institution, with its encrustation of practices honored only by
time but not by rationality, with its narrowminded, bureaucratic methods of operating, with its built-in resistance to change because vested
interests in the status quo produce (as Arthur Koestler has said) an
"inertia of the human mind" and a "resistance to innovation," may well
not be able to adapt to the needs and challenges of the scientific age.
It may be replaced - it is being replaced - by other institutions, such
as the think-tanks and other groups of experts. Would you, for example,
rather invest $1 million in a university or in Arthur D. Little Co., if
you had a tough problem to solve (say, pollution) ?
What this means is clear: It is by no means certain that the university will survive as anything other than a glorified place where the
affluent can get the credentials to retain their status, those on the make
can begin their hoped-for spiral of upward mobility, and females can
(hopefully) enter into exogamous marriages. If that takes place, then
the universities will merely be an extension of the high schools, purveying a little bit of knowledge but not much else. Maybe you will
say that that is enough, that the university should not undertake to do
more. If so, I can only say that I do not agree; and further, that I do
not believe that the best minds will be attracted to university positions
if their only task would be to become a modern Mr. Chips in an
urbanized setting.
Universities, including law schools to some extent, have benefitted
since the Second World War by being called upon by government and
industry to do a host of jobs. But that was because they had a monopoly,
or nearly so, during that time. That situation is now over. The prime
success of the RAND Corporation, of Stanford Research Institute, of
Arthur D. Little Co., of the Battelle Institute, and of the Hudson Institute, to name only a few, clearly points the way in which the trend is
moving. Even in law, a similar situation is springing up. In Washington
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alone, I know of at least five organizations which are concerned with
public-policy problems and which are by and large, although not
entirely, made up of lawyers. Ralph Nader's Center for the Study of
Responsive Law is one, as is Edgar Cahn's Citizen's Advocate Center.
Then there is the Center for Law and Social Action, which has just
gotten under way. To that trio may be added two policy-oriented
groups, the Institute for Policy Studies and the Institute for Politics
and Planning. The list is illustrative only; it does not include such
established organizations as the Brookings Institution, Resources for
the Future, and the National Planning Association. The point is that
the university is being seriously challenged by creation of other centers
of knowledge, which can bring experts from several disciplines together
without the impediments that seem to be epidemic on university campuses. In universities themselves it seems that only by creating new
institutes or cross-disciplinary organizations can a decent job be done.
Certainly that seems to be true with respect to science and technology,
as witness the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Cal. Tech., the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, and the Instrumentation Laboratory
at MIT.
The need is for the university to plan for and to create a center
which will be dedicated to the proposition that one of the inherent
rights protected by our constitutional polity is the right to be free from
adverse second-order consequences of science and technology and that
will be aimed at helping to produce viable solutions to the abrasive
problems of the human condition. Perhaps the ideal solution would
be to establish a new organization for that purpose, drawing when need
be on talents from within the university and also from outside the university. To some extent, Harvard's Center for Technology and Society
seems to be doing precisely that. But Harvard is Harvard and most
other universities cannot hope to attract the money or the talent to do
the necessary task of superimposing CPAs on the university itself. If a
CPA is to be established, in most universities, at least, it will have to
come within the existing framework. And that is where the law schools
come into the picture. What will be required?
(1) There must be a recognition that the problems outlined by
Dr. Platt do exist and that the law schools have a responsibility to help
to alleviate them. This will not be easily accomplished. Most, perhaps
all, law schools are still stuck in a mold that resembles rather closely
sometimes very closely indeed - the Harvard Law School of the
1920's. A major decision for the usual faculty meeting, it seems, is
to argue endlessly over such matters as whether torts or contracts should
be taught in four semester hours or five or six, whether a certain
number of semester hours can be graded on a pass-fail basis, and
whether or not to give tenure to Professor Zilch. (The latter decision
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is particularly piquant, for it is made on the basis of no articulated
criteria at all by professors whose raison d'etre is to deal with law in
the Aristotelian sense of "reason unaffected by desire".)
The problem of what is a problem must be faced. It is no easy
matter even to determine that, as Mayo and Jones have demonstrated,
and as Felix Cohen said a generation ago (in his essay entitled "What
Is A Question?"). Put another way, the law schools must give hard
and rigorous thought to delineation of their mission(s). We must, in
other words, know what we want. Policy by drift within the university,
which is traditional, no longer is up to the mark- if, indeed, it ever
was. This will, to be sure, call for a new type of thinking. That poor
excuse for not having a philosophy - pragmatism - so vaunted as a
peculiarly American posture, no longer is adequate. Indeed, it never
was - as witness the multiplying problems around us, brought by
that very mode of "thought." We must know what we want; we must
have a philosophy, an ideology if you will, that we are willing to fight
and work for. The implication, of course, is clear: Laissez-faire has no
more validity in higher education than it does in economics. In other
words, a major need is for leadership - a matter deserving separate
treatment.
(2) The entire concept of academic freedom needs thorough reexamination. If leadership is required, as I believe it is, then that means
that someone must actively be the boss. The result may well be loss
by the faculty of some of its "prerogatives." Some of these could well
be lost, and the sooner the better. Examples: "moonlighting"; course
content; teaching methods; tenure; the grading system.
I recognize that I am treading on sensitive ground, that I will be
accused of wanting to turn the law school into a fiefdom presided over
by a dean in the nature of a feudal lord. Not at all, for I would make
the dean's tenure as dean subject to a definite time limitation. Yale
does that now. Professors, however, have sat serene and aloof in their
ivory aeries for too long. If they want to practice law, then they should
resign from the faculty. And there should be the hardest type of thought
given to the other matters I mentioned, particularly tenure. The tenure
system locks in too many timeservers; all law schools have them. I do
not mean to suggest that a professor should be subject to being fired
on whim or caprice. Far from it. But I do say, with Peter Drucker, that
the tenure system has been abused. A decision to give tenure should
not be irrevocable. It should be reexamined, under established criteria,
every 3 to 5 years. A person at a law school should be entitled to "due
process of law," both procedurally and substantively, for the universities are private governments in fact and should be treated accordingly.
By according him due process, his rights will be protected, particularly
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if university administrations make, as they should, full disclosure of
their operations.
(3) Faculty members must have the capacity to do the jobs for
which they are paid. That sounds odd when put that way. What I mean
is this: At the present, I would gather that a majority of professors
of law have expertise only in parsing appellate court opinions in the
substantive areas in which they are most familiar. Those who "moonlight" by practicing law have, of course, the added expertise of the
practitioner. There are exceptions in this rather dismal picture, of
course, but I think it is generally accurate. (Saying such a thing will,
I know, make me less popular than a whore in church. But others have
said it - for example, Karl Llewellyn.)
One of the things faculty members should not be paid for is to
do the nickel-and-dime administrative jobs that the deans do not want
to do. They should not have to be on committees which meet often and
seemingly endlessly, dealing with curricular and other matters. Again,
I run against prevailing opinion in saying such a thing. Many faculties
have fought long and hard to try to get some power from the administration; and it will not sit easy with them to have to give it up. But I
put it to you that the only reason they wanted (and, admittedly,
needed) power was to counteract some of the arbitrary nonsense emanating from topside. But what this suggests to me is that professors
now spend too much valuable time with the trivia of administration;
and that the need is for invention of techniques that will at once
protect the faculty (when it should be protected) and permit them to
devote their time to more important tasks. Professors, as a rule, make
damned poor administrators. They ought to do what they can (or
should be able to) do best: think. They are paid for thinking and
communicating, in other words, with the communication coming both
in teaching and in writing. And deans are paid for deaning - not a
passive role.
(4) A center for policy analysis need not begin on the grand
scale. In all probability, it should start small, build firm foundations,
and then expand. As for subject matter, there is literally nothing on
the planet, or in outer space, that could not be brought within the ambit
of consideration, if not full analysis. All of society, and society's institutions, require analysis (perhaps psycho-analysis would be more apt).
By starting small, by taking on, say, the question of air pollution in
the city in which the law school is located (that is not so very small,
by the way), there would in all probability be a synergistic effect produced, both by the cumulative activities of many CPAs and by the
accumulated knowledge that would be derived from one problem
situation. The net result may well be what Myrdal calls the Principle
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of Cumulative Social Causation, one in which there might be an upward
spiral toward a better world.
(5) There will be a need for a team effort with lawyers, professors and students, working with scientists, natural and social and
behavioral. This will not be easy. Lawyers, particularly law professors,
tend to be loners, to work best as individuals. But it is necessary.
"Group think" and "group work" must supplement- I do not say
entirely replace- "individual think and work." We have very little
experience at this in the law schools, save in such organizations as the
law reviews. (To be discussed separately, infra.) A little collaboration
is evident between professors in writing articles or editing casebooks,
but not much else.
An indication, however, of what might be done may be seen in
the activities of G.A.S.P., Inc., a nonprofit corporation established by
students at my law school. The acronym stands for "Greater-Washington Alliance to Stop Pollution." After being given a problem in
Administrative Law in the spring of 1969 as the main course effort (I
had eliminated the casebook as the main tool - rather, crutch -of
instruction), the students on their own initiative formed G.A.S.P. and
filed a complaint with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Commission seeking to halt air pollution by the D. C. Transit Company's buses. The problem, in brief, had been for them to research
that area for a mythical client (a citizens' organization) and to state
what administrative relief could be obtained; and if relief was denied
administratively, what the federal courts would do. I am pleased to
be able to report that the students did an outstanding job with that
problem, so much so that, at this writing at least, they appear to have
prevailed over the bus company at the administrative level.
I mention this for two purposes: (a) to indicate that the usual
casebook approach to public-law courses is inadequate and (b) that,
in part at least, we have a new breed of law student in our classes.
They are simply not going to put up with much of the self-indulgence
of case-parsing that Llewellyn says we do. And I mention it also to
indicate one small bit of evidence that group effort by lawyers - in
this case, law students - working with minimal faculty direction can
produce highly professional results, and, what is vastly more important,
can make small chips in that huge block of ice that is the deleterious
effect of technology. (I should say here what should have been said
before: No one wants to be a Luddite -at
least, very few do; the
need is the difficult one of retaining the benefits and eliminating the
detriments -and
of making hard choices between the two.)
To revert, however, to the main point of group effort: This must,
of course, be multidisciplinary. Who is in charge is less important than
cooperative effort designed to cure man's ills rather than exacerbate
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them. There is work enough for all, more than enough, I should add.
One of the tasks that Hercules took on was to clean the Augean stables.
The world has become the modern day counterpart of those stables,
laden with the effluvia of billions of human beings who appear to
be intent on destroying or making unlivable their priceless and irreplaceable patrimony, the planet known as Earth. If the problem is
ecological, and that it is, the response must be no less. We will work
with each other, in the law schools and universities and with other
knowledgeable people, or surely we will all perish. Wealthy as we are
in this nation, we will end up, as John Gardner has said, as Croesus
on top a garbage heap. We will be affluent in the midst of nauseous
effluence.
(6) Where is the money coming from? Here, I could retreat into
the oft used gambit of professors and say that I only ask the questions,
I never answer them. There is a modicum of validity in such a view.
Each must think these matters out for himself, aided and abetted by
strong and affirmative, even charismatic, leadership that I have alluded
to above. But that is not enough. Where, indeed, is the money coming
from? The question is tough and may be insoluble.
With all of the present talk about environmental problems, there
has been little or no effort to add up the check and present it to us.
What we can perceive of the attitude of the taxpayer, he will be
unwilling to foot the bill to stave off and remedy the defects of a
runaway science and technology. Taxpayer's strikes are imminent. Already they are apparent in such places as Youngstown, Ohio, where the
people balked about the cost of education. The rising cost of medical
care is another area that is meeting resistance. But that is as nothing
when compared to what will happen when the bill comes in for curbing
science and technology.
What this means, at the very least, should be obvious. Certainly
it has been stated often enough. We need a reordering of priorities in
the nation. There is a finite limit to what we can do as a nation, and
we are beyond the tipping point already. Confusion about priorities
can, in substantial part, be traced to the failures of the political (that
is, the constitutional) order; "interest-group liberalism" just is not
working. But who is interested in setting, or even trying to set, priorities? Our political institutions are hopeless: Congress is imprisoned
by interest-group politics, the administrative agencies tend to be surrogates for the ostensibly regulated, and the Chief Executive appeals
to the great unwashed of the nation (rather than fiddling while Rome
burns, he watches football on the boob-tube); the Supreme Court, acting
as national conscience, has tried to act as a faculty of social ethics or
political theory, but with notable lack of success. Government, in short,
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seems to have lost the capacity to govern- not a very pretty picture,
but valid nonetheless.
Our voluntary private associations are little better. The churches
are little more than Sunday morning social clubs, handing out placeboes
to the smug and satisfied. The unions have become private power
centers intent only on maximizing their private value positions, as are
the farmers organizations and veterans legions. The corporations, which
dominate the economy, pursue their own narrowly conceived goals with
little regard to the over-all "public interest." I say that even though
Henry Ford announced last December that his company would begin
to worry about pollution. It does not take a cynic to be able to say
that Ford's response may well be a public relations gimmick designed
to help head off the rash of private antitrust actions that are being
brought (some against the auto industry for collusion with respect
to anti-pollution devices). (Speaking parenthetically, isn't it interesting
to note the device that industry and government has worked out in
antitrust actions- the consent decree? That is a system whereby a
company says it has not done anything but promises to discontinue it
in the future. That needs a Dickens or a Mencken to describe, not my
poor talents. The consent decree is a classic example of the symbiotic
relationship between government and industry that has been created
and that is now bringing into being the corporate state, American
style.)
That leaves the universities, the think-tanks, and the foundations.
And that is not much. But it is all we have, so we had better make do
with them, improve them where we can, and get on with the job. The
foundations can - indeed, they have been - sources of financial aid.
Noteworthy in this category is the Russell Sage Foundation. Less noteworthy are Ford and Rockefeller and Carnegie. For what doubtless
are multiple reasons, these large foundations have not devoted sufficient resources to getting qualified people to do some of the most
difficult jobs. Of course, I do not mean to denigrate much of the very
fine work that has been done, but I must confess that I simply do not
know what motivates the foundation executive - although I suppose
that the laws of bureaucratic behavior apply to foundations as well
as elsewhere.
And of course even the Ford Foundation does not have unlimited
resources. An ideal solution, one that no doubt reveals the naivete of
an academic, would be for the federal government to "tithe" itself, by
spending, say, 10 percent of what it spends on R&D (research and
development) for the establishment of centers for policy analysis
throughout the nation. Think what an annual $2 billion could do.
A further suggestion would be for the legal profession to "tithe"
itself. Why should law schools continue to operate mainly as service
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stations for the law firms, with little by way of a quid pro quo? Why
should not the firms allocate a percentage of their net income each year
to some fund, established, say, by the Association of American Law
Schools and then disbursed to law schools and individual professors?
As Dean Bayless Manning has recently pointed out, the law firms
(and their clients, of course) have relied on the universities as manpower pools. They have benefitted but they have not reciprocated. That
is a bad bargain, by any light, from the perspective of the law school.
When to that is added the melancholy fact that we have permitted,
and continue to permit, the practicing bar to act as a closed-shop guild
(and thus as a private government), regulating the manner in which
neophytes can enter the profession, we in the law schools are paying
double. Our curricula are tailored to the bar examinations, even though
it is widely recognized that those examinations have little or no relationship to an ability to practice law. (I would suggest, by the way,
that any student of a caliber that makes him eligible for admission to
almost any of our law schools could, in the course of one year's study,
learn enough to get him by almost every bar examination in this country.
If that be so, what does it mean for the 3-year curriculum? Or for our
failure to confront the bar with the manifest and manifold inadequacies
of their examining strategies?)
The doctors do it better, although I hold no brief for that legalized
cartel, the American Medical Association. They know how important
the medical schools are to the profession; and although they have been
derelict in keeping the number of doctors at too low a level (it is
probably accurate that the medical care in this country would collapse
were it not for foreign-trained doctors), they have come up with
financial assistance. That aid has come both from themselves and from
their influence in governmentwhich makes large sums available to
the medical schools. Is it not odd that, with at least 50 percent of our
Congressmen being lawyers, there is not something comparable for the
law schools? Perhaps governmental aid might come if the law schools
ever became more than service stations for the corporate bar. (I know
of the recent movement of a few students into noncorporate practice;
but I think the jury is still out on the question of how long that will
last. We can hope, however.)
The money question is tough, and there is no quick answer to it.
(7) A center for policy analysis would be useless unless there
were some way for its recommendations to get truly serious attention
from the nation's policymakers, both public and private. This is to be
seen in the many advisory commissions established in Washington,
which exist for a brief period of time, which get a brief flurry in the
media, and whose reports then are usually shelved and gather dust
amidst the tons of paper that float around official Washington. Once
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in awhile one of these commissions gets attention and action; this is
usually in direct proportion to the pressure being brought on government by some interest group. We now have, for example, an Administrative Conference of the United States, which grew out of a temporary
conference that operated in 1961-62. (That the Administrative Conference is noteworthy for trivia should not be taken as a slight; it was
meant to operate that way. Let no one delude himself that it is more
than a facade, or, perhaps better, a charade.)
How, then, can there be a way by which the politicians will give
serious attention to the CPAs? Only if some political muscle or clout
can be brought to bear, it seems to me. In my limited, admittedly
impressionistic view of the Washington scene, issues without muscle
or clout behind them quickly become forgotten. Politicians do not lead;
they follow; their main interest is in being re-elected. The reason why
so many have recently begun to beat the drum for improvement of the
quality of life is obvious: Enough Americans are now outraged at the
outrages that have been committed on their environment to ask some
tough questions of the politicos. But who will they listen to when the
crunch comes? Will it be the Sierra Club or the timber and grazing
interests? Will it be a center for policy analysis or the tycoons from
the supercorporations ?
The answer to which I am driven is this: American life is highly
politicized. If anyone wants to get something done, he had better
pursue the "political," not the "legal," path. (That acting politically
can also be legal shows merely the imprecise state of our taxonomy
about law and the legal process.) The inability of courts to effect any
meaningful changes, save when there is a high degree of cooperation
from the avowedly political branches of government, means that judicial
action, in and of itself, will not get the job done. Social norms must
be set in other ways. The courts can help but cannot control. Theodore
Lowi, in The End of Liberalism, has, as has been said, set out an
accurate description of the failures of what he calls "interest-group
liberalism," but his prescription of "juridical democracy" is fuzzy at
best, incredibly naive at worst.
(8) A word must be said about the law reviews, published as
you know in an increasing number throughout the profession. There is
scarcely a law school without at least one; some have two or more.
What this means is simple; the best minds (taken by grades) among
the students devote substantial time to editing periodicals that I suspect
do not get read. Why? The sheer bulk of the literature makes it
impossible. We are being buried in a sea of words. No one can hope
to keep up with the literature. I have two suggestions to make:
(a) That students, rather than writing case analyses, make it a
practice to grapple with true problem situations. Some of this is now
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being done, sporadically, in some of the periodicals. I suggest that it
should be the norm. Who, other than the author and the editorial staff
and maybe the lawyers and judges involved, reads case notes? Does
anyone know? I doubt it. I venture to guess that few get read.
The law review, as it began, was an instrument that did serve a
fairly useful purpose. It helped students learn to chop logic with judges
and to parse cases. But it did it within the intellectual climate of Blackstone's declaratory theory of law. That theory is now dead, even buried,
but it still rules the law reviews from its grave. That is "19th-centuryism" -and
we are only 30 years away from the 21st century (less
than 15 away from 1984). The time has come for the institution
of the student-edited periodical to be reexamined. More, student time
should be devoted to stretching the frontiers of the law and legal
process, to truly multidisciplinary studies of problem situations, to integrating law (when need be) with science and technology as well as
with the social and behavioral sciences. A few years ago, in a fit of
unique bravery (for them) the editors of the Harvard Law Review
commissioned several articles on law and behaviorialism. I mention that
only to say that if Harvard can do it, any law school can; that that
particular symposium considerably set back the cause of integrating law
with other disciplines should not be taken as meaning that the idea has
no validity. The best law journal (by far) in this country, and perhaps
in the world, is Law & Contemporary Problems, although even it could
be considerably improved.
What I am saying can be summed up briefly: The faculty should
reassert control over the law reviews and they should be vehicles for
publishing the results of the research of the CPAs.
(b) Given the plethora of periodicals, a major service could be
performed by some law school if it published, not an "original" law
review, but abstracts of the important papers in other reviews. The
Index to Legal Periodicalsis not enough to give us knowledge about
whether a given article is useful. A set of abstracts would be. There is
precedent for this (which should allay the fears of those who do not
want to strike out alone) in the economics profession, which has a
system of abstracts of economics articles published and available.
Some way, in some form, must be found to make the sheer bulk
of the literature manageable. If this were to be done by (say) the
College of Law at the University of Denver, a beginning might be in
the area of science and technology. I would hope that the progressive
leaders of this progressive institution would seriously consider this. If
they do, then I would further suggest that not only legal periodicals
but also such nonlegal magazines as Science, the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Scientific American, and Environment, among others, should
be abstracted.
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CONCLUSION

I end this peremiad with a plea. There are a host of problems and
issues emanating from science and technology that universities and law
schools in universities should meet head-on. They may be summed up
in four words: pollution, population, poverty, and peace. All are immensely important. But I suggest to you that the most important of all
is that of population: Unless and until human breeding can be controlled and populations stabilized, the other problems cannot be met.
A law school can take on no higher task than to delve into the controversial and abrasive problems dealing with population control. That is
nmy plea. I do not expect it to be answered or even acknowledged. That
is a dolorous note to end this statement, I know, but I cannot see how
anyone can believe otherwise. Whether, per T. S. Eliot, the world ends
with a "bang" or a "whimper" is not the point; for end it will from
the sheer weight of hydraulic pressures coming from too many human
beings. (I ignore, as we must, the second law of thermo-dynamics.)
Man must truly become, to use Emerson's term, "Man Thinking." This
means, finally, that he must adjure the Christian notion of special
creation and the inherent superiority of homo sapiens. Man must again
come together with nature, as he was millenia ago. In no other way
can the required ecological balances be struck, without which man
cannot survive. This means, then, that law and lawyers cannot be
morally or ethically neutral nor can scientists and technologists. (The
pretense is that they are, I realize; but that idea rests on such flimsy
foundations that it needs no argument to dispute it.) All must avowedly
pursue an ideology, one made of attainable goals that will enhance the
human spirit amidst a "oneness" with nature. In saying that I do not
advocate a return to a state of "nature red in tooth and claw," a
Hobbesian world in which life is "cold, nasty, brutish, and short." We
do not have any transcendental duty to attain that state of "oneness";
it is merely a necessity.

COMMENT
By RAYMOND

W

BOWERS

ELL, I wonder how many people sitting around this table envy
me the role of responding to Professor Miller's paper entitled
The Law School as a Center for Policy Analysis. Unhappily, I do not
think his paper reflects what I think are the challenges and the problems. The fact of the matter is, in my opinion, the law schools are
facing both problems and opportunities quite comparable to those
w\rhich were faced by the physical sciences at the end of World War II.
Physicists in the universities and elsewhere, proved themselves to be
highly opportunistic with regard to the general environment of that
time. I think a similar situation exists today with regard to law schools,
our subject of discussion, and of course our engineering schools. But, I
am going to concentrate on law schools at the present time. There are
new opportunities that I think the dynamic law schools will accept and
do something about; however, certainly not all are going to take advantage of this opportunity.
Now, it is a difficult task to respond to Mr. Miller, as he makes
so many points; it would take me several hours to respond. I will
therefore try to restrict myself to his principal points. The paper really
is divided into two parts. The first part deals with his perceptions of
the problems of science, technology, and society. The second half deals
with how law schools should respond to the demands that these problems will make on the law schools. I am going to spend most of my time
on the second half, because that is where he makes concrete proposals,
but I must say something about the first half.
He has obviously got a pessimistic and even alarming perspective of
the problems that face us. For example, he states, "that mankind now
lives on the knife-edge of ecological disaster and that unless he mends
his ways, and soon, we will soon be in another Dark Age, one from
which homo sapiens will never emerge." He says that, "as matters
now stand, science and technology, for what doubless are multiple
reasons, are ends in themselves, with those ends being aided and
abetted by the American legal profession and the political order."
He says at the end of that page, "science-technology mean change,
rapid and awesome beyond measure.... He says in his paper that
he is highly dogmatic. I do not really object to the dogmatism because
it does help clarify his viewpoints, but my reaction is that the whole
first half of his paper is unscholarly and borders on the hysterical.
I would not feel that this was an important point to make, if it were
not for the fact that in an emotional climate about technology and
609
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society, the universities are the one place which must remain centers
of objective analysis agreeing that one can never be completely objective.
The point I would like to make is that we should not become a
political arena, or political soapbox, where any kind of rhetoric is
acceptable. He talks about how, "we are still bound by a set of intellectual conceptions that have been smashed beyond repair ....
I do not
know what he is talking about, and I question whether he does. He
refers to John Platt, and he goes on to say "Platt says, '[w]e may...
have less than an even chance to survive until 1980'. This statement,
Platt himself says 'may seem uncertain and excessively dramatic. But is
there any scientist who would make a much more optimistic estimate
after considering all the different sources of danger and how they are
increasing?' " The answer is yes. I do not underestimate the seriousness of the problems that we are facing with regard to technology and
society, and I have given a good part of my recent professional career
to working on them. But I do react very strongly to overstatement of
the problem.
In order to have some perspective, one must know something
about the history of technology. It is not true that technology is producing changes so awesomely rapid that society has never faced problems of that magnitude before. If one does not want to look at a
complete history of technology in its interaction with society, he should
at least look at what the Industrial Revolution did to rural England and
how rapidly it did it. And since we are in Denver, I pick out what may
seem to you a rather inoffensive invention and ask you to concede
with regard to life on the plains states: what the invention of barbed
wire did nearly a hundred years ago. It is not a new problem and I do
not see any reason at all why we should beat our breasts and say we
will all be gone within ten years. But, of course there is hanging over
us the danger of a nuclear holocaust. That problem is different than
the control of our civilian technology.
Now during the first part of the talk, Mr. Miller comments on
law schools, their faculty, the university, and the tenure system, and
whenever he sees anything that he recognizes, he flails at it. I am not
trying to follow his comments because I do not really see that they are
very constructive. Universities, and to be sure their faculties, have a
certain conservatism, but it is irresponsible to say that this conservatism
is simply a patina with no substance to it. The reasons for tenure are
profound, and the problem before us at this conference is how we are
going to move these organizations to deal drastically with these
problems.
It is nonsense to say that drift is the way in which a normal university is operated. The Morrill Act of 1862 was not a piece of drift. The
introduction of black studies in more recent years was not just a matter
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of drift. There are quiet revolutions, or at least high evolutions, going
on in the universities at present, and I see no reason at all why we cannot
modify the universities to take into account the problems that we want
them to face. I also find it too simplified to say that due to law professors having a tenure, there are too many time-servers in the system.
It has been my misfortune to work in industry, government, and in the
university, and I have found "time-servers" wherever I have beenwith or without the tenure system.
Now let me turn to where he says -[ilf I have not succeeded in
turning you off by what has already been said, let us turn our attention
to what we in the law schools might do about the crisis of crises."
Anybody who lived through the thirties, anybody who had any understanding about what went on in Europe during the thirties and the
forties, finds it hard to believe that we are now faced with "the crisis
of crises."
Let me turn now to the other points that he makes, and couple some
of them together. He says in point number one that the law school
curriculum needs thorough revamping. I assume that he means by
thorough revamping, substantial revision. Of course they do. Although
I am not an expert on the law school curriculum, I am sure the law
curricula lags behind the needs today as much as most curricula do.
And he is right in saying that we have got to work on them, we have
got to change them. But please, we are in a position here to address
the question of how and in what direction, but because of the limited
time, we probably will not even be able to specify how they should
be changed. Nevertheless, do you think we could organize a conference
on the need to change law school curriculum? If we achieve nothing
else, and decide where it should be held, who are the hosts, who would
be an effective agency to do it, we will have achieved a lot. I do not
think you can deal with this problem by saying it is just a matter of
dropping the amount of time spent on contracts.
Many of the points he makes, in spite of the harshness of my
earlier words, are, of course, important ones. He says prelegal education
can no longer be ignored. I think he is absolutely correct, but again,
I do not really see that we are dealing with insuperable problems. I
think the law schools should address the question of whether they need
to recruit more of their people from science and technology backgrounds. It may be true that the backgrounds of people entering law
has been unduly restricted, considering the problems that they will have
to face in the future. I do not think there will be any difficulty in the
future attracting people who know something about science and technology into a career in law.
The content, he says, of what is given in courses should be rigorously examined to determine what is relevant and meaningful to the
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needs of the era. The word "era" is a fairly strong word. I presume
he means the next decade. Of course we have got to do that, but we
must also be careful not to overdo it. We need to educate students
with some kind of fundamental knowledge that will be relevant to the
next decade and the decade after that. I think no school could fall into
a worse trap than simply to tip up its whole curricular arrangement
simply because we seem to be obsessed with some very special problems
of national significance at the present time.
I agree with his first three points completely. We must examine the
curriculum and probably deal with our most sacred holy cow, that is the
commonly held view that the student is going to learn within the university and stop after that. If you believe that he is going to learn in the
future you would not worry so much about the requirements of the
curriculum, as we do at present. Also, we have to worry not just about
content, but about the motivation of people to go on into the professions.
Another point that he has made, seems to me to be an extremely
important one. At least it is important in the universities with which
I have been associated. He says that the law schools should become
truly a part of the universities. I do not understand how it is that,
presently, jurisprudence and the history of legal processes is really not
taught to undergraduates by the law school, but it is taught by political
science departments. I think, whenever that happened, it was a profound
mistake, as law schools cut off a bridge to the undergraduate body. And
I think the separation of the law school geographically, while it may
have reasons in the urban university, is something for which we have
paid a very high price. "Law should be taught," he says, "as a liberal art
and no one should get an undergraduate degree without having taken
such a course." I wish the law profession would devote much more
attention to providing the proper kinds of courses for students of
broad background.
Let me go on to his point number six. He wants a new category
of professors, one of them being a group of research professors "who
would spend their time doing the vastly important task of research now
being neglected." My feeling on that point is the following: I do not
want to be dogmatic, you cannot really prescribe a principle that will
apply to all circumstances, but I would not follow his advice there
as the general rule. I think we learned in physics, where research is an
integral process of all of our good departments, that you lose something
very substantial when you isolate people as research professors. What
he should be arguing for is an increased amount of research on the part
of law professors, and the integration of this into their teaching and
their attitudes towards students.
I am certainly glad to say that at Cornell, for example, in physics,
we have no research professors of the kind about which he is talking.
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Our most distinguished men all teach graduates and undergraduates,
like anybody else, and I believe it is one of our strengths. That is not
to say that there will not be special circumstances where a "research
professor" makes good sense. But I am not impressed with what happens as a result of the isolation of the professors in an essentially
think-tank environment and the incredible loss, as a result, to the
teaching process of what are some extremely gifted people.
I, in that sense, for example, do not particularly approve of the
Princeton Institute for Advanced Study in terms of it being a full-time
occupation. How much better off the world of physics, at least, would
be if various people that I could mention on that extremely distinguished
staff, had some contact with our graduate students and our undergraduates.
Now I come to his final point, the one he says he wants to hammer
home with some force: "The law school should undertake, as one of
its principle missions, the task of becoming a center for policy analysis."
He hammers it home in the remaining part of his paper. Here again,
he says, "I should add that CPAs may well not belong in the university
at all, that institution with its incrustation of practices honored only
by time and not by rationality, with its narrow-minded, bureaucratic
methods of operating .... " He says it may not belong in the university.
He implies that if he had one million dollars for an investment in the
pollution problem, he would put it in Arthur D. Little,1 instead of
the university. He clearly does not understand what Arthur D. Little
can do. These are complementary institutions, we need the "not-forprofits," we need the universities. The question is how we are going
to interact in a kind of compatible fashion. And it is not a question of
whether you would put a million into one, or a million into another.
It is nonsense to suggest that the universities have no experience
in problem solving. It is true that their experience is in a limited area.
There are few organizations more problem-oriented that the College
of Agriculture at Cornell University, and many others as started by the
Morrill and Hatch Acts. There is no prophet institute that could tackle
problem-oriented research in the field of world food production to
compare with the Cornell College of Agriculture. However, I do not
know the answer to the question of whether we can apply the same
techniques to other areas of more pressing social significance today.
Obviously, there are a lot of diffulties, but I reject the point that universities have no place in this area, and that the research institutes and
national laboratories have such a clear advantage that we should give
up before we start.
1 Arthur D. Little is one of several independent research institutes mentioned by Professor
Bowers. He occasionally refers to them as "prophets."
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I have just come from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and
obviously there are some people who feel that that is the kind of place
where problem-oriented research should be undertaken. I want to assure
you that it does not take a very perceptive person to see that they also
have severe problems with undertaking problem-oriented research of the
character that we are discussing. They also have organizational boundaries. It is not just a product of the university. Most organizations
have a kind of human sociological cell structure, and breaking through
the walls of these cells is only slightly easier in the national laboratory
than in the university.
Now all I want to say with regard to his point seven regarding
centers for policy analysis, is to repeat what I said earlier about the
research professors. I cannot prescribe any procedure that is going to
apply to all universities. If he would modify his statement to say that
some law schools should become centers for policy analysis, then I
would be with him completely. However, I think that he has approached
it somewhat backwards because I believe it needs to be organized at
the university level. At Cornell we are going to do it at the university
level, and we hope to include the law school, and if not the law school,
at least lawyers, as an integral part.
At Cornell, for example, the idea of starting such a center within
the law school, or within the college of arts and sciences, or within the
college of agriculture, would have been a profound mistake. I do not say
that is so for the University of Denver. In fact, one general prescription
I have learned through my participation in the organization of our program on science, technology, and society, is that the program must be
custom-fitted to the institution.
At Cornell we have set up a program which reflects very much the
strengths and the weaknesses of Cornell University. And that is how
you have to start, I mean to get anything done, build on the strengths
that you have. Now there may be a few places where a natural focus
for this kind of activity is within the law school. I suspect it is not so at
the majority of universities, but it may very well be so in one or two
places.
At this stage of the game, I simply want to say that we at Cornell
have been involved for a year in a formal program on science, technology, and society. I think we have had successes, but we have also
had failures. We are faced with many problems to achieve the kind of
thing that Mr. Miller is talking about.
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S HARE with Ray Bowers his disappointment and distress at the
first half of Mr. Miller's paper, and I also very much agree with
Professor Bowers' views of the threats and opportunities that science
and technology present our society. I am much more in accord with
Bowers' perspective and with the detail which he offers. I think I have
rather little to offer in a way of informed comment of Professor Miller's
varied suggestions to law schools, except his suggestion that they should
seek to become centers for policy analysis. So, my comment will be
entirely devoted to his title The Law School as a Center for Policy
Analysis.
I will talk a little bit about an approach to policy analysis. God
knows it is not the only one, but at least it springs from the systems
analysis - the systems approach - which Joe Coates and others talked
about this morning. I will talk briefly, then, about the nuts and bolts
of such a policy analysis project, which we are carrying out at the
moment. I will list a few randomly chosen needs for resources and
characteristics of environment, which I think you need in order to do
this sort of policy analysis. Then I will ask you if the law school can
furnish these resources and these environmental characteristics. It seems
to me, that is the important question which is implied in the title of
the paper, The Law School as a Center for Policy Analysis.
Well, so what is policy analysis? Harold Green asked me that
question about five weeks ago in his office. And suspecting Harold
Green's capability of cross examination, I timidly said a very few words
which I hoped were safe; "policy analysis is the intellectual activity
whether its intuitive or systematic, leading up to the choice of a policy."
Well, I am not going to chicken out quite that much here, in spite of
the fact that Harold Green is once again facing me.
More specifically, we are talking about the analysis of complex
policy problems dealing with risk, uncertainty, and technological change,
as well as with social and political forces. Carter Bales talks about three
components of this sort of analysis; the combination of the identification
and/or the setting of objectives, the identification of the possible means
of achieving them, and the selection of one of these alternatives.'
The grand old man of the systems analysis business, Ed Quade,2
1C. Bales & M. Falvey, A Guide to Issue Analysis (unpublished manuscript, 1969). Mr.
Bales is presently the Director, New York office, McKenzie Company (research &
consulting).
2 E. S. Quade; B.S., University of Florida, 1930; Ph.D. (Mathematics), Brown, 1936.
Division Head, Mathematics, RAND Corp. Editor of SYSTEM ANALYSIS & POLICY PLANNING APPLICATION IN DEFENSE, 1968 (with W. I. Boucher).
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talks about the policy sciences as evolving from the mix of the decision
sciences, operations research, systems analysis, gaming, simulation, and
PPB. He mixes these with the social and political sciences in his introductory article, in the initial issue of a journal called Policy Sciences,'
which I think is stimulating as far as his thinking in this direction goes.
The leading article in that first issue was written by Harold
Lasswell.4 He says there are five areas for emphasis: goal clarification,
which I suppose is this objective identification or setting business, the
trend, the trend historic, trend projective, and future oriented trends.
He thinks there is a substantial scientific area to be concerned about the sense of science and technology - in the sense of science as a disciplining agent; and then he finally emphasizes invention, evaluation,
and selection of alternative objectives and strategies.
So we are back to what Lou Mayo was talking about last night, the
imperative to be concerned with alternatives. Well, as an example of
how this imperative works, I would refer to this morning when we
were talking about the need to inject the transfused systems analysis
into our school curriculum. It would be most unfortunate if we oversold to law students the concept of systems analysis, as it has been
oversold to so many other audiences, and then leave them disappointed
that this is not a panacea. I think the concept of systems analysis and
systems approach can only be offered. As an evolving tool, it has an
awfully long way to go. Hopefully, it would be a challenge to people
in the law schools to participate in this evolutionary process. But I
would pray that they do not buy the same bill of goods that was picked
up by various governmental agencies, mostly to be used by some of
the defense firms in recent years, and end up having only disillusionment, and, in some places, more confusion than when they started.
One tentative probe into this sort of approach to policy analysis
is a project I have with the title, "Public Policy Intervention in InterIndustries Flows of Goods and Services to Reduce Pollution." What
we are doing is taking the petroleum refining industry in this country
as a prototype, proceeding to identify the flow of petroleum refinery
products through the economy, from extraction to manufacturing, to
use, to disposal. We are doing this based on the Department of Commerce's input-output tables, which, of course, just express value flows.
We have fairly well completed translating these into flows of physical
quantities. Our chemical engineering people are then working from
this statement of flows to identify the pollution potential, or the pollution problems that are inherent in this flow, including the processing
and use of these petroleum refinery products. And they are also contributing by looking at less polluting substitute processes, to be intro3 Quade,

Why Policy Science?, 1 POLICY SCIENCE 1 (1969).

4 Lasswell, The Emerging Conception of the Policy Science, 1

POLICY SCIENCE 3 (1969).
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duced and interchanged for high polluting processes, both for the
process of the material and also for its use.
Our colleagues in the law school are inventorying the public policy
responses to these technological threats and opportunities, which are
presently in the stock of regulatory mechanisms. We are also seeking,
by analogy, by synthesis, by whatever process we can come up with,
to build on this stock of alternative means of public policy intervention
to do something about the pollution problems, which we are identifying
through this flow of material across the economy. Well, this is pretty
much of our data base, and this is the part, of course, that is fairly easy
to speak of precisely. I can take two approaches to our next phase after
we generate this data base, this model of petroleum products.
I am optimistic as I talk about what would be the creative things
of the project, but that really means I do not get into quite what we are
going to do. But that is where the payoff is, because what we have to
develop is a somewhat disciplined means of comparing alternative
public policy, means of intervention to see how pollution can be reduced
by modifying some of the decisions that are made, both public and
private, about the use of petroleum refinery products.
Now we have got to do more than just array all these alternative
modes of public policy intervention, we have got to compare them. We
have got to go beyond the traditional cost benefit, or cost effectiveness
comparison, because cost pretty much just relates to the economics.
We have also got to deal with the social disruption that may result from
new applications of public policy. We have got to deal with the political
obstacles to the new modes, or different applications of modes of public
policy intervention. So, I think, instead of working with something
which is cost science benefit, we are working with something that is
burden science benefit, because we have got to be working not only with
the economic burden, but also with the social and political burdens
that will result from changes in the rules of the game by public policy
intervention. Well, after we go through that creative process, we have
to test this methodology not only against our model, but against the
real world critics.
One further data base that we are now generating that I think is
a very important part, which I do not think I mentioned, is data on who
is the audience for this sort of research. In some detail, we think this
is at least as crucial a piece of the data base as the actual flow of the
petroleum refinery product, and this is detailed down to the point of
what man on the Fortune magazine staff should we create a relationship with, both as an informed person in this field, as well as a potential
recipient of our information - also who at McGraw-Hill, who on the
Senate Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee or the Senate Public
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Works Committee? This is a very important part of the data base research policy analysis that we are undertaking.
After we test our methodology with this petroleum industry prototype against people in the industry, against people in government,
presumably people out there in the real world, we hope we do not stray
too far from their thinking. We then have to present this in understandable form to people who are in the policy business. Probably, in
some form that tends more toward scenarios as examples, and away
from "academic obscurafication," of which social scientists, and I am
one I guess, are so often guilty.
Another forum of presentation for our output is through communication with our students. And I think this may end up being an
argument, for the location of this sort of activity in a university, since
we have a platform which our college of engineering bravely offers me,
to give me a captive audience of some of their graduate students. Our
law school, of course, is involved with faculty and the students who
have a good deal of interest, and we occasionally warrant a few social
science graduate students, although not as many as I will admit I
expected to see. So, those who are the policy makers and the people
who are hopefully recipients of education are the audience we have
to keep in mind.
Well, how to do this sort of thing, what sort of background, what
sort of millieu is going to get us the best odds of getting a good job
from our people, what sort of resources do we need, what sort of working environment do we need? And this gets down to the gut question
of the law school: Is it a good place, can we furnish this kind of
working environment?
At this point, I thought it would be good to list comprehensibly
all the environmental resource characteristics that would be desirable.
Well, this list is not the least comprehensive, so I assume that some of
you, in reaction and commentary, can come up with others that would
be obviously more crucial than these half dozen that I have. However,
I think that an environmental characteristic that you have got to have in
the setting for useful policy analysis of this sort is an extremely
flexible, organizational structure, because it has to be able to accommodate different problems; and obviously, and even more difficult, it
has to be able to accommodate different types of people.
You have to have something I think I will call an "inducement
system," that will encourage good people to participate in the project.
These probably have to be people both inside and outside. And I do not
know if I am talking about inside and outside the law school, inside and
outside the university or whatever the boundaries of this setting should
be. But in any case, you are going to have to induce good people to want
to work together instead of doing their own thin'g individually, and
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I do not think universities have much of a tradition of working in this
direction. You must decide whether you are going to do this through
reward, whether you are going to do it through authority, those
authoritarian forces that are most implicitly present in a hierarchical
structure. I am not sure about how it can be done, but you have to have
a good inducement system to attract both the insiders and the outsiders.
I have an intuitive feeling that it requires particular emphasis on the
care and feeding of the insiders, because you are pretty sure that if you
bring insiders that you are going to be paying them.
I think another environmental characteristic that you have to have
is proximity among the people from these different organizational entities that are inevitably going to have to participate in almost any sort
of policy analysis; but particularly, policy analysis which concerns scientific and technological problems. How do you get these productive
patterns of colleagueship without overburdening the people who will be
spending a good time together? I guess a corollary of this, it is a truism
of course, is that communication among these people is vital, and it
takes a good deal of time to develop the proximity and acquaintance
that I think are important. But, one particular thing that the interdisciplinary policy analysis group is going to need for a long time is someone to interpret among the different, somewhat distinct, classes of
people who are participating. And, I think, the best place for this somewhat interpreting function to lie is with the person who is also responsible for trying to integrate this work done in these different groups.
Whatever he is considered to be, his main function is integration of
various efforts from among other disciplines, people of different world
views, people who may often be from different inducement systems.
It is quite an undertaking! But, this is the person who is going to be
responsible for delivering good output to the right audience on time.
He will need some entrepreneurial talent along the way too, because
somebody is going to have to raise the money for this stuff. He is a
needed resource in this effort.
There are a couple of less tangible environmental factors that I
think are particularly crucial and much harder to define. I think environment has got to go beyond acceptance of a concept of examining and
comparing alternatives. I think it needs to encourage what is almost
an obsession, an obsession of alternatives, which create almost for their
own sake for quite awhile. The status quo can only be one of those
alternatives, and I think it generally should be a pretty suspect one for
quite awhile. I am not sure what sort of environment creates this, but
without it I do not believe this approach to policy analysis can be very
fruitful.
Related to this, but worth separating, is the fact that you need an
environment which encourages skepticism about the givens. Particular
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attention must be paid to the inclusion of the givens of the establishment and of the sponsor of the work, because, I think, in policy oriented
work, the customer is very rarely right in his perception of what the
problem is, or any of those things that are often given. And you can not
solely limit yourself to the values of the establishment or the sponsor,
because these are what end up being translated into criteria when you
start comparing and considering these alternatives.
Along with the skepticism and the necessary force to be able to
maintain it, there is a considerable degree of independence and of
continuity of independence. Now, I think this fact may be terribly
crucial. Mike Baram was touching on this this morning, I think, when
he quoted Hugh Faulk on the problem of people having to look
forward to going back into the pool, going back into industry, going
back into government, going back into academia. If that is what you
have to look forward to, instead of continuity of independence, I question the quality of the policy analysis that will result.
Well, I did my summary except to say that I think these specifications, that of the nature of the environment that is needed, while not
inclusive, raised some useful questions which any organization, including
the law school, needs to face if it is really going to deal with the law
school as a center for policy analysis. Thank you.

EXTEMPORANEOUS COMMENT
BY MICHEAL BARAM

W

ELL, I think today we have heard two ideas which are intuitive to
the emerging role of the law school. One is Arthur Miller's idea of
creating centers of policy analysis and the other is what several other
speakers have suggested about interdisciplinary and clinical interdisciplinary programs. I would like to speak against the former and for
the latter.
The academic landscape is littered with too many centers of
policy analysis already; science and public policy programs in particular, which have not really served the educational needs of students or
the needs of society and have tended to serve the professional staff or
the interests of the researchers. I condition my remarks by saying that the
policy program activities at George Washington University have been
excellent. And I think that this is partly because of the milieu in which
they arei nvolved, which is Washington; their access to decision makers
makes policy analysis work there, and the program has the excellent
guidance of Dr. Mayo and others, several of whom are here today; make
it a vital process at Washington. I do not think policy programs or
centers can be such a vital process in Boston, or Denver, or anywhere
else where we are all essentially relegated to reading the regulations
and policy statements of others. And policy analysis at these other places
tends to be a very sterile occupation for the researchers, with very little
benefit to the students.
If we are really in the business of education, we cannot sit down
and build centers of policy analysis. We have to establish interdisciplinary or clinical programs, such as Dr. Gilmore has suggested, which
would eventually contain a policy function as a byproduct.

ON THE COMMENTS
By

T

ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER

I.

HE Editors have sent me the commentaries of Professors Bowers,
Gilmore, and Baram on my paper. I wish to respond.* I do not wish
to alter my paper in any way. Nothing said by those gentlemen leads
me to believe that my perception of the nature of the problem confronting man and my proposal for law schools to become centers for
policy analysis are invalid.
In what follows I must again speak in short, declarative sentences
of a dogmatic nature, simply because time and space do not permit me
to do the job I would like. I shall not try to engage in a mutual
exchange of dogma, but will endeavor to point out where the three
commentators are in error. Nor will I engage in the puerile ad hominem
verbalizations of Professor Bowers, for that surely would not advance
the dialogue. However, I will mildly suggest that my paper must have
indeed touched a raw nerve for him to have had such a violent
reaction.
First, Professor Bowers: It will serve no useful purpose to refute
what he says on a point-by-point basis. That can be done quite easily.
Rather, I will content myself with attempting to point out how his
ideas are not in accord with some fairly well-known observers.
(1) The idea that universities must remain centers of objective
analysis runs squarely against the teaching of such people as Bridgman,
Polanyi, and Myrdal, not to mention Fulbright and Ridgeway. It
appears as though Bowers has not taken cognizance, or does not know,
what those writers (among many others) have to say. We must, in
other words, carefully examine just what objectivity means (and where
it is possible). If the commentary of Bowers is an example of scientific
objectivity, I fear that we are indeed in trouble. I happen to believe,
with Myrdal, that an indispensable requisite of all scholarships is to
"face one's valuations"; universities, and individuals within them, have
not done this, but the need grows more obvious as time goes by.
(2) Bowers obviously did not read my paper carefully, for
nowhere in it did I advocate that universities become political arenas
or soapboxes, "where any kind of rhetoric goes." I did suggest the
need for facing valuations (per Myrdal) and also for striving for a
right to a decent environment, which as Little Abner would say, "any
fool can plainly see" is something other than what he attributes to me.
* Professor Miller was unable to attend the conference, and his paper was presented by

Professor Ernest M. Jones of the University of Florida College of Law.
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(3) He manfully confesses ignorance about what I am talking
about, although that is quite apparent from the tenor of his remarks.
But when he questions whether I know what I am talking about, he
is making a statement that is unworthy of a professor at Cornell.
I think that if he would give a little thought to what I said in my paper,
he might then readily perceive that the statement he quotes has been
proffered by so many people that it has become almost commonplace.
(4) If Bowers wishes to disagree with Robert Gomer and John
Platt and Alvin Toffler and Don Price and Ralph Lapp, among many
others, by asserting that, "It isn't true that technology is producing
changes so awesomely rapid," he of course has a full first amendment
right to do so. The first amendment merely protects freedom of
expression; it contains no requirement that the statement be valid.
So if Bowers wants to ally himself against many others, scientists and
otherwise, of course he may. But he should realize also that he is likely
dead wrong.
(5) The same may be said for his notion that "it is not true that
society has never faced problems of that magnitude before." But he
fails, utterly, to give any historical examples. The Industrial Revolution
is merely the beginning of the modern scientific-technological revolution. He should have gone back even further than the nineteenth
century, for our perspective must encompass the entire range of history
(Just how barbed wire is relevant escapes me.).
(6) Whether the problems of poverty, population, and pollution
can be corrected, "given time," as Bowers says, is something we can
all fervently hope for. Surely even a professor of physics can see that
I would not suggest formation of centers for policy analysis if I did
not believe that such problems possibly are correctable. But I would
like to see some hard evidence, particularly on the question of population. His is a touching, even pious, faith; a faith that we can all hope
will come into fruition.
(7) He says that he is impatient to get to the question of moving
universities to deal realistically with social problems. But, if so, why
doesn't he suggest something?
(8) The Morrill Act is not probative evidence to negate the idea
that universities have policies of drift. It is a statute, Professor Bowers,
passed by Congress. What I was talking about (I could mention Lttle
Abner here again) is the internal governance of universities. Black
studies, it is true, were more reactions to perceived crises than just a
matter of drift. But that, unhappily, is what Charles Schultz once
called ad-hocery, certainly not in accordance with a carefully thought
out plan for the mission of the university. Bowers' dogmas are interesting, but he needs to furnish a few bits of hard evidence.
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(9) If there is no reason why universities cannot be modified,
then why doesn't Bowers suggest ways such modifications can be
effected, as well as their details? Strange.
(10) His opposition to my views on tenure are so delphic that
I cannot respond. What are those "profound" reasons that make
tenure so important? To say that industry and government also have
"time-servers" is not relevant to the issue. The essential question is
whether the university is doing its job adequately (whatever its mission
may be, and on that score surely there must be much hard thought),
and whether the tenure system is helping further the proper mission
of the university. What I call for is reexamination of that system under
due process safeguards. As the situation is now, it is more difficult to
get rid of an inadequate professor than it is to impeach a federal judge.
Just what values are served by protecting the lazy and the incompetent ?
In such a reexamination, there must of course be a delineation of
the mission of the university. In this country we have moved into a
situation of mass higher education; one in which a college degree is
necessary but is becoming meaningless. When everyone has one, it
loses its value. I do not advocate returning to the 19th-century concept
of the university for the aristocracy alone. But our universities are being
governed under principles and concepts derived from that time, while
presently both society at large and its institutions, including the universities, have changed fundamentally. (The study about to be published
on the role of the university in public affairs, funded by the Carnegie
Corporation for the presidents of the land grant colleges, may help in
setting new priorities.) Although he does not expressly say so, Bowers
apparently feels that "whatever is, is right" in the universities, or, if
not entirely right, is correctable. But how? In what direction? By what
means? Under what criteria? It is mysterious that Bowers does not
enlighten us on that score.
(11) Different perceptions of the order of magnitude of the
present crisis do not make anyone "a fool" who happens to disagree
with Bowers. Quite the contrary. If he thinks the thirties in general,
and Europe in the thirties and forties specifically, presented more
fundamental problems, he of course is at liberty to so believe and to
state his opinion. But it is not worthy of a professor of physics at Cornell
to label one who disagrees "a fool." That is not argument that anyone would use outside the gutter. Bowers does not define the problem
and castigates his friend, John Platt, for using the term "the crisis of
crises." We in the law schools tend by and large to make our dialogue
at least outwardly more courteous. Without being vacillating, we at
least can speak to each other in measured terms. Apparently this is
becoming increasingly difficult for the hard scientists, for as I write
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this the newspapers are carrying accounts of violence and name-calling
at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science - and even, God save the mark! - of the sorry spectacle of one speaker at the AAAS convention bringing bodyguards with
him, apparently to prevent physical attack. (That is physicist Edward
Teller.) Where, pray, is that objectivity that Bowers says universities
display and implies that scientists have? Is there something about
physicists that . . . ?
(12) I find the remainder of his remarks temperate and reasonable, save for one or two instances. The paucity of experience in problem
solving by universities is clearly shown by his remarks. It is thin indeed,
as Bowers admits. He further admits that he does not know how to, or
whether we can, apply the probleim solving techniques in food supply,
such as Cornell does, to other areas "of more pressing social significance." For that matter, he does not even tell us what a problem is, and
that itself is a most difficult question, as I said in my paper. For
example, there is no hard evidence today that the 'green revolution"
in food production will solve the pressing needs of the hundreds of
millions of people in the world who are hungry. In simplest terms,
of course we can solve low-order technological "problems"; but how
do we translate that expertise into dealing with the social cancers of
poverty and peace, of population and pollution? Alvin Weinberg of the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which Bowers mentions, admits that
"technological fixes" will not get the job done alone, although they
can be of great help. Agreed. But please, Professor Bowers, let us have
some suggestions.
(13) In sum then, Professor Bowers appears to be violently opposed to my perception of the nature of the problem but - I hope I am
not misreading him - tends to agree in large part with the need for
the university, if not the law school, to become a center for policy
analysis. On the details of the latter point, there is room for reasonable
argument and compromise. The need is for the establishment of such
centers. I suggested the focus of the law school, not for mere reasons
of parochial guildism, but because at some time, in some way, law
must be used instrumentally as a means of bringing desired changes
into being. Lawyers, inept as they are, still are about the best problem
solvers, in a social sense, that America has. But that, as I say, is arguable, and I quite agree with Bowers that the need is to move the
dialogue along and to get some programs under way.
As for his emotional reaction, principally to my use of Platt and
others, the less said the better. I find it faintly amusing. Not amusing
at all are the tactics of the gutter, in descending to asinine namecalling. But that is his hang-up, not mine.
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Next, Professor Gilmore: Inasmuch as Gilmore says he agrees with
Bowers, what is said above must perforce apply to him. As for the
remainder of his remarks, I am willing to accept his characterization
of it as being "rambling." So it is. But he does raise some interesting
questions; one, that must be analyzed, is about centers for policy analysis.
He gives some basis for further discussion.
One thing is puzzling: He tends to equate policy analysis with
systems analysis. Perhaps this is understandable, for he is an economist
with obvious familiarity with some of the benefits and pitfalls of
systems analysis. Quite obviously, the two terms are not synonymous.
He should know better.
Finally, Professor Baram: His comments are mercifully brief, temperate, and to the point. I think that there is plenty of room for honest
disagreement about such matters as the need for more centers of policy
analysis.
Again, however, I am puzzled by his view that the District of
Columbia provides an excellent milieu for such a center, but that
Boston or Denver do not. Since Baram is closely involved in a multidisciplinary, multiuniversity teaching program in the Boston area - one
that looked in the summer of 1970 to health care for that area - I am
unable to grasp why Boston or Denver or Grand Forks, North Dakota,
or any other place, cannot be such a center, or at least begin to move
in that direction. After all, this is a time when cries for "participatory
democracy" are heard through the land, when there is growing distrust
and even fear of the federal government, and when the inadequacies
of state and local governments are becoming ever more obvious. In
this connction, I see no reason why what Baram calls "interdisciplinary
or clinical programs" cannot be established for teaching purposes.
If they are, then the result, as he says, will be policy analysis.
II.
These comments have been written under pressure of time. I have
not sought to document every statement in detail; nor did I in my
principal paper. There I presented a position, a point of view. Extensive
documentation or footnoting would have been superfluous, even though
they might have lent an aura of "scholarship" (pseudo-scholarship is
a better term) to the paper. If anyone, including Bowers and Gilmore,
thinks that these problems are easy of solution or that there is one
solution, he should read Ernest Nagel's fine book, The Structure of
Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (1961). There
are more ways to truth (however that slippery concept might be
defined) than the scientific method, whatever it is, and it is high time
that the scientists, natural and social and behavioral, awakened to that
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Since writing the foregoing I have come across a statement on the
nature of the situation facing modern America (Davie, Futurology, The
London Observer, Jan. 3, 1971, p. 25):
[M]y next call ... was at the celebrated Stanford Research Institute, where I saw a high-powered electrical engineer named Norman
McEachron (I knew he was high-powered when he told me he had
been to Cambridge, as a Churchill Fellow, and had found the electrical
engineering "about 30 years" behind the times). McEachron, who had
a trim beard and a high quiff of hair, told me he worked partly as an
astrophysicist and partly as a futurist. He was trying, as part of a group,
to think about alternative futures for the U.S. The American government was financing the research.
McEachron explained that his own task was a small part of the
whole project, yet grand in scope, nevertheless. He was trying to answer
the question: what is the social situation in the U.S.? To this end he
had =rawn a number of graphs "measuring" the social scene, and they
were leading him to conclude that the U.S. was in a crisis "in the
medical sense: the patient may collapse."
"Since 1960," he said, "the curves on my graph are exponentially
different. By whichever measure I take, the trend is up: illegitimate
births, production and import of handguns, the rate of inflation, loss
of worktime through strikes, divorce, juvenile drug arrests, adult drug
arrests, assaults on policemen, incidence of adult and juvenile crime all of them." He showed me graphs; the line always rose, and in some
cases shot up alarmingly towards the top right-hand corner of the paper.
"Rates of pollution would probably show the same trend. Then
there's the economy; we're into a crisis that will be very hard to turn
around. No one knows what to do about it. And there's the ecological
crisis."
He expanded his theme of crisis, and then said that its central
fact was a conflict of values. "A society works when there is a correspondence between the values of its citizens, the social structure,
and the environment surrounding the society. But now they don't
correspond."
He talked of the clash of values between the young, the hardhats,
the blacks, and the Middle America whites. "We have a system whose
values developed in response to a given situation. Now we have
a changed situation, and the values are no longer appropriate. We
have to change. Mainstream culture simply doesn't have the answers
to our problems. In fact, the old value system actually increases the
problems- the notion that the pride of families and the power of
nations are to be furthered, as in the past, by population increase; the
notion that any technology that can be applied should be; a system of
economics based on an ever-increasing GNP and expenditure of irreplaceable resources; the belief that experts know best.
"And a shift in the values-system does seem to be emerging.
There's a really strong movement towards religion and drugs, though
the actual word religion is not often used. There is, for instance, a
move towards seeing life more as a Christian vocation than like a job;
that switch is really fundamental, more fundamental for the person
who makes it than getting rid of a wife. People seem to be striving for
a kind of revitalization of themselves and the culture, to try to find a
new basis for progress. One thing I've noted: it's amazing how often
Huey Newton, the Black Panther leader, cites the Constitution; it
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seems to stem from a feeling that the U.S. has betrayed its ideals. The
Declaration of Rights is a more revolutionary document than MARX."
Not all these ideas were new to me, but I had never heard them so
neatly fitted together. Before McEachron appeared, I had picked up
a house magazine advertising a show called "On A Clear Day You Can
See Forever." He seemed to be having a clear day.
"We simply have to change direction, but no one has any idea of
which direction to go in, therefore everyone has to be listened to.
What's most dangerous is the increasing tendency of different groups
not to listen to the others. They can't even agree to disagree. They
regard each other as inhuman. It's like primitive man who, as soon as
he hears a growl outside his cage, says 'Give me my club.' I end up
my work thinking: if we don't listen, we won't make it. The chances
of our survival may have passed: who can ever tell ?"
He showed me a chart his group had drawn up, showing "alternative futures" for the U.S. It was like a tree, with the present as the
roots and the possible futures as the tips of a dozen branches. Each
branch, when it reached the year 2000, had been given a label, ranging
from the desirable goal of "exuberant democracy" to increasingly
gloomy and appalling alternatives, ending up bleakly with "Caesarism"
and "collapse".
"The easiest paths to take," said McEachron, "all head into what
we've called a slough of despond: recession, confusion, apathy. It turns
out that, so far as we can see, it will be very hard to get to the desirable
future, what we've called exuberant democracy, and much easier to get
to an authoritarian form of state concentrating on social control, what
we've called 'Caesarism'."
Driving back down the freeway from Palo Alto to San Francisco,
among the solid shoals of cars and the neon signs; I reflected on the
report that McEachron and his colleagues had sent to Washington,
under contract no. OEC-i-7-7-071013-4274. The report said bluntly
that desirable future histories were scarce and that it was "paramount"
for the developed world to change its values - not that the Washington of Nixon and Agnew was likely to pay any attention.

Nota bene: I emphasize that quoting McEachron does not "prove"

the proposition, but it does indicate that those who toil in Ithaca, New
York, might well be advised to become au courant with what such
people are saying. To ridicule them, to shrug them off, is to emulate the
classic ostrich. Bowers, of course, is free to do so; but does it help?

POLITICAL ADAPTION TO A
TECHNOLOGY SURFEITED
SOCIETY
FRANKLIN

I.

P.

HUDDLE

PROBLEMS CREATED BY TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT

T is unnecessary to provide this audience with a catalog of all the
expressions of outrage at what is happening to our environment: the
wide spread meetings of indignation on Earth Day, the reaction on the
Santa Barbara campus of the University of California to the spreading
oil slick, the anxieties over the SST, and so on.
But not all of the criticism comes from the disaffected. For
example, the National Academy of Sciences is regarded as the intellectual and scientific seat of the establishment. Yet, one recent report
of an Academy panel began with a definite recognition of the responsibility of technology for the present state of the environment:
We are living in social crisis. There have been riots in our cities

and in our universities. An unwanted war defies efforts to end it.
Population expansion threatens to overwhelm our social institutions.
Our advanced technology can destroy natural beauty and pollute the
environment if we do not control its development and thus its effects.

Even while scientific progress in biology and medicine helps to
relieve pain and prolong life, it raises new problems relating to organ
transplants, drugs that alter behavior, and the voluntary control of
genetic inheritance.'

Or take our national strategic posture - our military relationship
vis-a-vis our number one adversary. According to Dr. Herbert York,
who served as the first Director of Defense Research and Engineering
during the latter years of the Eisenhower Presidency:
Ever since the end of World War II, the military power of the
United States has been steadily increasing, while at the same time our
national security has been rapidly and inexorably decreasing. The
2
same thing is happening to the Soviet Union.

According to York, things have now reached such a pass that our
national security depends increasingly on the reliability of Soviet electronics. He asks:
Do they have the necessary level of sophistication to solve the contra-

diction inherent in the need for a "hair trigger" (so that their system
will respond in time) and a "stiff trigger" (so that they will not fire
' BEHAVIORAL

AND SOCIAL

SCIENCES SURVEY COMM.

ON SCIENCE AND

PUBLIC POLICY,

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, AND THE COMM. ON PROBLEMS AND POLICY, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES: OUTLOOK AND

NEEDS 1 (National Academy of Sciences, 1969).
2 York, ABA, MIRV and The Arms Race, SCIENCE, July 17, 1970, at 259.
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accidentally)? How good are their computers at recognizing false
alarms? How good is the command and control system for the
Polaris-type submarine fleet they are now rapidly, if belatedly, build-

ing? Will it be "fail-safe" ?3
Perhaps the most comprehensive denunciation that I encountered
was in the September 26th issue of The New Yorker, in a lengthy
article by Charles A. Reich of Yale Law School. We seem to be living,
he says, in a society that no one created and that no one wants. We are
engulfed in technology. The crisis, he says, is an organic one, arising
out of our basic premises, and therefore beyond reform short of revolution. He tabulates seven related sets of defects:
1. Disorder, corruption, hypocrisy, war;
2. Poverty, distorted priorities, and legislation by power;
3. Uncontrolled technology and the destruction of environment;
4. Decline of democracy and liberty, powerlessness;
5. The artificiality of work and culture;
6. Absence of community; and
7. Loss of self.
Most of these appear to be attributable ultimately to technological
innovations. However, Reich also declares that help is on the way.
It is the revolution of the new generation. Just as industrialism produced a new man, "today's emerging consciousness seeks a new
knowledge of what it means to be human, in order that the machine,
having been built, may now be turned to human ends." 4
To me it is significant that some of the same views, without the
animus, are coming out of the establishment itself. When the Committee on Science and Public Policy of the National Academy of
Sciences took up the study of technology assessment at the request of
the Daddario Subcommittee, it described its task as exploring how
the benefits of technology "might be attained with less injury to human
and environmental values."5 Said the NAS report:
[Tihe problems to which we must address ourselves are these:
How can we in the United States best begin the awesomely difficult
task of altering present evaluative and decision-making processes so
that private and public choices bearing on the ways in which technologies develop and fit into society will reflect a greater sensitivity
to the total systems effects of such choices on the human environment? How can we best increase the likelihood that such decisions
(domestically and, in the end, globally) will be informed by more
complete understanding of their secondary and tertiary consequences,
and will be made on the basis of criteria that take such consequences
into account in a timelier and more systematic way? And how can
3Id.
4Reich, Reflections: The Greening of America, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 26, 1970, at 47.
5 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 91st CONG., 2d SESs., TECHNOLOGY: PROCESSES OF
ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE (House Comm. on Science & Astronautics, Comm. Print 1969).
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we do these things without denying ourselves the benefits that continuing technological progress has to offer, especially to the lessfavored portions of the human population? [In the original, all but
the first line appeared in italics.] 6
Another Committee of the Academy declares:
Decay of the cities, deterioration of the social and physical
environments, racial alienation and conflict, and poverty have led
government departments and agencies on all levels to seek ways of
effectively utilizing the behavioral
and social sciences in coping with
7
complex urban problems.
Some of the older generation are going along with the idea that
technology is inherently bad, and, that by contrast with the present,
the Medieval Age was a golden age indeed. This seems to be the
thrust of Lewis Mumford's current series of articles in The New
Yorker.' Mesthene characterizes a 20th century Luddite view:
[T]echnology is an unmitigated curse. Technology is said to rob people
of their jobs, their privacy, their participation in democratic government, and even, in the end, of their dignity as human beings. It is seen
as autonomous and uncontrollable, as fostering materialistic values
and as destructive of religion, as bringing about a technocratic society
and bureaucratic state in which the individual is increasingly submerged, and as threatening ultimately, to poison nature and blow up
the world.9
Perhaps I should emphasize that this is not Mesthene's view. It is one
of three unhelpful attitudes he has observed. The other two are an
uncritical enthusiasm for all the works of technology and a relaxed
attitude toward the social consequences of technology. Even so, he says,
there is a measure of truth in all three.
Marianne Githins of Goucher College suggested in one of the
papers presented in September before the American Political Science
Association meetings in Los Angeles1 ° that there is a great gap today
between teachers and students of political science. As she puts it:
Protected by their fantasies, their myths- their romantic vision
-political
scientists nonetheless live in a particularly grotesque age
when death and degradation surround us all. Their students see the
threat of mass annihilation, poverty, slums, alienation and powerlessness, inhumanity, racism, greed, corruption, and indignity. . . . Is it
6 Id.
7 COMM.

ON SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL URBAN RESEARCH, DIVISION OF BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO URBAN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE CONSIDERATIONS 1 (National Academy of

8

Sciences, 1969).

Mumford, Pentagon of Power (pts. 1-4),

THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, at 50, Oct. 17, at
48, Oct. 24, at 55, Oct. 31, at 50 (1970).
9Hearings on Technology Assessment Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research, and
Development of the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
363 (1969).

10M. Githens, Political Science: Nineteenth Century Myths and Twentieth Century Technology, September, 1970 (mimeograph).
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any wonder then that they rebel against a discipline rooted in
romanticism? 1

There are indeed defects in our system. It is also evident that an
important source of these defects is related to our technology. But the
point has also been made repeatedly that it is not technology per se
that is causing the mischief but our management of it, our failures to
exploit socially desirable technologies, and our inadequate screening
of defective though commercially profitable technologies that combine
to shape the environment that we are all so outraged about.
Technology is national in scope, national in effect, and national
in its organizational instrumentalities. Yet we have no effective national
mechanism for either exploiting the good or restraining the harmful.
We lack national goals and priorities as standards by which to measure
our innovations. Once we identify and agree upon a national goal,
our progress toward it is irresistible. But so many of our national goals
are in conflict that we stand frustrated and motionless. We demand
an increased amount of electrical energy every year to power our air
conditioners and household appliances; yet we decry the effect on the
environment that results from the new power stations and transmission
lines. We demand the convenience of throw away bottles and plastic
containers; yet we are dismayed by the mountains of waste that we
generate. We demand the efficiency of computerized information
management but we are apprehensive over the invasion of privacy
when personal information about ourselves finds its way into memory
banks. Practically all the population growth of the nation in the past
quarter century has taken place in metropolitan areas. We have formulated no clear-cut national goals for the organization, management,
and design of our cities. We spend vast sums on ridding ourselves of
disease but we have yet to produce a generally acceptable definition
of "health." There are innumerable proposals for ways to deal with
the blight of crime in our society, but we do not know what crime is,
let alone how to deal with it.
It is not that we have invested too heavily in military technology.
As the President has said, an investment of $40 billion in an ABM
system that gave us true security would be no more than prudent.
But, unfortunately, our investments in defense hardware have provided
neither security, nor the motivation toward an international agreement for security. Our investments in the environment have been
similarly lopsided. Last year we invested about $10 million in the
Office of Coal Research and $48 million on false eyelashes. I do not
question the necessity of either outlay. Nor do I suggest that there
should be a fixed correspondence between them. But I do suggest that
investments that benefit all the people are more difficult to make than
11Id. at 16.
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investments that modestly benefit a specific individual customer.
Because throw away bottles are cheaper than returnable bottles, the
cities must buy more land for sanitary landfill. Persuaded by advertisements of the evils of "tattle-tale gray," the housewife accepts the
unseen cost of the putrification of lakes and streams. The difficulty
is compounded when both the costs and the benefits are generalized
as, for example, in an investment to process municipal sewage to reduce
the pollution of a large river by some modest extent.
II.

OUR LEGAL AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Several Presidents, most notably Eisenhower and Nixon, have
attempted to formalize in the Executive Branch the process of goal
setting by convening representative or knowledgeable individuals to
search out and define society's most pressing needs. It has always struck
me that this was the purpose of the Constitutional provision for the
State of the Union messages from the President to the Congress. The
President would say what needed to be done, the Congress would pass
laws to have it done, and the President would then insure that the
laws would be faithfully executed. Unfortunately, neither the Constitutional arrangement nor the supplementary mechanism of a goals
commission has managed to keep up with the times or to deal comprehensively and rigorously with the needs of society.
One of the penalties of a democratic society is that there are
always too many different ideas about what faults should be corrected
first, and which ways to go about correcting them. Because this process
is so slow and partial, and the stresses generated by each corrective
effort are so publicly visible, it is easy to conclude, as some of our
young people seem to have done, that nothing will happen for the
better so let's junk the whole contraption. It has been such a long time
since Hobbes and Machiavelli that the obvious alternatives are perhaps
inadequately perceived. One of the important resources of our environment is the much maligned mechanism of a government that still
affords us the best real hope for working together toward improvement of both the services of government and its efficiency in planning
and achieving them.
The damnation of technology is no modern phenomenon. It runs
throughout history. Jonathan Swift poked fun at the scientists who
were trying to extract sunbeams from cucumbers. The Faust legend
has been repeated in many versions. The theme appears in the Thousand
and One Nights, in the story of the Genie and the Bottle - which the
late President Kennedy used as his analogy to the spread of nuclear
weapons. The Original Sin, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, reflected
man's ill-advised quest for knowledge. The Greek mythology repeats
the theme several times in the story of Pandora's box, the legend of
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Daedalus and Icarus, and most of all in the story of Prometheus.
Apparently, there have always been Luddites, and there have always
been innovators who wanted to learn and outdo their predecessors.
The only thing unique about our present condition is our reach. Our
bombs are bigger, our pesticides more durable and destructive, and
our drugs more insidious. As our skill in exploiting resources enables
us to feed, clothe, and house more people, the population continues to
increase. They, and the processes of civilization, are affecting our somewhat fragile environment in ways that evoke dissatisfactions. We know
we are doing something wrong, but we haven't yet been clever enough
to characterize what it is, nor to determine what to do about it.
What role has the law in all this? To the extent that law is a
stabilizing element in the social structure, it can delimit and moderate
change. To the extent that law is adaptive, it can help in the social
adjustment to change. To the extent that law is creative, it can direct
the course of change.
One of the fundamental criteria in political theory as to the
viability of a governmental system, is its ability to accommodate itself
to change. Change is inherent in all societies. There are two broad
approaches to political theory, one of which recognizes that society
and its environment are in perpetual change, while the other attempts
to postulate a balanced and unchanging society. Plato represents the
second approach, and Aristotle the first. Interestingly enough, the
founders of our own republic sought to reconcile these two opposites.
They borrowed from Montesquieu the idea of a balanced system with
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, toward a
political goal of tranquility in a regime of law. They borrowed from
john Locke the idea of legislative supremacy, with representatives
selected democratically, toward a political goal of personal liberty and
adaptation to dynamic change.
Technology imposes an ever-increasing burden of change on our
society with significantly increasing power, toward both beneficial and
injurious consequences. How can we define the needs of our society
for change? How can we anticipate what technology is capable of
doing? How can we make it work for us and not against us?
To answer these questions, we need to improve our skills in
defining the needs of our society, and in measuring social changes.
We need to establish national goals and argue about them, in order
to reach a consensus on what is best for all of us, in both the immediate
future and for the longer range. And finally, we need to recognize
that too much change, too fast, is a danger to avoid. We can agree, I
think, that we cannot forego change, but we need to distinguish
between change as such and change that is progress. We cannot go
on doubling our population, our electric power consumption, our auto-
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mobiles, and the tons of raw materials each of us uses every generation
in the name of progress. Sooner or later, each of these variables needs
to flatten out. The problem is how to introduce rationality into the
process. Do we want to?
Some changes are more dangerous or harmful than others. We
should beware of irreversible changes that do us injury. Some kinds
of tropical soil, when laid bare to the sun, turn to hard rock. Even
in our own country, we are turning 3,000 acres per day from agricultural land into suburban developments, some of it the most productive
of all our cropland. By carelessness we have set more than a hundred
of our coal mines on fire, to burn and waste, and pollute the air, until
they eventually burn themselves out. Some have been burning since
1900 or before.
Those who think that technology can be reversed should explore
what the implications of such a reversal would be. Take farming, for
instance, the vigorous application of technology to farming enables
a farm population of perhaps 5 percent of our total population to feed
all the rest. Of all the farms managed by that portion of the population,
the top 3 percent outproduces the bottom 78 percent. Only by large
investment in agricultural hardware and chemicals can these large farms
succeed. And only thus can mankind have the leisure to do other things
- like make automobiles, attend college, or design computer software.
In 1800 it took 56 hours to produce an acre of wheat. Today it takes
2 hours. In 1800 it took 344 hours to produce 100 bushels of corn.
Today it takes less than 4 hours.12
It is not my contention that one level of technology is necessarily
better than another. I merely observe that it has been the verdict of
our society to go that route, and, having once chosen it, we cannot
easily reverse the decision. We are not only stuck with the decision,
we are obliged to continue to improve our technology.
Professor Reich takes the corporate society to task for its role in
destroying the essential values of the American society, 13 but I submit
we are all at fault. If our countryside is marred by the litter of signboards, should we blame the 3-M corporation for putting up the signs,
the land owner for accepting rental on his property, the consumer for
responding to the display, or all of them? We complain because the
American automobile is oversized and overpowered. But when Chrysler
tried to give the customer a smaller car, which Chrysler's planners
thought the public ought to want, the result was a near disaster for
the company. Then, when the company deliberately went to the other
extreme with a long and bloated body, the sales results were spectacularly favorable. Similarly, Ford experimented with safety as a sales
12

See e.g., E. HIGBEE, FARMS AND FARMERS IN AN URBAN AGE 8-11 (1963).

13 Reich,

supra note 4.
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gimmick, only to discover that it did not sell cars. Though we kill
55,000 people a year on the highways, injure another two million, and
do 10 or 15 billion dollars worth of damage, we apparently regard
these general costs as reasonable in exchange for the privilege of having
our own private transportation. But we would not (so it is believed
on the basis of the experience of Ford) be willing to pay a few extra
dollars to reduce the danger of accident by some small increment.
One student suggests that a confrontation between technology
and the law is in prospect.14 Traditional law, he says, operated to deny
change, while public law and administrative law served to implement
public policies "spawned by scientific-technological developments.""
Constitutional law concerned the individual, but today, thanks largely
to technology, "the fundamental unit of the political order is now the
social group.""' Furthermore, he says,
Science and technology, by contributing to the growth of large business
units, have helped to establish a system of private centers of political
power-

private governments, in other words. The giant corporation

is a private government because it: (a) makes decisions of national
or social importance; (b) acts in concert with government; (c) acts
as an agency of administration 17
for government; and (d) has a political
order in its internal operations.

In this connection, there is a rumor around Washington that
of the larger aerospace companies offered to contract to manage
administration of the federal government. If true, I am sure it
an unsolicited proposal. This apochryphal episode dramatizes

one
the
was
the

observation that the distinction between private and public has very
nearly disappeared.
The conclusion of the author I am quoting, Arthur Selwyn Miller
of George Washington University, on the confrontation of law and
technology, is that:
Scientists and technologists cannot do the job of engineering proper
social change ....

Heretofore .

.

. the legal profession has gladly-

blindly - helped to make the American commitment to technology
irresistible, irrevocable, and irreversible. [Legal education prides itself
on being non-normative.] The law schools have failed and the lawyers
have failed to meet the8 challenges of social change brought on by
science and technology.'

III. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Considering that the public investment over the past decade in
research and development totalled $170 billion, a reasonable case can
14 Miller,
15

Id.

Science Challenges Law,

at 586.

16 Id.at 587.
17Id. at 588.
18 Id. at 592.

13 AMER. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST (1970).
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be made that the public has an interest in insuring that the results of
this investment are used in the public interest. But how well has this
interest been served? What, for example, have been the contributions
of the academic community to help in the orderly accommodation of
our society to the changes wrought by technology? Back in 1945, the
social scientists told the Congress that "for every important mechanical
invention that physical scientists make there is created a new social
problem on which social scientists should work."' 9 How well have they
worked on these problems? What problems have they identified and
worked on?
Over the past years, there has been considerable interest in something called "technology assessment." Although it had its inception
as a concept in a congressional office, it has been taken up in quite a
few academic centers with enthusiasm. There have been courses, seminars, invited lecturers, and even a few research contracts, dealing with
it. Many views have come forth. For example, Milton Katz calls for
"therapeutic deterrence" by law, to prevent the emergence of harmful
technologies.2 Freeman Quimby finds that the public has difficulty
in responding rationally when the choice is between a position supported by a scare campaign and a position supported by objective
technical information."' John Platt urges that to meet the challenge
of change, all scientists must unite and mount an all-out research study
with the utmost urgency to solve the problems technology has created."
Harold Green proposes reliance on the adversary process, and holds
that mission agencies cannot assess the merits of the technologies that
relate to their own missions.2 3 Gene Lyons suggests the need for a
constituency in support of the assessment function. He would create
this by requiring that an assessment agency issue an annual report of
its findings as a sort of banner to attract all men of good will. Hugh
Folk questions whether any form of political assessment is feasible,
suspects motives of all politicians and scientists, and suggests as an
alternative the mustering of intellectual forces of the academic community for this purpose. 4 Leon Green warns that technology assessment
is likely to turn into technology harassment, but at the same time
points out that the public's willingness to accept a shoddy and second19

H.R. Doc. No. 91-137, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 108-111 (1969).
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rate technology has contributed considerably to the present unsatisfac25
tory state of affairs.
Ed Wenk describes the specifications for an implementing institution of technology assessment in these words:
Who says what is or is not wanted and how? And how do we
provide a focus for expression of a full spectrum of social and
environmental values which need to be taken into consideration? Here,
we immediately recognize the complexities arising from our pluralistic
society, with its rich variety of interests, the need to identify candidate
values and the need to establish priorities. Science and technology,
however, have no built-in moral purpose [or] guidance system. In
my view, machinery in relation to technology assessment is thus
required
to serve as a mirror and lens of social needs and wants,
and an institutional synthesis of science and the humanities by which
policy can be interpreted. Such machinery must be independent of
special private interests, and also of interests of the Federal bureaucracy
and independent of partisan politics. 26
Various proposals have been offered for ways to assess the results
of technology: the establishment of an independent commission, a
board responsible to the Congress, an agency in the Office of Science
and Technology (which is a part of the Executive Office of the President), a division of the National Science Foundation, various assessment units in existing mission-oriented agencies of the government,
and others.
The most elaborate concept was that offered in house bill H.R.
18468, by Representative Daddario. It was revealed after an extensive
program of studies, discussions, and hearings. It proposed a network
of assessment functions and agencies, including a technology assessment to provide early warning of consequential impacts of technology,
the use of the Legislative Reference Service as a research arm, and
the designation of the National Science Foundation as an additional
research service in support of the proposed Office of Technology
Assessment.
Under the Daddario concept, assessments would be initiated by
any chairman of a congressional committee, by the Technology Assessment Board, or by the Director of the Office of Technology Assessment.
A companion bill was introduced in the Senate, S. 4085, on July 15,
by Senator Allott of Colorado, with five co-sponsors.
No action has been taken on the Daddario proposal in either
House of Congress, during the present session. Possibly it is too
advanced to be politically acceptable to our present decisionmaking
organization. It may be that it overstresses the technological aspects
of issues and gives insufficient recognition to the political factors.
Several of the witnesses who testified on the Daddario bill last spring
5

Id.

26 Hearings on H.R. 1704-6 Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Development

of the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1970).
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before the House Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, pointed
out that it was a major political invention and that inventions in the
social sciences take a long time to evolve toward workability. There
was generally a tendency to try partial measures and to refine them,
bit by bit, toward a new conceptual design. This may be what is
happening.

IV.

THE ULTIMATE DECISION LIES IN CONGRESS

It is a truism that few Congressmen are scientists and few scientists become Congressmen. Traditionally, most members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives are generalists - more often than
not, attorneys by training and previous condition of servitude. Yet they
are called on to decide hundreds of questions every year that involve
highly technical issues and information. As generalists, they need technical assistance. How do they get it?
One way is by sheer exposure. By the time a member has earned
the seniority to become chairman of a committee, he has had one or
two decades of exposure to the technical matter of that committee.
This is one main reason why the findings of committees commonly
are accorded the respect and the respectful acquiescence of the congressional membership.
Another way is by the recruitment of an expert staff, both to
the committees and to the individual members. An impressive array
of talents, in terms of advanced academic degrees and professional
experience, has been accumulated in recent years on Capitol Hill. In a
recent report, I described the requirements of the congressional staff
in the following language:
The functions of the congressional staff in the collection of
information bearing on a technical issue clearly imply that the staff
needs to have, collectively, a demanding array of qualifications. It
must be familiar with the political context of the issue, and also with
the technical context. It can advantageously bring a multidisciplinary
outlook into the process. It needs skills of technical analysis, and a
capacity for filtering out nonessentials. A knowledge of the social
organization and hierarchies of relevant technical disciplines is indispensable. Equipped with these resources, the staff is able to perform

the essential functions of insuring completeness of assessment and
resolution of the technical issue, which include the following
elements:

(1) Identification of the essential technical issue involved;
(2) Identification of the subsidiary technical issues;
(3) Establishment of the political importance of resolving the
technical issue;
(4) Preparation of an initial study or staff report containing
appraisal, analysis, and definition of scope of the technical
issue;
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(5) Identification of witnesses best able to contribute information (meeting established criteria) pertinent to the
technical issue;
(6) Recommendation for appropriate modes of information
gathering;
(7) Participation as consultants in the process of information
exchange to insure that all pertinent questions are asked
and that responsive answers are received;
(8) Analysis of information received, to determine its completeness;
(9) Procurement of further required information, outside evaluations, corrected testimony, and supplementary statements;
(10) Analysis of data for interpretation and conclusions;
(11) Report on alternative possible resolutions of the technical
issue, and the comparative cost/effectiveness of the preferred alternative resolution of the issue; and
(12) Securing of external policy review to filter out inadvertent
27
staff bias.
To supplement its own congressional staffs, the Congress has
also provided itself with a continuing organization, the Legislative
Reference Service, in the Library of Congress. Many of the LRS divisions are concerned with scientific and technical matters, but perhaps
the most concentrated attention to this field is in the Science Policy
Research Division, organized in 1965, and in the Environmental Policy
Division, established in 1969. The assistance provided to Congress
from LRS takes many forms: drafts of committee prints and reports,
preparation of analysis memoranda, pro-con assessments of issues,
identification of qualified witnesses, formulation of questions, and
answers to spot questions. In the 1969 hearings before the Daddario
Subcommittee there are ten pages of fine type that list titles of studies
and reports by LRS that might be considered assessments of technology
or policy studies of technological impacts.2 8 The categories of these
reports suggest their range: arms control, chemical and biological warfare, communications technology, computer technology, crime control,
education, energy and power, environmental quality and natural resources development, food and population, health and safety, human
resources development, oceanography, science policy and technology
assessment, space sciences, transportation, and urban and rural development.29
Records of the Science Policy Research Division indicate that in
1969 this staff served 93 Senators, 342 Representatives, and 66 congressional committees or subcommittees. It prepared 15 printed reports
(issued as congressional documents or prints) and made 2,829 separate
27 Supra note 20, at 516-17.
2

Supra note 20, at 32-42.

2 Id.
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responses to congressional requests for assistance. Illustrative of the
questions it dealt with are the following:
(1) Can systems technology be applied to social and community
problems?
(2) Does the United States need a revised and more comprehensive national materials policy?
(3) What has been the involvement of the past Congress with
science and technology in its public policy aspects?
(4) What lessons of administration and procedure are to be
drawn from the technology assessment conducted by a professional
society on the issue of the military use of defoliant chemicals in Vietnam?
(5) What is the status of environmental science centers at institutions of higher education in the United States?
(6) What can be done to lessen the impact of crime on small
business ?
(7) What has been the recent development of the social sciences
to support the making of public policy, to develop social indicators,
to do forecasting, and to pursue research at government direction?
In a recent magazine article, Congressman Daddario called attention to the fact that the congressional function of law making has an
important derivative value.3 0 He wrote: "The discussion and publicizing of issues [in congressional investigation and debate] provides
a means of calling them to the attention of the public and, in the course
of time, motivating the public to arrive at a consensus on what should
be done about them." 3 1 Thus, the congressional hearing, faithfully
reported, is a valuable adjunct of the political process.
I suggest that the substantive nature of the business of the Congress, and the kinds of information it asks for and gets, is a practical
demonstration of genuine congressional concern with the technical
problems that have agitated today's youth. It is also important, I think,
to recognize how complex these problems are.
Last September, in Los Angeles, I gave an invited paper on technology assessment before a panel of the Americal Political Science
Association. My impression was that the audience was more interested
in damning the establishment for its technological goofs, or reveling
in paper utopias, than in sharing the hard problem of what to do about
technology in the real world. Toward the end of the discussion period,
one young man expostulated that all we were doing was talking, while
3ODaddario, Science, Technolog), and the American Congress,
1970, at 253.

3'Id. at 259.
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he could not breathe: "Clean up the air, that's all I ask. It's as simple
as that."
I doubt that Los Angeles will find it that easy. But nationally, in
many very specific ways, our society is moving slowly and ponderously
toward improvement-not perfection, but betterment. Last month,
for example, under the leadership of Representative B. F. Sisk, the
Congress took a major step toward strengthening its own sources of
technical information and policy analysis by passage of an important
new bill, H.R. 17654, "to Improve the Operation of the Legislative
Branch of the Federal Government, and for Other Purposes." In the
report on his bill issued by the House Committee on Rules, it was
explained that Congress needed and would be provided with "massive
aid in policy analysis. ' 32 For this purpose, the report continued, "we
propose that Congress expand the functions and facilities of the Legislative Reference Service in the Library of Congress. 3 3 Then the report
went on:
LRS is renamed the Congressional Research Service to reflect
more accurately the general trend of its duties. Upon request, CRS will
supply committees with experts capable of preparing, or assisting in
preparing, objective, nonpartisan, in-depth analyses and appraisals of
any subject matter. These analyses and appraisals will be directed
toward assisting committees in determining the advisability of enacting
legislative proposals, of estimating the probable results of such proposals and alternatives thereto, and3 of
evaluating alternative methods
4

for accomplishing the results sought.
According to the report the new legislation should be expected to bring
about a tripling of the staff of the Service by 1975. The CRS would
be authorized to ask any agency of the Executive Branch for "books,
records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as the
Service considers necessary." New senior specialists would be added
in military affairs, science, technology, and urban affairs. The new
law requires the Service, at the beginning of each session of Congress,
to prepare for each congressional committee "a list of subjects and
policy areas which the committee might profitably analyze in depth."
In response to committee requests, the Service will perform analysis,
appraisal, and evaluation of legislative proposals, as to the advisability
of passage, estimated results, and consideration of possible alternatives.
In addition to expanding its own staff, the Service is also authorized
to place contracts for the services of individual experts and institutions
to prepare studies or perform research tasks. The Service must also
prepare an annual report of its activities.
32
33
34

H.R. REP. No. 91-1215, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).

d. at 16.
d. at 18.
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CONCLUSION

In summary, we are inundated by an onrushing technology of
great power, offering important opportunities for betterment and evident hazards from its defects. We dare not stop it. We do not know
how to measure its effects on ourselves. We cannot foresee its effects
on our society in advance. We have no standards of social progress
and see no way of developing them.
There is no logical reason why we should not inhibit dangerous
or injurious technologies, but we are still groping for ways to do it.
We have seen that technology has a momentum of its own, and that
society is willing to accept serious faults if the accompanying convenience is great enough.
Mankind has the capability of destroying itself with its technology.
We can only hope that we recognize the brinks of disaster before we
go over them, and learn to cooperate by backing away, when necessary.
The focus of effort is on the Congress. I have shown that the
Congress is taking steps to improve its own resources for decisionmaking in technical issues. In our organization, the Congressional
Research Service, we are already hard at work preparing to meet the
heavy responsibilities that are indicated for us. The question is, can
Congress effectively allocate its already overworked energies? Will it
be able to design motivations to correct faulty technology and to
accelerate adoption of needed innovations? Can it impose regulations
adequately to inhibit further faulty technology? Can it work cooperatively in identifying and meeting national goals and priorities? And
can it do all these things at a rate fast enough to restore national
balance and stability?
The answer lies in the future. But I am sure that the outcome
will better serve our national values of individual freedom and general
welfare, if in our impetuous haste for quick fixes, we do not turn
away from the institutional resources we have been improving for
nearly two centuries.

COMMENT
By JOHN A. WEESE

I

MIGHT start out by saying that, of the papers I have heard, this is
the one with which I find myself in substantial agreement. I heartily
concur that the creation of the CRS is necessary to provide Congress
with the technological help which it so greatly needs.
One of the subjects touched on by Mr. Huddle with which I have
some familiarity is that of the automobile industry. He mentioned,
for example, the study of the Chrysler product that the Chrysler Motor
Car Company went through in 1953 or 1954, in which it was decided
that what the country really wanted was a more sensible car, one that
would get better gas mileage, one that was easy to get into and out of,
one that was comfortable to sit in and so on. This conclusion was
reached after making a survey of homeowners, asking each householder, "What kind of car do you really want?" The answer they got
was that the householder wanted a sensible vehicle.
One of the other automobile manufacturers was conducting a
survey at the same time, and he was going door to door but asking
the question in a different way. Instead of asking the householder,
"What kind of an automobile do you really want," he would ask,
"What kind of an automobile does your neighbor want." The answer,
of course, was that the neighbor wanted lots of power, big chrome,
big fenders, and so forth. Unfortunately, the second automobile manufacturer, when he produced a vehicle with these characteristics, sold
a whale of a lot more cars and made a lot more money.
In all of these talks on technology, there is a danger of crying
wolf when the wolf is really not there. I was pleased to see that Dr.
Huddle points out that the management of technology is the problem
and not technology itself. Of course, we should all have the freedom
to conduct investigations to try to provide the pool of knowledge that
is required. If we are to have technological progress, and to apply
it to our social systems wisely, then it is imperative that we have the
best technological information that can be obtained.
The statistics that arise out of this are rather interesting. Dr.
Huddle points out that in our country we are turning 3,000 acres per
day of agricultural land into suburban developments. I have hurriedly
made some calculations along that line, and if my figures are correct,
it will be about 2,250 years before we reach the stage of total suburbia.
I am aware of course that not all land can be used for agricultural
purposes. I also should point out that the rate of conversion of land
is probably not static; it was probably substantially less than 3,000
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acres per day a decade ago. So the rate of increase is not constant, and
probably my projection of 2,250 years, is indeed long. However, it is
rather interesting to put this phenomenon into perspective.
Other aspects of studies brought out in Dr. Huddle's paper on
pollution of the environment, are also interesting. The issue of
Scientific American which has just arrived this month points out that
sophisticated measurements of the level of oxygen in the atmosphere
do not reveal any difference between the measurements that were
made in the 1900 to 1910 era and those made recently, with very few
exceptions. The apparent effect of man's activities on that particular
element, at least, appears to be somewhat minimal.
I would now like to return, if I may, to Dr. Huddle's discussion
of the automobile industry. Automobile safety, of course, is something
about which people in engineering and technology are very much
concerned. It is certainly a more complex problem than that of simply
producing a safer automobile. There are many other problems that
go along with it. It is interesting to study, for example, the little ad
that appeared in Time magazine on the blood alcohol levels for
drunken driving. This was a real revelation to me. It seems that,
according to that particular article (if you read between the lines),
approximately .15 percent alcohol content is required to make a person
legally intoxicated. In my weight bracket, that meant that one had to
consume nine cocktails in one hour, which struck me as being a rather
phenomenal amount. There are some countries in Europe, and I believe
Norway is one of them, that have very stringent laws regarding
consumption of alcohol and driving. That touches upon one of the
other items you mentioned in your paper, namely, that if you are
going to put very stringent regulations on traffic laws, the responding
cry of the public will be something to behold. I think the American
Association of Tavern Operators or whatever, would be rather bold
in their resistance to legislation of that type.
It is possible, of course, to design automobiles that are considerably safer than the ones that are on the road right now. We can
design collapsible structures for automobiles; we can make it possible
for people to survive crashes that they do not survive at the present
time; but we cannot install seat belts in an automobile and then make
it mandatory that the person wear the seat belt. Personally, I wear the
seat belt every time I get into the car, but I cannot get my wife to
wear hers no matter what I do and I have now given up harping at her.
Joseph Coates has mentioned several times the difference between
the fundamental idea in law, of getting at the nub of the issue, i.e.,
deciding the issue and resolving the problem, and the philosophy used
by engineers or technologists of trying to devise a system within a setup of restraint. In relation to safety requirements, the automobile is
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an interesting example of this point. If you change the price of automobiles slightly, particularly if it is a change relative to the rest of
the market, it puts you at a terrible disadvantage as far as selling is
concerned. The automobile market is highly competitive and if you
are going to make changes providing for safety features, the changes
have to be made in such a way that other manufacturers will be forced
to follow the same criteria, and add a similar expense to their budget.
There are further considerations to be made beyond the influence
of economic factors on the development of technology. I find the
proposal for the network of assessment of functions of agencies,
including technology assessment, to provide early warning of consequential impacts of technology, to be very interesting. The consequences of technology, of course, are not always apparent even to
those of us working in technology. This is often an extremely complicated matter. I am sure that the people who devised DDT, for instance,
certainly did not anticipate that DDT would have the persistent effects
that have resulted from its use. In an editorial in the Nov. 5, 1970,
Denver Post entitled "Science - Our Only Hope," it was pointed out
that the chemists who developed DDT and its related insecticides
won Sweden's Nobel Prize for their achievements in organic chemistry.
Now, because of its long life and totally unexpected side effects, DDT
is banned in Sweden and many other nations. Chemists are now hard
at work developing specific methods for destroying harmful insects
without harming any other forms of life. I think that this is one of the
resources of technology that should be kept in mind as we contemplate
the role technology will play in the future. I share Dr. Bowers' conviction that we will survive the next decade. It has always struck me that
man is a most cunning and able creature when it comes to survival.

I have no doubt that with the proper impetus, mainly our own survival.
we will be able to figure out how to continue the species.
Dr. Huddle also commented on the young man who said, "Clean
up the air, that's all I ask, it's as simple as that." This type of statement
is very common about our country today. We have had similar confrontations on our own campuses. I really wonder if we were to clean
up the air, stop the war in Viet Nam, and release Bobby Seale and
all the other political prisoners, whether all the problems associated
with the unrest of our youth would really disappear. I suspect they
would not.

COMMENT
By

L ET me be brief in

MASON WILLRICH

commenting on Frank Huddle's paper and then
I will discuss some problems of legal education that we should
address. Let me focus first on the problem of the need for national
goals. This is always a great dilemma and I gathered, despite the
President's commission report on the subject, that there is very little
chance of making any progress on national goals. Perhaps the history
of that commission bears out this conclusion. Even if we were to adopt
some goals in an affirmative sense, the greatest risk might not be that
we would attempt to blindly follow the goals that we set out. I question
whether we have the wisdom to arrive at wise goals.
The Ten Commandments are a series of "thou shalt nots" and I
would suggest, in terms of goals, that we should address our attention to
the need for ecological commandments of this negative sort. The real
priority is again one of human values beginning with survival, secondarily human health, and thirdly human welfare. But I would suggest
that we think at the national level, in terms of some very strong "thou
shalt nots."
Since human survival, health, and welfare are goals common to
all nations, it would seem logical to consider the international impact
of our goals, or our "thou shalt not" commandments. Many of the
solutions which we propose will become undone by competition at
the international level because we only represent a piece of the problem. On the other hand, our country, with 6 percent of the world's
population, is consuming 40 percent of the world's resources and
contributing 40 percent of the world's pollution. Any ecological goals
that we set, and attain, are bound to make a big dent in global problems. If we can arrive at some commandments which we apply first
of all to ourselves, we may indeed arrive at a situation where our
pattern may be emulated to some extent on an international level.
In terms of the commandments, we must grapple with the problem
of "scale," which was mentioned yesterday. I think that in the future
we have to scale down everything we do. We must somehow permit
human heroes to emerge again. Perhaps for the benefit of the lawyers
we could draw an analogy. Antitrust laws are designed to preserve a
particular environment, an economic environment where competition
and a certain amount of free enterprise prevail. If we could take an
approach to this problem of scale in technological enterprise that was
administered on a simple size approach, perhaps something would be
achieved at the national level. It would be a matter of saying that is too
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big or there is too much risk involved in the size of that technological
creation. Assuming that the national goals should be "negative," and
basically protective or conservative, I would suggest that the positive
goals be formulated at the local level. Hopefully we will have plenty of
room for pluralism and diversity. And at the local level we need a
reassertion of local government initiative. The power should really flow
out of Washington. We are not going to get anywhere, in a positive
sense, by thinking in broad national categories. We have heard over and
over again that science and technology is a universal problem. Well it
is indeed, but in terms of its application there are impacts on individual
people and on people in very localized situations. Hopefully a social
environment would evolve in which there is real competition among
various localities. Our thinking could be done in manageable political
units, not necessarily pointed at large scale solutions. We could break
the problems down so that they are small enough to gain some success.
I am just suggesting that we think in terms of a rebirth of the city-state
concept within this country.
I am troubled by the degree of rationalization that we have found
necessary in order to condone putting nontechnical professionals into
the area of technological assessment. Any technological assessment is
going to be dominated by uncertainties. I think we could unwisely
spend an inordinate amount of our intellectual effort trying to refine
one small "certain" part of a larger "uncertain" problem. The areas
of uncertainty are just too vast and despite everything we are going
to have to make some choices because the problems are going to
demand decisions, whether wise or not. If we have these negative
commandments as guidelines we can at least take a conservative
approach to these problems.
As to the implications of my preceding remarks for legal education,
I would try to revive again the concept of the lawyer as a social architect,
perhaps more architect than engineer. I would also build in much more
conservatism in the outlook of the law. We must begin to reject what I
view as reckless reliance on past decisions and on our history of successful
discovery of natural resources. History will not repeat itself if there
are no resources to locate. A more realistic view would be to look at
future needs and to plot our technological decisions against the fact
that the "spaceship earth" does indeed have limitations. In developing
rules to operate this "spaceship earth" we must be conservative if we
intend to have the spaceship around much longer.
Finally, I am troubled by the student who says, "[just clean up
the air, it's as simple as that." I think this student has a point that we
try to avoid by saying that the problem is just too complicated for a
simple decision. We follow that up by listening to what we can do
about the problem and then putting forth an enormous effort to invent
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a social technology to make the decision. The social decision is just
as complicated as the hard core technology itself. I have the impression
that the social technology that we are trying to invent is going to
function about as effectively as the hard core technology.
There is an argument to be made on behalf of simplicity. I think
that in terms of education, legal and otherwise, we have to instill or
reinstill the notion of the need for simplicity in terms of how we relate
to people through things. I do not think that the problems we are
grappling with here can be studied in legal education alone. These
problems embrace the whole university. Law schools are a unique
American institution. England, for example, does not have any law
schools and yet they produced some fine legal practicioners and have not
suffered a shortage of lawyers. In Europe there are no law schools and in
Latin America there are no law schools, but we have them here. The
notion that somehow the law schools should become the center of policy
analysis is to me, a little bit overbearing. Consider the possibility of
providing some portion of legal education at the college level. The
young people want to get involved and they want to get out into the
world. We insist that they drag out their adolescence for seven years
before entering a law firm, and in fact, a lot of them wind up behaving
like adolescents for seven years. But it seems to me that we might at
least try turning out some lawyers with 5 years of education after
secondary school.
Furthermore, I am very concerned about the general availability of
legal education to various people. As I mentioned last night, if you make
legal education into a postgraduate 3-year curriculum and insist on fulltime participation, the implications in terms of the kinds of people who
have access to legal education are obvious. We face this problem in
terms of being able to recruit blacks and the people who really want
some law on their side but who presently do not have it. They are not
going to get it in our present educational process. If we put some legal
education into the undergraduate school at least we have broadened
the base of opportunity to go into the study of law.

COMMENT
By

EDWARD SCHWARTZ

TLL, I took the paper to be concerned with controls over tech-

Vnology and really the only point I want to make is that there should

be no resulting inhibition of research. I think this point was already made
when someone suggested that we talk not about the control of science
but the control of the technological product. Various types of controls
have been mentioned such as the example of offering incentives for
users of technological developments to solve some of their problems.
Just a few days ago the Federal Aviation Administration was soliciting
opinions on a plan they have for making incentive payments for
modification of aircraft currently in use that make excessive noise.
This is one type of control. Another type of incentive would be to
require the manufacturer to be liable for more than just the direct or
immediate harms of the product of the technological device. He could
be held liable for more remote harms or for harms to other users. In
other words, make the entire industry pay for the loss or the harms
to the environment. That kind of cost would be passed on to the
consumer, so the consumer would, in the end, be exercising control
over this by deciding whether he wanted to pay an additional cost or
forego using that product. But what I want to emphasize is that
controls such as this would act on the product and not affect the
research. I think we agree with the premise that in no way do we
want to inhibit research and there is no need to go any further.

SAVING Us FROM OURSELVES: THE
INTERACTION OF LAW AND
SCIENCE -TECHNOLOGY*
By JAMES W. CURLIN
INTRODUCTION

M
L

UCH of the furor about technology centers around the morality of
focusing on profit margins and thereby permitting external costs

to be transferred to the society in general, without the informed consent
of those who must finally bear the cost. This internal assessment, even
in this period of manifest social concern, emphasizes the calculus of the
'economic cost-benefit ratio," with little concern for the consequential
damages hidden in the external "social cost-social benefit ratio."' It is
these societal costs which disrupt social order and undermine political
and judicial stability. One of the best (and perhaps most overused)
examples of technology as an agent of social disruption is the automobile. It is blamed for changes in social mores, for occasioning the
death of the downtown core-city, and the rise of the suburb. Most of
the social impacts registered by the automobile were, I am sure, neither
intended by Henry Ford, nor were most of them even foreseeable,
given the state of knowledge that existed in the early 1900s.
Clearly, to fully appreciate the problems posed by the introduction
of technological innovations, such as the automobile into society, one
must look behind the decision theory used to evaluate the suitability
of a product or service for the public market.
I.

LEGAL PROCESS AND SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY

Change brought about by technology must be managed in such a
way as to minimize the adverse effects prospectively, before harm
accrues. 2 Thus, maintenance of social stability against the impact of
*This work supported by the National Science Foundation under NSF Interagency Agreement No. AAA-R-4-79.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960); see also Nutter,
Coase Theorem on Social Cost: A Footnote, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 503 (1968). Economists
call these costs "external diseconomies," which are defined as: a generally nonpurposeful
byproduct of producing one commodity which raises the monetary cost of producing or
consuming another commodity.
2 The process of identifying the second-order effects of technology is called "technology
assessment." The definition seems to have assumed sufficient breadth to include implementation of social control, as well as the scientific and engineering approaches to
identification of second-order effects: "The concept of 'technology assessment' represents
an attempt to understand and appraise the results of technological progress in order to
allow the development of policies for the rational application of technology." Technology
Assessment at v (R. Kasper ed. July 1969, Proceedings of a Seminar Series at George
Washington University).
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science-technology requires that we identify and promote, along with
the primary beneficial consequences, the desirable second-order consequences; and reduce to a practical minimum those second-order
3
consequences that are unintended, unanticipated, and undesirable.
Three social institutions presently serve ad hoc roles in technology
assessment: (1) market; (2) courts; and (3) legislatures.4 Generally,
the market has failed to give any indication of being a viable assessment agency. The public persists in demanding consumer goods with
little concern for inherent dangers or longrange hazards; moreover, the
public seems unwilling to pay higher consumer prices to abate the
hazards. Failure of the market in its assessment role is attributable
partially to the consumer's failure to recognize potential hazards and
secondary consequences, and partially to an unconscious awareness that
the social costs (external diseconomies) fall upon the general public
and therefore do not directly affect the specific group or person who
purchases the fruits of the technology.' A unique exception to this
statement is liability insurance which in some ways tends to soften the
effect of one of the inherent secondary consequences by spreading the
cost of potential risks over a series of periodic payments and limiting
these costs to the specific consumer group. It also serves as market
assessor of technology. Premium rates reflect the insurance companies'
willingness to assume the risks for the activity; therefore, if premiums
are excessive or if the risks are so great that insurance is not available
for the activity, it will operate to encourage an assessment of the factors
causing the high risk.'
Courts have traditionally served as the primary instrumentality for
internalizing the social costs resulting from socially irresponsible acts.
Through the application of common law tort doctrines, the judiciary
redistributes the social cost by placing financial liability upon those
responsible for the injury, thus, it operates directly upon the incidents
of costs. 7 The effectiveness of common law doctrines as instrumentalities of technology assessment has waivered with the laws' reflection
6 (1969).
Technology Assessment and the Law: Introduction and Perspective, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1035-37 (1968).
5 Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); The process of
transferring social costs to the general public is described by Hardin in an analogy to
the use of the Common by herdsmen. By placing one additional animal in the Common,
a herdsman will gain the productivity of one animal, and because the cost for the
production of this additional animal is distributed among all of the herdsmen of the
Common, the socially irresponsible herdsman always gains more than it costs him as an
individual. The tragedy of the Commons occurs, of course, when the herd exceeds the
carrying capacity of the range.
6 James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J.
549 (1948).
7 Katz. The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 587
(1969); Portnoy, The Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment. 55 CORNELL L.
REV. 861 (1969).
3 R. BAUER, SECOND-ORDER CONSEQUENCES

4 Green,
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of societal attitudes toward technology. The strict liability doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher8 gave way to less harsh nuisance doctrines, which
required a showing of negligence, when the economic benefits of a
rapidly expanding laissez-faire industrial society were realized at the
turn of the century. As a result of recent public concern for environmental problems, nuisance doctrines are presently showing a trend back
toward a position closer to strict liability.
A contemporary example of the role of common law as a force
in technology assessment is demonstrated by the dynamic law of products
liability. The grounds upon which manufacturers of automobiles will
be found liable for design defects have been expanded from negligence
to breach of implied warranty, and strict tort liability. There is neither
data available to ascertain the financial impact which design suits have
had on the industry, nor is it possible to evaluate the role of judicial
process as a public mechanism to control automobile design, but greater
public awareness of design litigation heightens the possibility that the
corporate conscience will respond.'
Evolution of common law doctrines is extremely slow by modern
standards, and as we shall see later on, technology has a tendency to
out-pace its assessor. Furthermore, the chronic, insidious damage emanating from modern technology mocks traditional doctrines which
require showing of harm and proximate causation. Finally, standards
established by courts on the basis of cases and conflicts presuppose that
the harm is already done - "Law is the articulation of the answers of
yesteryear.""°
In the legislative arena there evolves a merger of law and politics.
This interaction between demonstrative public concern (politics) and
judicial doctrines results in statutes and achninistrative regulations
predicated upon, at least in theory, the balance of social benefits and
social risks.
Legislative process does not require the presentation of a case or
conflict for statutory enactment, thus it may be applied prospectively
in anticipation of a societal problem. This fact coupled with the fact
that most statutory law is applied by administrative agencies, provides
flexibility and makes legislation seemingly the most effective vehicle
for technology assessment presently available.
Notwithstanding the legislature's unique capability to implement
legal process to protect the health, morals, safety, and general welfare
of the public, it too fails as an assessment institution. In most cases,
legislatures like courts, act after the fact. Seldom does a preliminary
8

L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).

9 Nader & Page, Automobile Design and Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 645 (1967).
10 Miller, Science vs. Law: Some Legal Problems Raised by "Big Science." 17 BUFFALO L.
REV. 591, 593 (1968).
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assessment of technology motivate the legislature to enact legislation;
it is only after an obvious social problem arises and the issue becomes
politicized that legislative action is taken. There is often a lag between
identification of a social problem and its legislative solution in order
for the public to become concerned enough about the problem to generate the political response needed to overcome legislative inertia. More
telling is the fact that legislatures are structured for the mechanics of
making laws of generality with which to deal with broad social problems; they are not equipped to handle the specificity required to
evaluate the second-order effects of science-technology. If the market,
the courts, and the legislatures are unable to adequately fulfill this task
of technology assessment, how can it be done?
II.

THE NEED FOR NEW INSTITUTIONS

The present federal agency structure divides the responsibility for
science-technology assessment among numerous agencies, each limited
by well-defined mission boundaries. No single governmental agency
now possesses the broad authority or resources needed to evaluate the
problems of science-technology in the broad context of its potential
impact on the social and physical environment. A cursory look at some
of the current problems which have been the result of technological
innovation should serve as a substantial impetus in driving lawyers,
scientists, politicians, and educators to press for a new institutional arm.
During the last 20 years computing technology has developed
from highly specialized scientific application to general use. Considering the basic question of admissibility of computer output as evidence,
the fact that records in machine language cannot be read directly by
the court raises a potential problem with the hearsay rule. Courts have
thus far fitted computer printouts into the business records exemptions
of the hearsay rule although such records are intrinsically secondary
evidence." Questions concerning the availability of computer records
have also arisen in application of discovery efforts in rules of procedure. 2 Additionally, computer softare inventions present new and
unique problems of protecting this kind of intellectual and industrial
3
property under the established system of copyright law.'
One can speculate on the far-reaching impacts that mechanical
innovations might have on society, and consequently the potential
a1 Lowman, Evidence: The Admissibility Of Computer Print-Outs In Kansas, 8 WASHBURN
L. J. 332 (1969); see Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W. 20d 871
(1965); cf. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Knox Homes Corp., 343 F.2nd 887 (5th
Cir. 1965).
12 Local 743, IAM v. United Aircraft Corp., 220 F. Supp. 19 (D.C. Conn. 1963), aff'd
337 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965).
3 Koller, Computer Software Protection: Report of an Institute Clinic, 13 IDEA 351
(1969).
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interaction with law as both a remedial tool and regulatory mechanism.
But the more difficult problems will be those created by biological
innovations. Professor Rene Dubos has observed that "the ethical
issues created by modern biology [originate] from the necessitated
course of two complementary aspects of human life: the right of the
individual person, and the needs of the community from which he
derives his physical and mental sustenance."' 4 The balancing of personal freedom against societal interest is not a new challenge to legal
process; but biomedical technology impinges upon sanctum sanctorums
-the body, the mind, and the family. The conflict is with what one
might consider a vested personal right to reap the benefits of biomedical science and the secondary consequences that broad scale application
of such a vested right might have on society.
Consider both the recent application of biomedical innovations in
human tissue transplantations, and the issue of artificial insemination.
There can be no heart transplant until the donor has achieved a total
state of death unless medicine commits murder. This leads directly to
medical and ethical problems concerning: What is death? How is death
defined? What is the difference between legal death and medical
death? Exactly when does death occur so that a donation may be
made?" 5 Correlative legal technicalities associated with tissue transplantation are: Who has the right to determine whose heart will be
used for a transplant? Can a prospective donor determine the use of
his organs before he dies? If so, how long in advance of death need
this decision be made? Can a surviving spouse or heirs of a decedent
make this decision? What happens in the event that the decedent and
his survivors have different ideas about what should be done with his
remains? Who owns the cadaver? A short time ago the term "death"
had a single meaning which was capable of definition. Now, in the
light of current medical reality and the need for prompt removal of
organs for transplantation, the moment of death is less capable of
definition. There is the most extreme state of death: cytological death,
meaning extinction of every living cell. There is physiological death,
meaning cessation of vital functions. There is intellectual death, the
inability to synthesize or assimilate knowledge. And there is also spiritual death, theological death, and social death."
Similarly, the introduction of artificial insemination by donors as
an alternative for marriage partners suffering from male sterility has
had an unsettling effect on some familial relationships. Courts have been
asked to decide on the legitimacy of offspring conceived in such man14Seminar, The New Biology and the Law, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 427, 431 (1969).
15 Wechter

& Aranson, Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Transplantation,

18 DEPAUL L. REV. 488, 489 (1969).
16 Seminar,

supra note 14, at 435.
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ner, whether insemination is tantamount to adultery, and the inheritance
rights of the offspring.1 7
The resolution of these problems must finally evolve from the
collaborative thinking of scientists, physicians, lawyers, theologians, and
philosophers. Biochemical developments on the horizon will raise more
complex questions.
At this point one must distinguish science from technology, for
it is this distinction wherein part of the root of the problem lies.
Technology is applied science. 8 Therefore, the gestation period between
the evolution of scientific discovery and the development into a marketable technology is a potential period of intellectual introspection, during
which research, debate, and speculation about the potential problems
of applying the fruits of the discovery can develop. Time lags between
scientific discovery and technological application continue to get
shorter (Table 1.)."9 Ways are constantly being sought to reduce the

technological lag because of obvious economic implications. 20 This
period of lead time is precious for in-depth assessment, yet it will
continue to be shortened to its minimum practical limit by the
technologists.
TABLE 1.
Time Lag Between Product Discovery and Application
Innovation

Year of
Discovery

Year of
Application

Electric Motor

1821

1886

Vacuum Tube

1882

1915

Radio Broadcasting
X-ray Tubes
Nuclear Reactor
Radar
Atomic Bomb
Transistor
Solar Battery
Stereospecific Rubbers & Plastics

1887
1895
1932
1935
1938
1948
1953
1955

1922
1913
1942
1940
1945
1951
1955
1958

Ad hoc
and private
lag between
trols." The

assessment of technology by the traditional governmental
institutions discussed above involves a significant time
recognition of the problem and implementation of conmomentum of science and technology, coupled with

17 Guttmacher, Artificial Insemination, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 566 (1969).
905 (1969).

18 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

19 Wolfbein, Pace of Technological Change and Factors Affecting It 19 (paper presented
at the North American Regional Conference on Manpower Implications of Automation,
Wash.. D. C., Dec. 1964).
20 PREHODA, DESIGNING THE FUTURE 89 (1967).
Legislative View, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1044,
21 Daddario, Technology Assessment -A
1049-50 (1968).
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potential harm which modern developments can suffer upon society,
mitigates against the ad hoc approach to technology assessment. A
number of alternative institutions have been proposed to serve the
necessary governmental functions.22 There is a diversity of opinion as
to the specific role such an institution should play in regulation of
technology, the mechanics of implementation and to whom it should
answer, but it is generally agreed that the assessment institution must
have a significant research component at its disposal.2 3 To be effective
the assessment institution must be staffed heavily by natural scientists
and engineers, with a significant complement of social scientists to
consider the economic, behavioral and political ramifications. Whatever form the institution takes, it must be innovative in its approach
to assessment. By definition, it must be broadly multidisciplinary and
structured to maximize the interaction among specialists. It will be
unique enough among science-technology institutions in that no exact
24
prototype exists today.

III.

THE LAWYER AND LEGAL PROCESS IN
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

It is implicit from the foregoing that the legal process p!ays an
important role in technology assessment; but just what is that role?
I must disagree with Chief Justice Burger in his view that "[tjhe
law's assignment in society is not one to anticipate needs. The law
responds after a problem arises, and that is as it should be. ' 2 5 I prefer
to adopt the thesis that law, being normative in nature, must also be
expanded to include law that is goal-seeking; in short, it must be
neutral; it must be "result" or "future oriented.'' 26 This implies a
responsive, dynamic law-a law which participates at all stages of
the science-technology assessment process. Given this position on the
scope of the law, exactly what is the lawyer's role, and when does he
enter into the assessment procedure? Although the lawyer is not uniquely
vested with infinite wisdom to formulate the proper question, legal
22NATIONAL

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., TECHNOLOGY: PROCESS OF
AND CHOICE (House Comm. on Science & Astronautics, Comm. Print
1969); COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ENGINEERING POLICY, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, 91st CONG., 2d SESS., A STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (House Comm.

ASSESSMENT

on Science & Astronautics, Comm. Print 1969); Ecological Society of America, National
Institute of Ecology: An Inquiry? (March 25, 1970); ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES BOARD,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCESTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, INSTITUOF THE ENVIRONMENT, pt. 1 (1970).

23 Kiefer, Technology Assessment, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 5, 1970, at 42.
24 AD Hoc NEL CONCEPT COMMITTEE, OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, 91ST CONG.,

2d SESS.,

THE CASE FOR NATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

LABORATORIES

15-16

(Senate

Comm. on Public Works, Comm. Print 1970).
2 Seminar, The New Biology and The Law, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 427, 433 (1969).
26 Miller. Science vs. law: Some Legal Problems Raised by "Big Science," 17 BUFFALO
L. RtEV. 593, 602 (1968).
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training does sensitize one to social problems and humanistic values
which must be considered before the questions are posed. This is
essential since once cannot get correct answers without first posing
the correct questions.2 7 The importance of posing the proper questions
in technology assessment assumes perspective if you consider the
queries: How much noise can a human tolerate, compared to, how
noiseless can the machine reasonably be made? I suggest that you
would arrive at widely divergent answers from assessment of the
same technology merely by approaching the problem from contrasting
positions posed by the two questions.
The lawyer's role is better defined later in the assessment process
when the attributes of the technology are known and appropriate
control is being considered to protect basic individual rights. Implementation of control should remain in the hands of the legislature
to weigh the facts against public policy considerations. How the technical data and alternatives are presented to the legislative body, and
the procedural aspects of the policy formation are both aspects of the
process which will rely heavily on the legal profession.
It has been suggested that the weighing of public risks (costs)
versus public benefits cannot be entrusted to an elite group, a panel
or board acting ex cathedra; but rather the public itself must express
its views through its elected representatives in the democratic process.
How then is the information communicated simultaneously to the
public and the legislature to begin policy formulation? Professor
Harold P. Green suggests that the adversary process offers a potent
vehicle "to compel scientists and technologists to present the issues
to the public in the language of ordinary public discourse rather than
in the esoteric jargon of their disciplines." '
An adversary procedure would give equal time and attention to
the negative factors of technology as well as the positive factors emphasized by the vested interests. This approach is not without its detractors
however. Discussion concerning the application of the adversary process
to information transfer within a technology assessment institution
invariably reveals an aversion among scientists to participate in a
procedure which centers upon advocacy.2 9 Most scientists would apparently opt for an "objective institution" as opposed to an "adversary
institution," thereby failing to recognize that advocacy can also be
objective-like in its final result.
27

28

See Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410

(1943).

"In law also the right

answer usually depends on putting the right question." Id. at 413.
See SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE
AND ASTRONAUTICS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 175 (Comm.

Print No. 13, 1969).
29 Kasper, supra note 2, at 79.
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IV.

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION

The behavioral divergence with regard to advocacy is but one
of the attitudinal impediments which must be overcome between
scientists and lawyers in a multidisciplinary effort such as technology
assessment. Another equally important problem is: How do we
structure an institution capable of handling the complex task of creating
a highly interactive, multidisciplinary organization which I discussed
above? It is implicit that there must be the intellectual capacity to staff
such an institution. Earlier I mentioned the apparent attitudinal differences between scientist-engineers and lawyers; since communication
among the disciplines is the key to an effective assessment institution,
it is beneficial to look at some of the differences between the professions. Scientific method involves the formulation of theories by inductive
logic gained from empirical observations, which are then tested by
experimentation, reformulated, tested again and verified. The output
is reputed to be arrived at scientifically, ergo "dispassionately," "objectively," and "unbiased." The "logico-inductive" process is the backbone
of science; the facts and theories thus derived must survive a period
of critical study and testing by other competent and disinterested
individuals, and must be found so persuasive that they are almost
universally accepted. John Ziman observed in a comparison of science
and nonscience, that:
We all feel that legal thought is quite different from scientific
thought - but what is the basis of this intuition? There are many ways
in which legal argument is very close to Science. . . . To the extent
• . . that the Law is strictly logical, it can be made "scientific" .. . .
But, of course, in Science, when the evidence is conflicting, we withhold our assent or dissent, and do the experiment again. This cannot

be done in legal disputes, which must be terminated yea or nay ...
The Law is thus unscientific because it must decide upon matters which
are not at all amenable to a consensus opinion. 30

A most important philosophical distinction between science and
law is the power to discriminate between what is consensible and public
in a scientific sense, and what is not. The frustrations of a lawyer are
understandable when his scientist-colleague refuses to make categorical
statements concerning factual observations. Science depends heavily
upon statistical inference to create the consensual acceptance of proven
theories. Physics represents, perhaps, the "purest" of science; it is
deterministic and can be reduced to mathematical terms with high
predictability. Statistical probabilities associated with many experiments
in the physical sciences will exceed 99 percent, the difference between
prediction and perfection being due to random experimental error.
Biological and behavioral sciences, on the other hand, have low probabilities associated with their predictability, and must, therefore, depend
30

J. ZIMAN, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 13, 15 (1968).
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heavily on statistical inference. The natural systems with which we
are compelled to work in environmental and sociological studies are
characteristically variable; thus, observations made thereon are less
reliable. Predictions under those circumstances are considered quite
good if they are correct 60 percent of the time. The point being that
science measures the value of a theory by the ability to reproduce
results with sufficient predictability to elicit a consensus of agreement
among professional colleagues. The tendency is to make further observation and experiments to improve the reliability of the prediction so
as to persuade other people to agree to the consensus.
Our first care in Science, is to preserve the consensus from unwitting error; what is certain must be clearly delineated from what is
conjectured; the continuous incorporation of merely probable results
must inevitably lead to a degradation of the credibility of the whole
31

scientific enterprise.
Law deals with normative principles and moral issues which are
quite outside of science. The business of law cannot be consensual in
the same respect as science. "Science cannot tell us what ought to be
32
done; it can only chart the consequences of what might be done.
Recognition of these distinctive and complementary roles of law and
science reinforces the argument for developing a close alliance between
the disciplines.
Certainly the Gestalt of law tends to conflict philosophically with
the rigid "logico-inductive" processes of science, thus resulting in
barriers to effective communications between the practitioners. To keep
this communication problem in perspective, however, it is well to note
that similar information impedances exist within the natural sciences.
Common use of the scientific method has failed to bridge the communication barrier among scientific disciplines. It would seem that
disparate logic is not the cause of breakdowns in communicationthe cause is segregation of the disciplines. Institutions are traditionally
organized on a disciplinary basis; physicists are housed in a department
of physics; biologists are sequestered in a department of biology;
lawyers are in a legal department. Each becomes highly proficient in
intradepartmental communication; specialized languages develop, disciplinary logic becomes standardized, and a semifraternal atmosphere
may persist. There may even be institutional policies which encourage
the interaction among departments, but generally these efforts fail to
result in meaningful cooperation because of insistence that disciplinary
bonds be maintained. Occasionally individuals will overcome the
inertia of the discipline-oriented system and develop professional relationships with colleagues from other departments. When spatial
3

1Id. at 44.
Id.at 15.

32
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problems are overcome and the disciplines are brought to focus on a
common problem, there is an interim period required for the group
to adjust to jargon and philosophies. Only after the semantics are in
order can truly effective communications result among the disciplines.
There has been little notable interaction between lawyers and
scientists, or between natural scientists and behavioral scientists. Part
of the problem has been the failure of scientists to recognize the
relevance of law or sociology to what they consider to be scientific
matters. 3 In most organizations the legal department's function is
primarily administrative; it handles the commercial aspects of doing
science-technology business, e.g., contracting, patent work, and
employee relations. It is not staffed for intellectual or academic pursuits.
Most scientists never come in contact with lawyers in their normal
course of business, and those that do often consider lawyers as technicians concerned with picayunish, esoteric details. We are dealing
here with disciplines quite unaccustomed to talking with each other.
Given the basic differences in logic and methodology between
law and science-technology, how can the universities better prepare
scientists and lawyers to cope with problems of interdisciplinary communication? Formal education has a pervasive influence on the attitudes
and philosophies one brings into his profession. In the past, universities
have imbued students with acceptance of the separatist, disciplinary
approach to problem solution. Recent trends in higher education indicate a recognition of the viability of the interdisciplinary approach
leading to the establishment of interdisciplinary curricula. Today's
students seem to realize that satisfactory solutions of the most important
problems facing society can come only from the coordinated efforts
of natural science, behavioral science, and law. The activism which
permeates the campus has resulted in extracurricular student organizations being formed to attack social problems such as environmental
pollution, racial discrimination, and consumer exploitation. These
external activities fill a void which exists in the traditional educational
structure. In some respects they are a monument to the failure of higher
education to provide the "relevance" being sought by today's youth.
An interesting feature of these extracurricular activities is that they
achieve the necessary interdisciplinary approach to the social problem
because they are unstructured to the extent that the resources are
matched to the needs of the problem rather than the problem being
narrowed in definition to fit the resources of a discipline. In other
words, if the problem identified for attack is one involving, say, the
pollution of an estuary, the unstructured student organization is free
to seek voluntary contributions of knowledge from any willing disciplinary source available, be they in engineering, ecology, sociology, or
33Miler, supra note 26, at 597.
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law. It is unlikely that the student group would ever consider restricting
the definition of the problem to conform to the capabilities and
resources of a single discipline. I cite these external student activities
only as evidence that the new generation of science and law students
recognizes the need for dialogue among the disciplines, and that
through their extracurricular activities they are developing additional
communication skills which will carry over into their professional
careers. The educational institutions have responded to the student
concern with new innovative cross-disciplinary courses and seminar
series designed to improve communication and understanding. Another
encouraging manifestation of the coming age of interdisciplinary concern is the large number of students crossing disciplines for graduate
training. The results of this phenomenon may produce a "hybrid
vigor," with the emergence of new substantive professional fields yet
undefined.
Thus far I have dealt primarily with institutional deficiencies and
personal rapport which tends to mitigate against effective interdisciplinary team research. The communication gap also extends to the
literature. Science-technology has depended upon the written word to
create the consensus required for acceptance of scientific theory.
Science articles are generally written in the dispassionate, third-person
language of the peer group. This mode of communication is persuasive
and effective for those versed in the subject matter and familiar with
the jargon. Lawyers write in the same manner for consumption by the
bar. This is as it must be. But there is also a responsibility sub silento
to inform those in other disciplines of the trends and concerns in one's
subject area. This task has been largely assumed by journalists, with
the result being that the information is filtered for content by one who
is versed in neither discipline. I suspect that more law is read in
magazines like Time or Newsweek by scientists, and more knowledge
about science is gleaned from the same magazines by lawyers, than
from any other source. To keep abreast of even a single narrow field
of science, a person must seek his material from a score of specialty
journals. In broad fields of interest like environmental affairs, one
must consult an unmanageable number of periodicals from widely
diverse disciplines to remain informed of the important developments.
There are few interdisciplinary periodicals which summarize the
research of a problem area; most are intended for publication of
research resulting from the activities of members of the sponsoring
discipline.
Legal periodicals are equally inaccessible to scientists-technologists.
Law reviews, incidentally, serve an important function in assessment
of science-technology. As the intellectual sounding boards of the legal
profession, law review articles are often the first to identify and
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analyze the legal, moral, and societal dangers associated with a new
technological or scientific development. The usefulness of the law review
for legal analysis of problems associated with science-technology could
be enhanced even more by a conscious effort on the part of the editorial
staffs to identify sensitive areas of developing science so that perceptive,
imaginative analyses of potential legal problems could be made in
advance of the release of technology to the public. The copyright policy
of most law reviews, however, limit their dissemination within the
scientific community, and thus reduce their effectiveness as a feedback
mechanism to the scientist.
Cross-publication by professional counterparts in both legal and
scientific periodicals could improve information exchange by making
the pertinent literature more easily available to the other discipline,
and by compelling the contributor to translate disciplinary information
into an understandable form.
Comprehensive key-word abstracting systems would also facilitate
information exchange across disciplinary boundaries. The inclusion of
scientific and legal titles within the same retrieval system would
enhance the usefulness of the system to both disciplines. The use of
key words, common to both legal and technical material, would insure
retrieval of all pertinent information regardless of disciplinary origin.
Specialized curricula have been developed at many law schools
to meet the need of specific problems confronting the legal process.
These new areas of developing law are fascinating and capture the
imagination of the creative student. But just as legal educators have
come to realize the value of legal clinics in the training of practitioners,
so must they consider the development of clinical programs and
internships for those planning a career in dealing with the legal problems of science-technology. A summer spent in association with scientists and engineers at a large laboratory or within an institute or agency
dealing with science problems could be most beneficial for both law
students and scientists.
Continuing education should also incorporate interdisciplinary
programs of instruction for the bar and scientist-technologist alike.
Joint symposia should be developed to discuss specific mutual problems
among scientists and lawyers. Cross-participation in professional meetings of both disciplines would serve as effective forums for confrontation between the disciplines. Scientists have also come to realize the
importance of legal processes in achieving harmony between sciencetechnology and society. Law will become more attractive for graduate
study to the new generation of socially aware scientists. Educators may
expect to see more students with backgrounds in science-technology
enrolled in law schools in the future.

COMMENT
By ERNEST M. JONES

A LLOW me to preface my remarks with the observation that a com-

mentator invariably singles out for comment those portions of a
paper which are open to question or with which he disagrees. Therefore, if what follows appears to be overly critical, this should not be
construed as a blanket indictment of Dr. Curlin's ideas.
In his introductory remarks, Dr. Curlin refers to three social
institutions which presently serve ad hoc roles in technology assessment,
namely, the market, the courts, and the legislatures. After a brief
discussion of each of these, he concludes that they have failed as sciencetechnology assessors. While Dr. Curlin's observation is merely introductory to the main thrust of his paper, I find it unfortunate that he
would discuss the worth of these institutions as assessment mechanisms
in terms of failure. Admittedly, there are weaknesses in each, but each
also has some very important advantages.
Thus, while I would agree with Dr. Curlin's main point that there
is a need to explore the possibility of devising new assessment mechanisms, I would argue that there is also a need to enhance the effectiveness of institutions already engaged in technology assessment.
Along with his general proposal for new institutions, Dr. Curlin
identifies three characteristics which he believes an effective assessment
mechanism should have. In his opinion, assessment mechanisms must be
broadly multi-disciplinary, structured to maximize the interaction among
specialists and equipped with a significant research component. While I
agree that there is a need for these elements, I would question Dr.
Curlin's recommendation that the research component "be staffed
heavily with natural scientists and engineers, and have a significant compliment of social scientists." I must take issue with his emphasis on the
need for natural scientists and engineers as expressed in the phrase
"heavily staffed." I find myself rather suspicious of technology assessment which is largely performed by natural scientists, or engineers, or
anyone else whose formal professional background is more concerned
with things, than with people, emotions, values, and institutions. In
other words, I would suggest that the research component be "heavily
staffed" with social scientists rather than with natural scientists and
engineers.
Having dealt with the general characteristics of the proposed
institution, Dr. Curlin turns to a discussion of the roles various groups
and processes will or should play in technology assessment. Turning
next to the role of the legal process as an assessment institution, Dr.
664
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Curlin suggests that the lawyer can make an important contribution to
the assessment process by employing the traditional techniques of the
adversary procedure. Clearly, the assessment process would benefit from
a clear explication of the negative, as well as the positive, factors of
technology, but I would submit that it is advocacy, rather than the adversary procedure, that is most apt to produce this result.
Broadly conceived, advocacy is more than the tactics of claimants
and the procedures of formal dispute-settlement; it embraces all valueoriented behavior. Hence, it may refer to a process which is open, not
merely to lawyers, but to anyone engaged in value-oriented behavior. It
follows, therefore, that the role of the lawyer, trained as he is in the
techniques of the adversary procedure, should not be our primary
concern. Rather, our focus should be on the roles of the legal process
in technology assessment, with particular reference to the contributions
of advocacy.
As to the interrelationship of the legal process and scientists, Dr.
Curlin seems to believe that scientists have such an aversion to advocacy
that the successful organization of any new technology assessment institution will be impeded. If scientists do have an aversion to advocacy,
I must say I find it very difficult to understand. I am told that scientists
pay homage to the tenets of the scientific method, and that scientific
colleagues who offend these norms can anticipate that the worst kind
of informal sanctions will be applied to them. If that is the case, the
scientific method turns out to be an informal legal stystem, complete
with norms and sanctions, and invokers and impliers, or, if you would
prefer, prosecutors and judges; and all this activity is heavily infused
with advocacy. Therefore I fail to see why scientists would cringe at
such a notion. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that scientists
have an aversion, not to all forms and styles of advocacy, but only to
some. I also suspect that aversion is predicated on a stereotype of advocacy which is equated with what a lawyer does in trial courts and particularly before juries.
I believe that attitudes toward advocacy can operate as impediments
to effective collaboration in technology assessment between lawyers
and scientists. This is more likely to be true of "lawyer-behavioral scientist" collaboration than of "lawyer-engineer" collaboration. The reason
for this is that both the practicing lawyer and the engineer, as I understand the engineer's training, are trained in applied problem solving
techniques. On the other hand, the training of the behavioral scientists,
like that of the pure physical scientist, is more theoretical, and less
applied. Thus, the behavioral scientist and the lawyer do not have a
common basis around which to build communication and understanding.
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The fact that lawyers and engineers, rather than lawyers and
scientists, share a common basis on which to build successful communications emphasizes the need for an improved flow of communication between those trained in law and those trained in the other relevant
disciplines which may have to be assembled in technology assessment
institutions. Dr. Curlin offers the thesis that effective communication
among disciplines, for collaborating on assessment, is "the key to an
effective assessment institution." I would like to take issue with this
statement. Although I would be willing to say that effective communication is a necessary condition for effective assessment institutions, I
would not say that it is a sufficient condition for effective assessment.
Hence, I do not think I would call it the key. In fact, I do not know
of any variable which might be at work in effective assessment that
can justifiably be called the key. I think effective assessment is something that arises out of the operation of a multitude of variables, and
there may be, not one, but a variety of sufficient conditions.
Finally, I would suggest that we distinguish the general problem
of more effective interdisciplinary collaboration in technology assessment from the role of universities and the role of law schools with
respect to interdisciplinary collaboration. We can make some suggestions for changes, and Dr. Curlin's paper does so with regard to the
pattern of educational practices of the universities as a whole. However,
it is a different problem, it seems, to come up with constructive suggestions for possible changes in educational patterns in law schools with
the objectives of improving collaboration between graduates of law
schools and those of other disciplines. It is this latter problem that
interests me, and, hopefully, it is by addressing and solving this problem that we will be able to overcome many of the impediments to the
creation of an effective multidiscipinary technology assessment institution.

COMMENT
By JOSEPH F. COATES
INCE Professor Jones has sufficiently dealt with the latter portion of
Dr. Curlin's paper, covering the craft aspects of implementing his
various proposals, I will limit the scope of my remarks to the first part
of the paper, which in my estimation contains most of the dubious and
questionable assumptions.
In my opinion, Dr. Curlin's entire argument concerning assessment
and the disruptive role technology plays in social change cannot only be
handled without the intrusion of values, but insofar as this is done, the
result will be a cleaner and more precise analysis. In other words, moral
tone, as a force behind analysis, ought to be diligently and totally expunged. Thus, if one is to perform a professional job of analysis, he
must be, in a very real sense, antiseptic - he must be free of the adversary position.
An example of the disruptive effect of technology vis-a-vis social
change was noted in Curlin's reference to the automobile. The resulting
disruption, he suggests, may be seen in the development of the suburbs
and the corresponding death of the core-city. Indeed, we do have
suburbs, and we have had a decline of downtown areas, but the main
cause has not been technology; instead, it is a rather perverse set of
tax incentives which has caused this phenomena. Thus, the issue is not
primarily technological; rather, it is a traditional issue of manipulating
fiscal agencies by means of public policy. Simply because technology
is one of several components which comprise the system with which
one happens to be distressed, it does not necessarily follow that technology, rather than some traditional component, is the thing to be
manipulated.
Perhaps it is equally fallacious to assume that when our present
institutions, the market, the courts, and the legislatures, engage in
technology assessment, they are ineffective.
I suspect that the common beliefs about these institutions as
effective technology assessors are irrelevant due to the failure to utilize
the institutions for that purpose. Moreover, even where there has been
utilization of the institutions, it has not been accompanied by an
effective evaluation of the derivative benefits. Therefore I would contend that one has to look past the question of whether it is actually
technology which is at fault in order to develop new insights as to
where to probe in the manipulation of public policy. To support this
hypothesis, I will address my comments to two of Curlin's "traditional
actors," the market and the legislature.
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Curlin concludes that the market has failed as a viable assessment
agency; however, the important question is not whether the market has
indeed failed, but has it ever been tried?
I would suggest a two part answer: First, certain aspects of the
market institution have not been tried, and second, the parts that have
been tried have not been properly evaluated. An example of this
improper evaluation, which results in an improper assessment, can be
noted in the area of liability insurance.
Looking at the insurance industry, one can see that it is the leading
advocate of unsafety. The entire operation of the insurance industry
depends on the establishment of an investment pool. That investment
pool, in turn, is extremely elastic due to its dependence upon rates.
The only method by which that pool can be increased is to have people
who need insurance. Clearly, one needs insurance because he has a
real or perceived risk. Therefore, in a simple economic analysis, the
insurance industry is the major public advocate of unsafety. If you
accept this notion, the question is, what are the tools that could be used
to manipulate the insurance industry, and in turn, to manipulate technology. The main sources that should be checked for an answer may
be social institutions, social invention, and social technology, not hard
physical technology alone.
The second of Curlin's "traditional actors" which I wish to comment on is the legislatures. Curlin suggests that due to the adaptability
of the legislative process, the legislatures are the most effective vehicle
of technology assessment presently available. I cannot agree. We live
in a crisis-susceptible society. The crises of the fifties established the
public policies that today are routine. Similarly, the crises of the sixties
are already embedded in our political system. Therefore, I submit that
our legislatures respond to the crisis of the moment. They do not
respond to opportunity, nor do they anticipate crises, except in a rather
narrow way. Thus, it is a serious error to suggest that the legislatures
are effective technology assessors. Even though that may be one of
their legitimate roles, they have not performed that function in the
past.
Having briefly voiced my doubts as to the efficacy of the market
and the legislatures as viable assessment agencies, I would like to turn
now to the more specific issue of the components of an assessment
agency, in whatever form.
While it is generally agreed that an assessment institution must
have a significant research component at its disposal, I must stand with
the minority and question this assumption. I do not think that there
should be a committment to one kind of institution, or one kind of
organization. Rather, since technology assessment can come in so many
forms, during such a long span of time, with variable durations, we
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ought to encourage various types of institutions to field assessments.
I do not mean to imply that one needs a physical facility to do physical
research, in order to conduct technology assessment; rather, I think
that, as a preliminary notion, one ought to look at technology assessment as essentially a paper and pencil enterprise in which the paper and
pencil serve as conduits for the mind's communications concerning the
future. Assessment is primarily analytical - synthetic, not experimental.
Since assessment is essentially an anticipatory activity, we should
always try to keep the beneficiary of the activity in mind; otherwise
the characteristics of the assessment will not be quite right. More
precisely, there may be serious differences between the temper, the
scope, and the intensity of the assessment, depending upon whether
it is directed toward legislative or regulatory action. On one hand,
regulatory action seems to imply a need for a more intense awareness
of the details of technological alternatives and practical consequences.
On the other hand, if one is doing an assessment at the legislative
level, it may require a different kind of assessment, since the objective
may be the formulation, rather than the execution, of a given policy.
I would suggest that we should be concerned with three basic
issues. The first is the influence technology has upon environment and
behavior. The second involves issues focusing upon the prevalence of
people - criminal aspects, privacy issues, and so on. The third, which
follows from the other two, and toward which I think there is strong
avoidance behavior, is the fact that central planning is the order of the
future. Unless the legal system is restructured, and fundamental cognizance is taken of the drive toward central planning, I think that the
legal structure will remain inchoate in its dealings with science and
technology.
My conclusion is that in any social dislocation, insofar as there is
an apparent, highly technological component, one ought to automatically ask the question: Is there a complementary social-technological
component, which either is a main component, or which could be a
main component in the manipulation of the problem? I would argue,
for example, that lawyers ought to be aggressively exploring new
measures of manipulating the insurance industry, which may indirectly
manipulate technology. The point of my emphasis, and the implication
that there is a growing need for a determination of how to explore
for society, is that social technology may be a dominant factor in our
corrective enterprises. The subsidiary implication for law schools is
and proliferate new social technology. Given the fact that there is a
fundamental dislocation between the structure of society and the structure of law, I suggest that the solution may lie in a total transformation
of the law. If we accept the fact that a transformation is needed and
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we do not inform our law schools and student lawyers of this impending
revolution, we will be doing them, and society, a disservice.
Basically then, in regard to technology assessment, I believe Curlin
is wrong. He says that the object of technology assessment is to increase
the desirable second order consequences and reduce to a minimum
those second order consequences which are unintended, unanticipated
and undesirable. I question whether that is really the intention of
technology assessment. It seems to me that it is not. Technology assessment is the instrument by which one explicates alternatives, and the
obstacle that must be overcome is the development of suitable and
incisive methods for bringing about analysis and exploration of alternatives. Assessment is something which has to be carried on continually,
as the unanticipated second and third order consequences of technological exploitation become apparent. As such, technology assessment
is a tool for the policy maker; it is not the policy maker. It should be
viewed by the policy maker as a conceptual enterprise, not a scientific
enterprise, to probe the future.

COMMENT
By

P

PHILIP

L.

BEREANO

REPARATORY to the main comments I wish to make, let me say
that I have a somewhat different definition of technology than Dr.
Curlin. I look at it as encompassing more than just applied science, and
tend to include within it organizational and informational relationships.
Also, running through the discussion of technology, either implicitly,
or sometimes explicitly, is a very strong notion of elitism, to which I
react very negatively. I see elitism entering into decisionmaking in two
contexts. The first is the managerial sense - who decides and how. The
second is the problem of allocation, or in other words, to what problems
do we devote our resources. For example, the majority of people at
this conference have focused on what I would call the problems of elite
groups.
We have been concerned, as Dr. Curlin's paper indicates, with the
problems of heart transplants and definitions of death. I would submit
that these problems are trivial in the present social context. To concentrate our resources on genetic manipulation, rather than on the problem
of infant mortality, or the problem of child malnutrition, seems to me
to be folly, or even criminal. Similarly, to concentrate the resources,
as our private sector largely does, on muscular dystrophy, which affects
far fewer people than sickle cell anemia, seems to me to be inexplicable,
except when one realizes that sickle cell anemia is a disease that is largely
restricted to blacks. Similarly, references to abortion and the liberalization of the abortion statutes should be made with the realization that
the experience in New York State, in the 6 months since the abortion
law was liberalized, shows that the right and the ability to get an
abortion remains essentially a privilege of upper class, white women.
I submit that our society must begin to deal with problems such
as the above and not with the questions of heart transplants or genetic
manipulation - which are intellectually interesting, but which are
usually problems of elite groups. This is essentially why I have a very
negative opinion about much of "futurism." My argument is essentially
that futurists work with the false premise that our social problems
are largely due to surprise, while I believe that they are due to indifference. Therefore, I do not think we should be preoccupied with eventual
dilemmas of the future, when apparently we are unwilling to handle
present, contemporary problems which, in fact, we are capable of
handling.
I would define technology assessment in somewhat broader terms
than Mr. Coates. I perceive it as "technological planning." Planning has
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evolved from an architectually based setting, to questions of economic
development, and then, subsequently, into questions of social programs,
health care, and so on. I would submit that technology offers a suitable,
substantive area to which planning, as a process and as an intellectual
tool, can devote its attention. I believe that technology assessment is
in fact the application to technology of theories that have been developed in the planning process.
One of the strongest theories that has been developed within the
planning literature is the choice theory associated with Paul Davidoff
and Tom Reiner. Very clearly, the whole notion of values, as well as the
whole concept of normative considerations, is central to this theoretical
framework. Briefly, they see the planning process as one in which goals
are selected through a normative process, and means are either ascertained, or better still, created, so that they produce options and
alternatives which involve some normative consideration. Thus, I feel
that the value question is not sterile; in fact, it is fundamental. I consider
technology assessment to be a broad concept in which mixed socialtechnological questions are to be asked.
The fact is that decisions must be made, in spite of the theoretical
difficulties. That is to say, even though we cannot perform analyses
which are clean and neat, politically and socially we are making decisions. If we cannot justify these decisions "rationally," because they
are not clean and analytical, we have to look to other criteria, of which
one of the most important is that these decisions must be accepted by
people as being legitimate, accepted, most importantly, by those people
affected by the decisions. How can decisions be accepted as being or
having a sense of legitimacy? Each of us probably has our own notion,
but I would suggest that the idea of advocacy, as discussed by Professor
Jones, can play a central function in this area.
I see the ideas of advocacy and the adversary process within technology assessment, or within any planning operation, as having merit in
at least two main ways. One is the explicit recognition and acceptance of
the value component. The second is that advocacy increases the possibility of participating in the process of making social decisions, thereby
enhancing the legitimacy of the decisions made. As a result I think that
the criteria we should use for persons who are involved in this advocacy
is not just expertise, but something quite different, and that is wisdom.
This is not an original thought on my part by any means, but I think
that it is an important one.
This participation aspect is, I believe, the major way to counter
the elitism in the processes that we have been discussing. Within a
democracy the facilitation of increased participation is the only way
to allow the posing of the correct question, which I see as a much more
important and a more fundamental step than attempting to find the
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correct answer. If we accept the fact that posing the correct question
must come before ascertaining the correct answer, value considerations
necessarily enter into the assumptions we must make in considering the
various alternatives.
Everyone, it seems to me, gets assistance in deciding upon possible
alternatives except the public. Mr. Huddle told us about the increased
assistance that Congress is going to get. The Executive Branch has
many operations, such as OST and the Science Advisory Committee,
to do this. I would like to see a "P"SAC with the "P" standing for
Public, i.e. the Public Science Advisory Committee. In this regard I see
the activities of people like Margaret Mead and those of the Scientist
Public Information Movement, as being extremely important methods
by which scientists are attempting to bridge the gap from the technical
to the public policy dimension. Unfortunately, for some unknown
reason, such activities are usually played down at conferences such as
this. And yet to my mind, this is one of the few sane developments on
the national scene.
Ralph Nader has remarked, in one context, that the era of intermediaries is over. I think he is right in the sense of intermediaries being
independent entities through which people are expected to channel and
funnel their activities. But I do not think the era of advocates is over
in the sense of the advocate being the agent, and assisting his client,
group, or person, whomever they may be. I feel that the era of advocates
is actually just beginning.

EXTEMPORANEOUS COMMENT
By

I

WILBERT

E.

MOORE

HAVE four or five unrelated joints, all of them brief. I was provoked by Dr. Curlin's paper into thinking once more about the poor
job the social sciences do training people in the techniques of social
invention. Except for law, and perhaps social work, we do not have
technological adjuncts to the social sciences. We trust social invention,
therefore, to legislators and other amateurs. What brought this to mind
was his wish for an organization creature which does not exist. With
regard to the creation of such an organization, I find myself in agreehave to try several. We do not have
ment with Dr. Coates -we
enough theory or experience to permit us to create the ideal assessment
organization.
I agree with Professor Bereano that we have discussed our problems in elitist terms, but I would submit that it is both justifiable and
proper. This is because "elitist problems" are closely related to a middle
class bias. Class has been thought to be one of the more useful concepts
used by sociology. I would say that by most standard measures, or
criteria of class membership, the United States is 85 percent or at least
80 percent middle class. This leads me to the conclusion that there
is no such thing as the culture of poverty. The poor, as Dr. Bereano
noted, share our middle class values and, they develop mechanisms to
help them cope with and endure their poverty while they aspire to
middle class status. Thus, to say we have a middle class bias, seems to
admit that we are talking about the majority of the American population
and, the problem becomes one of getting everybody into the game.
Finally, one other comment that I wanted to make is that we
do have a vehicle of communication between those lawyers and social
scientists who want it, and that is Law and Society Review. I would also
suggest a Law and Technology Review, which would, again, not try to
reach every lawyer or every technologist, but only those who want to
cross the bridge or stand in the middle of it. It seems to me that there
is room for such a journal.

IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENCE -TECHNOLOGY
FOR LEGAL PROCESS

SUMMARY
By ROBERT B. YEGGE

T

WO assumptions have been implicit during this conference: 1) that
there is a need for external monitoring of science and technology
and 2) that the law should play some role in that enterprise.
For a number of reasons, both the judicial and the legislative
branches of the law have failed to provide the necessary surveillance;
and administrative agencies, as they are now structured, have also been
unable to do the job. (Some participants, in any event, expressed
considerable misgivings about overreliance on administrative agencies.)
We agreed that there is now no adequate "early warning system" to
alert us to unanticipated legal consequences of advances in science and
technology.
During these discussions, science has been characterized as a poser
of questions and the law as a source of solutions. Traditionally, it has
been true that scientists and law men do different things and serve
different clients. Today, however, the boundaries are less clearcut.
As the sociologists have told us, all things are interrelated, albeit some
more closely than others. We are in an age of rapid and extensive
change, affecting every level of the community, and it is now incumbent
on all of us, particularly those of us in the law and the social and
physical sciences, to concern ourselves with our future as well as to
contemplate our past.
This conference has focused on law- not on science and technology. The center of our attention has been the role of law and its
administrators in the process of making decisions about our use of the
findings of science and the products of technology. We have been
concerned with the problem of how the law, as a formal institution
of social control, can best serve as an effective vehicle for assessment
and control of developments in science-technology.
Since the specific charge before the conference had to do with
legal education, we posed the question: How can the law school meet
the challenges of training people who will be called on to make legally
based decisions about scientific and technological innovations? A number of interesting general observations were made during these meetings,
but I shall limit this summary to those matters which seem to me to be
related to the specific question.
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When we directed our attention to law schools, several ancillary
questions arose:
(1) What law schools are we talking about?
First of all, is the law school the proper place in which to pursue
techno-legal problems? (Indeed, is any existing academic unit the
proper location for this kind of activity?) If we assume that law
schools do provide an appropriate base, do we then assume that all
of them are equally well equipped to make the effort? Participants
pointed out that there are political and ideological differences, as well
as qualitative differences, among law schools and that such differences
argue against an across-the-board effort on the part of all institutions
of legal education. Programs in science-technology-law, then, at least
initially, should be developed at a limited number of law schools.
(2) What faculty would be involved?
Higher education and professional education today are not overpopulated with multidisciplinarians. Finding the proper mix of interests and skills for the assessment of science and technology, or teaching
in a science-technology-law program is often, if not always, difficult.
The actuarial likelihood of instant access to the necessary interests and
skills within a particular faculty is very low.
As Chairman Young pointed out, the value systems of people in
different disciplines can be a barrier to successful interdisciplinary
programs. In addition, there are serious institutional pressures inherent
in higher education generally, which hinder the development of multidisciplinary teachers - e.g., while senior scholars may be secure enough
to step across disciplinary boundaries, junior faculty members are frequently anxious to make their reputations in their own fields and
reluctant to deviate from what is accepted by their disciplinary peers.
The academic world, unfortunately, seldom offers peer recognition for
extra-disciplinary accomplishments.
(3) What curriculum would be suited to the task?
We examined a number of possible curricular goals. The law
school need not, of course, concern itself with training scientists and
engineers. But legal education should strive, in dealing with the problems of science and technology, to produce lawyers who recognize their
lack of expertise in those areas and who are prepared to work with
experts in the processes of decisionmaking and assessment. Obviously,
a basic understanding of scientific methodology will be of great value
to future lawyers. But it is essential that they also be aware of their
need to consult with scientists and engineers in assessing the consequences of scientific investigation and technological innovations. (One
suggestion made on this point was that a kind of technological sensi-
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tivity training be provided in the legal curriculum, so that the student
would develop an automatic skepticism and a habit of investigation
in making assessments.)
Traditional course offerings of law schools already cover some
of the clearer interrelations of law and science-technology: patent law,
natural resources, and international law. The content of many of
those courses may be viewed with suspicion by the scientist or technologist, but, at least, legal education has recognized that the relationship exists.
Like science, law has many facets- law making, interpretation
of the law, legal reform, and, for the so-called practicing lawyer,
avoidance of the law. The subject matter of these procedures cover
the gamut of human problems. If law schools are to attack the issue
of the implications of science-technology, for legal process, they must
first determine which processes, in what order of priority, will get
systematic attention. So there are choices to be made before the curricular goals of any particular law school can be drawn up.
One caveat was noted: It would be easy for the upcoming generation of law-trained people to overreact and overparticipate in the
management and assessment of technology. The resulting "legal overkill" could have as disastrous an effect as current legal indifference.
(4) What students would be involved in the new programs?
There has been widespread agreement on the fact that today's
law student is substantially different from his predecessors, who are
now in practice. In past years, the Phi Beta Kappas were attracted
to the scientific disciplines and the law schools got the "Gentlemen
C's." But, today we are benefiting from an awakened interest in the
law among the most intelligent of the college generation -young
men and women deeply aware of, and concerned about, democratic
principles.
The new law students recognize the inevitability of change without
a concurrent fear of the unsettling effects change has on old habits
and expectations. They have an explicit awareness of the persistent
ills and imperfections in American society. They are not naively indifferent to the educational enterprise or its relation to the serious goal
of attaining justice.
In view of the recent and projected burgeoning of scientific
inquiry and technological advances, it becomes extremely important
that the scientific ethos is made a part of legal education so that
developments in this area will be seen as challenges rather than as
frightening or inconsequential events.
It was suggested that no matter how we train law students they
will pursue careers randomly, not systematically. But this view over-
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looks the fact that there is specialization in legal practice (despite the
protestations of the American Bar Association) and today's students
are pursuing specialties, sometimes regardless of financial reward.
(5) What legal careers would be involved?
To give any new program a chance of survival, there must be
career objectives that students can perceive. The folk notion that all
law graduates will enter general practice in, say, a two-man firm in
Lamar, Colorado, is patently false. Lawyers do many and diverse
things and there is a serious question whether what we are now teaching
in our law schools is relevant to the things our graduates actually do.
The fact of the matter is that there are career opportunities in government, industry, legal education, and even law firms (yes, even in
Lamar) that require some acquaintance with the implications of
science and technology for legal process.
In a variety of legal roles, lawyers advise the justice-consuming
public on matters concerned with the monitoring and management of
science and technology. Judges are lawyers, and when the courts are
called upon to protect us against technological assault, they have a
specific mediating role in the assessment of technology. The administrative agencies of government are acutely aware of law, either because
the administrators are lawyers or because they constantly consult lawyers. Legislators and their assistants and advisors are predominantly
lawyers and the information they have about science and technology
is critical to legislative action.
I share Professor Jones's concern that the role of the legal process
and concomitantly the role of the law school - in the assessment
of science and technology, was not clarified more systematically at this
conference.
It has been suggested that the traditional approach of legal
education - deductive reasoning, rule orientation, syllogistic thinking
- is not conducive to the development of programs in sciencetec inology-law. Instead, we must find a new approach, and our first
step should be a careful definition of the problems and prospective
problems precipitated by science and technology.
It also seems desirable that law students be taught (and that
legal process recognize) that complex social problems cannot be
solved by any single solution. The differential values of individuals
and groups affected by the wonders of technology must be taken into
account. It is even possible that the law- which is thought to be the
embodiment of prevailing social values- should face the fact that
it is often arational, though not necessarily irrational.
-
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Many of our speakers and discussants have noted that the problem
approach has recently gained favor in some law schools. On one level,
this teaching method is in stark contrast to the Langdellian, appellate
case-analysis method that has been the exclusive tool of legal education
for some time. The problem approach involves a systematic definition
of a problem (from more than the legal perspective), followed by an
exploration and appraisal of alternative solutions and their consequences. Further sophistication in using this teaching method leads to
a clinical experience in assessing a real problem resulting from the
introduction of a new technological advance and seeking remedies for it.
Advocacy is, and will rightfully continue to be, important in the
assessment function of the law. But we need to know more precisely
what the role of advocacy is and how we can most effectively train
future advocates to use it wisely in the process of assessment. Perhaps
this challenge should engage the first efforts of law schools - an
area in which we have some professed, if not real, expertise.
It has been suggested that the products of technology may be
useful in teaching law and legal process, analyzing individual and
societal legal problems, and finding alternative proposals for reform.
However, the use of systems analysis, for example employing elaborate
computer hardware, should not serve as a wholesale replacement of
the case-study method of teaching or we risk repeating the same fallacy
of a monolithic approach to legal education that we have suffered
from in the past.
It was also suggested that law schools should redesign their
curriculums totally -away
from training in the techniques of legal
manipulation and toward training in policy analysis. (This approach
could, it was pointed out, coexist with traditional training.) The
development of policy-analysis centers would necessitate an environment somewhat different from that provided by the current lawschool structure. It would call for a flexibility that allows for relationships among interdisciplinary scholars through special allocation of
time, special inducements, proximity, effective coordination of efforts,
and independence.
Some members of the conference have differentiated between
the policy-analysis approach and the multidisciplinary approach, which
involves teaching, research, and clinical experience centered on a given
problem. I guess that the difference between the two is that the
former is exclusive and the latter would be pursued in conjunction
with the traditional legal curriculum, as is now being done at a few
law schools.
Finally, our discussions touched on that dirty subject, money
as any discussion of establishing new programs in legal education
must. From the point of view of the general university administration,
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law schools are "cheap" education: They require no expensive equipment other than books; they hold large classes run by a single professor;
there is a conspicuous absence of teaching and grading assistants, and
so on. To mount any innovative program and to sustain it requires
funds from outside the parent institution, at least until the law school
can demonstrate that the experiment has been successful and that the
program is basic to legal education.
Yet, unless there is some bold action by some law schools, even
in the face of these difficulties, the current indifference of the law
and its practitioners to the implications of scientific inquiry and
technological innovations will persist and legal curriculums will become
even more "irrelevant," to borrow from today's parlance. Possibly,
institutional timidity is at the root of most of the problems with legal
education today.
A great deal of what has been said at this conference can serve
as an agenda for the development of programs in science, technology,
and the law. Hopefully, this symposium issue of the Denver Law
Journal recounting our discussions will provide an introductory text
for this significant, emerging area of teaching, scholarship, and
community concern.
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